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FOREWARD
This is the third and final report on the Factors Affecting the
Retirement of Commercial Jet Transport Aircraft. It includes the
contents of the first two reports as well as bringing the material
up to date (as of August 1979). During the last 10 years the de-
cisions involving whether or not to retire aircraft have become more
complex as new elements for consideration arose. Management found
it necessary to consider: (1) the effect of aircraft age, (2) the
impact of government noise regulations and legislation, (3) the cost
and availability of fuel, (4) the ability to finance replacement
aircraft, (5) the impact of inflation on the ability of technology
to provide more cost-efficient aircraft, and (6) the impact of de-
regulation.
The first progress report treated aging, the problem of financ-
ing in the 1970-1975 period, the conflict between the government and
the airlines over the desirability of a retroactive application of a
noise limitation rule to the majority of the transport fleet, and de-
regulation (only a proposal at that time).
The second report highlighted industry efforts (ultimately un-
successful) to secure special financing legislation whose effect
would be to accelerate the retirement of a major portion of the jet
4 _	 transport fleet in order to comply with a newly promulgated noise
compliance rule.
As a result of the failure ;,o secure assisting financial leg-
islation, airlines endeavored to secure through legislation a modi-
fication or elimination of the administratively determined compliance
rule. This final report, in addition to chronicling the progress
of this effort up to August 1979, treats the impact of fuel cost
and availability; examines the problem of obtaining cost-effective
technology to induce retirements; and reviews the "new look" in fi-
nancing capability made possible by earnings and restructured bal-
ance sheets from 1976 through 1978.
Evanston, Ill.	 F.A.S.
August 1979
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FACTORS AFFECTING THE RETIREMENT
OF TRANSPORT JET AIRCRAFT
by
Frank A. Spencer
ABSTRACT
In the last ten years the changing social-economic-technolog-
ical picture, as well as a shift in our national priorities, has
introduced new elements complicating the calculus of aircraft re-
tirement decisions. Because of the belief (historically correct)
in a compound growth rate of traffic and economics of size, the
primary attention of aircraft designers has been on developing
large capacity (250-500 passenger) wide-body aircraft, such as the
747, DC-00, and L-1011, which fortunately meet our national objec-
tives of fuel efficiency and lower noise emissions.
More recently, in the smaller 200 passenger category, designers
have met the challenge- though not without great difficulty, of
producing quiet fuel-efficient aircraft (767, 757) to replace the
early 707 and DC-8 series. However, for various reasons, there has
not been comparable progress in developing such a replacement for
the smaller sized 727/737/DC-9 which constitute about 75% of the
airline fleet and which either do not meet, or barely meet, the
earliest noise standards which are themselves being progressively
tightened. Because of the technical difficulties and cost involved
for private industry to develop a fuel-efficient, quiet, replace-
ment for the 2- and 3-engine, 100-160 seat category, it is suggested
that NASA channel additional research toward meeting our energy and
environmental goals for this size aircraft.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Prejet Era The thousands of aircraft built in World War II
and, in particular, their use in carrying passengers and cargo,
focused public attention on air transportation. Large sums of fed-
eral money were fed into the aircraft manufacturing industry thus
providing financial support to develop more efficient technology
for commercial air transport. This development, combined with pent-
up demand, increases in disposable income and leisure time, led to
high growth rates in air travel which quickly absorbed the products
of the new technology. Airlinas were able to dispose of their ex-
isting aircraft as fast as they acquired new larger craft. Such
disposal was above the book value and provided substantial funds
for new equipment.
ix
Jet Era The jet age was born in 1958 with the introduction
of the7u_r ojet Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8. Quickly there followed
a period of high growth rates induced by fares made possible by the
lower operating costs of these new technology aircraft. As a re-
sult, the industry was enveloped with optimism. Accentuating this
optimism was the fact that the new jets soon began to stretch in
size as more powerful engines ware developed. There seemed to be
every reason to expect a repetition of the prejet cycle of retire-
ment and replacement long before useful life expired. On this ba-
sis, a series of wide-bodied airplanes were designed. The first
such craft was the jumbo 747. With a capacity of s r5 to 500 seats,
it represented a quantum jump in seats offered, as compared with
existing jets with normal seating of from 100 to 160. The second
series of wide-bodies, the DC-10 and L-1011, were delivered with
225 to 250 seats in normal configuration. Unanticipated escalation
of all categories of costs, a business recession, and the Arab oil
embargo, contributed to a dramatic decrease in the rate of travel
growth, a swing from profit to loss for many in the airline indus-
try, and the failure of orders of new equipment to materialize.
NEW FACTORS AFFECTING RETIREMENT
In the past the factors affecting the retirement of aircraft
have been very similar to those affecting the relacement of ma-
chines in industry generally. They include: (1^ the need to re-
place because machines are worn out by use or age; (2) the ability
to finance replacement; and (3) the availability of a correctly
sized substitute which has lower operating costs, including the
costs of ownership, than the existing machine. However, in the
current airline equipment retirement situation, four entirely new
factors have emerged which have added further uncertainty for the
decision makers, not only in the airlines but in the airframe and
engine manufacturing companies as well. These factors are:
1 "Deregulation" or "Regulatory Reform"
2^ Aircraft noise regulations and the financing of compliance
^
3 Availability and price of jet fuel
4 Inflation to the degree that costs may offset technological
efficiencies
1. Deregulation as a Retirement Factor: With regard to "de-
regulation" or " regulatory reform t s stu y concluded that com-
plete deregulation was not a real threat. Therefore, the initial
position taken by the industry that "chaos is around the corner"
was not valid. After considerable rhetoric arguing that the U.S.
had the best air transport system so a change in the regulatory
system i s not warranted, industry leaders embraced the concept of
regulatory reform. Since the study began, the Air Line Deregula-
tion Act of 1978 was enacted. Thus far the majority of industry
supports or expresses low key reservations about deregulation.
x
In any event, the uncertainty of whether there would be regulatory
change has vanished.
2. Noise R ulation as a Retirement Factor: The second new
factor is the noise controversy. In 1974 the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA` proposed an amendment to the Federal Air Regu-
lations (FAR) requiring all existin g
 jet aircraft to meet new strict-
er noise emission standards which over 80% of the jet fleets did
not then meet. A segment of the population living near airports
have asserted a loss in property values, a deterioration in the
quality of life, and adverse effects on the education of their
children - all due to jet noise. Buttressed by favorable court
decisions, airport neighbors have pressed for more stringent fed-
eral rules. Late in 1976 the FAA adopted an amendment to the oper-
ating rules (Part 91-136) providing an eight-year period for a
phased-in compliance with a near term ccst estimate of between one
and five billion dollars. Compliance would accelerate the retire
-ment of certain models of jets.
The opponents of the rule aue that installation of retrofit
kits of sound absorbent materialISAM) does not make a perceptible
difference in noise emissions of the current non-FAR 36 planes with
the JT8D engine. They also argue that while application of SAM to
the 707 and DC-8 series with JT3D powerplants would provide signi-
ficant relief on approach, modification is not warranted because:
(a) the greater problem is on takeoff where there is little benefit;
(b) because the planes are not only old and approaching the end of
their design life but are also extremely fuel inefficient. There-
fore, these latter craft are almost, if not already, economically
obsolete. Finally, it is clear that the expenditures of large sums
on retrofit will decrease funds available for purchasing r , -,w air-
craft which themselves will reduce noise to a greater degree, and
will also use less of a scarce resource - petroleum. Prior to No-
vember 18, 1976, the evidence is that the FAA had no intention of
promulgating new noise rules without a legislative plan to assist
in the financing. The November 18th Aviation uncize Abatement Policy
contained no such policy and, therefore, was a change in position.
Just before leat,ing office, President Ford again reversed ad-
ministration policy o vd proposed financirg legislation. In 1977
and 1978 there were a series of bills purportedly aimed at replace-
ment. The emphasis, however, actually vzried between retrofit,
replacing the engines, and replacing the airplane. In December
1977, after considerable political maneuvering, H.R. 8729, a bill
satisfactory to the airlines, was reported favorably by the House
Committee on Public Works and Transportation. This bill provided
substantial financial assistance to airlines for retiring noisy
aircraft in favor of new technology aircraft. In 1978, objections
by the House Ways and Means Committee, concern over precedent such
legislation would establish, rising airline profits, and a rash of
xi
airline aircraft orders, led to failure of Congress to enact financ-
ing legislation by the time of adjournment.
The reasons for the defeat of the financing legislation in 1978
made clear to the ATA the political impossibility of success of a
similar bill in 1 979. To return retirement decisions to the old
basis of economics required removal of the environmental constraints.
Thus the ATA set for its 1979 goal the removal of 2- and 3-engine
transports from the compliance rule and the extension of the time
limits on 4-engined aircraft through some mechanism such as a "new
technology incentive provision." The Senate bill gave lip service
to the possibility of financial assistance under CAB auspices, but
was not taken seriously.
The industry was a little too successful in "gutting" the House
bill with the result that several airlines broke industry ranks and
testified that both the Senate and House bill (1) were so weak that
state and local governments and airport operators would initiate cur-
fews and other constraining rules which would be more expensive in
the long run than compliance, and (2) that the bills discriminated
against those carriers which had at considerable expense programmed
themselves for compliance. As of August 1979 no legislation had
been enacted.
3. Availability and Price of Jet Fuel: The third new i-actor
relating to the replacement of current Jets is availability and
price of jet fuel. Short run availability became an issue at the
•	 time of the oil embargo and present energy forecasts indicate in-
creasing shortages at desired prices for the future. The avail-
abilit y problem diminished but then re-energed in the spring of
,979. Additionally, domestic prices of jet fi^-1 have more than
quadrupled from about 1lc per gallon to over SUr with further es-
calation likely.	 International fuel costs are still higher. The
,^ising fuel prices have done {w ch to render certain aircraft models
economically obsolete. While new or derivative technology aircraft
are significantly more fuel-efficient thar: the narrow-bodies., a
difficulty arises in optimizing fuel costs unless a stable price
is known. NASA. and industry studies indicate that aircraft designs
are different for 1%, 30C and 60C fuel. Uesigners h :JI ve been suc-
cessf 1 ' in reducing specific fuel cut:sur.«tion from early jets by
about one third.
4. inflation as a Factor in Re tirement.: The fourth factor
affecting the re^irc^rent o. aircraft .s 1; . d ^,or^.
	 n the 196'
a stable price level, increasing profitahiIity of new more efficient
aircraft, and cash flow frcxn depreciatior7, enabled carriers to fi-
nance equiV,z1t purchases. Currently lea!-to- year price increases
for-- the same equi^rient are running 8 to g ^. F i nal ly, units of tech-
nological progress are becin^ing so incredsir.,ly expensive that, when
owners,14) costs are in€:luded, the return un inve,Uaaent (RGI) is
Xii
likely to be less than the corporate "hurdle rate."
REVIEW OF CONVENTIONAL RETIREMENT FACTORS
!^ie As a Factor: Age was examined in the context of chrono-
logicai age, age in hours of service, age in cycles (landing or
pressurization) with the conclusion that no ►ie of these are elements
in todays retirement problem.
End of Hook Life: The investigation revealed that there has
been considerable variance in rates of depreciation charges. The
variance is due primarily to "financial management" policies and
hence has no necessary direct relationship to actual retirement
policies on aircraft.
Financial C
-
apabilit,K: The financial capabilities of airlines
in general, an morey  particularly of the airlines who historically
have been leaders in the re-equipment cycle, were, in the 1970-
1975 period, such as to pose extremely serious problems in raising
funds for launching a new technology or derivative airplane. As
a result of high debt/equity ratios and poor earnings records,
long tome,; `loancing by insurance companies had become an unlikely
event. In 1976 sere were a limited number of what may be described
as interim aircr?ft equipment purchases financed by covre rcial barks,
m ufacturers, and other lenders under imaginative contractual ar-
rangements. With new technology or derivative aircraft eNtimated
to cost from $25 to $40 million each in the 200 seat category, and
with the quantities needed for individual airlines, lending insti-
tutions could not justify Financing for some needy airlines.
The year 1977 showed a resurgence of profitability. Balance
sheets evidenced considerable "corrections". At least one carrier,
though net a candidate for launching new large scale equipment pur-
chases, obtained long tern: unsecured financing from insurance com-
panies. It should be noted that a significan t, portion of the earn-
ings and balance sheet correction came from accounting adjustments
whi-.ii could not be counted on to continue.
A still greater Growth in airline profitability occurred in
1978. 3anks were now happy to lend money for aircraft acquisitions.
As the earl jets came closer to econooiic obsoiescence because of
rising fuel costs, and as carr;ers began to fee, that their long
run int,rests were congruent with retiring noisy, iuel-inefficient
aircraft, orders heaan to flow for new technology aircraft. As if
to dk!;or.strate teat the financia' di fficulties of 1974-1976 were
passed, some car-rie'(hs, in announcinu nee, orders , proudly proclaimed
That thL purchases could be financed "internai ly".
X1 ii
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By July 1979, while the economists were agree:ng that the U.S.
was either in or approaching a recession, the downturn had not yet
significantly affected airline earnings. however, despite substan-
tial improvement in balence sheet items, the leverage situation of
a number of carriers made than highly sensitive to adverse econom-
ic conditions. Nevertheless, obtaining financing for replacement
aircraft is not currently a factor in the retirement equation.
Conclusion: Rapid technological progress, much of which was
initiated through federally assisted research in World War II, re-
sulted in quantum jumps in productivity as a result of the ability
of engineers to compound the benefits of speed and size. Because
of the lowered operating costs which were reflected in the rate
structure, the airlines experienced high growth rates and adequate
profits sufficierc to finance aircraft replacements with larger
more efficient aircraft. A recession, inflation, fuel price and
availability, uncertainty over environmental standards and high
reliability of and low maintenance on jets combined to slow the
replacement process.
Because it is much easier to engineer reduced operating costs
into ever larger airplanes and because such engineering in the past
has been congruent with a projection of previous growth trends, in-
sufficient attention has been given to developing a quiet, fuel-
efficient, new technology plane in the capacity range of the 727,
737, DC-9 series. Engineers indicat ,4 that design problems in handling
the center engine preclude the economic re-engining of the current
727 of which over 1500 have been built. Solutions are not readily
apparent for the twin engine 737. The DC-9-80 series is a deriva-
tive and not new technology. With Boeing heavily committed to
launching two new airplanes,wi'h Douglas busy stretching the DC-10
and marketing its DC-9-Super 80, and with Lockheed not having the
resources to gamble on a "clean sheet" aircraft there exists a gap
in the 1U0-160 seat configuration.
Al,nough substantial efforts are being made to reduce the noise
emissions lof the 2- and 3-engined narrow bodies, such efforts, ex-
cept for the re-engined DC-9 Super 80, even if successful, will not
likely be associated with the needed reduction in fuel consumption
so necessary to compete with the economics of the high bypass ratio
aircraft
	
Therefore, given our national priorities, it is appro-
priate to channel additional research to support the development
of a freshly designed "clean sheet" aircraft which would integrate
the latest technology airframe of 727/737/DC-9 replacement size
with a high bypass type powerplant specifically tailored in thrust,
fuel economy and noise emissions for the specific airframe.
Transportation Center
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois 60201
August 1979
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FACTORS AFFECTING THE RETIREMENT
OF TRANSPORT JET AIRCRAFT
A.
INTRODUCTION
A.1 RES AKH TASK
In June, 1975, representatives of airlines, aircraft manu-
facturers, the investment community, the government, and academia
met in Washington under the sponsorship of NASA for an Air Trans-
portatior, Demand and Systems Analysis Workshop. Various parti-
cipants pointed out that because historically there had been a re-
lationship between the demand for air travel and the type of equip-
ment and service offered, there was a need to know more about re-
tirement plans for current aircraft. Both the engine manufacturers
and the aircraft manufacturers suggested an investigation into
what elements went into the retirement decisions of management.
The airline representatives themselves expressed interest in fur-
ther studies of the length of life of existing 'Jets and the possi-
bilities and costs of extending this life. Both the airlines and
D
the manufacturers were concerned about new factors entering the
replacement equation, such as (a) noise regulations, (b) fuel
prices and fuel availability and (c) inflation. Finally, the
lending institutions who had a large stake in financing previous
-2-
airline equipment as well as financing the large aircraft manufac-
turers and their suppliers were interested in what type of commit-
ments would be sought by their customers. At that time, when a
number of major airlines were in serious financial difficulties,
figures in the area, depending on the time span considered, of
from 20 to 60 billion dollars were mentioned as the capital re-
quirements.
As an outgrowth of the concerns and questions raised, the cur-
rent study was sponsored by NASA to investigate the technological
and economic factors affecting the retirement dates of commercial
jet aircraft. As time went. on it became necessary to add to the
area of investigation the effect of legislation and environmental
forces.
A.2 RESEARCH PROCEDURE AND FOCUS
Early research satisfied us that because of varying dynamic
forces a meaningful mechanistic model is not possible. As the
text will reveal, there is no reason to retire current jets in
the next several years because of chronological age, hours of ser-
vice, or the number of landing cycles or pressurization cycles.
Therefore, retirement decisions are economic, or even political
depending upon various perceptions of future demand and costs
flavored by voluntarily= ur involuntarily induced ideas as to
timing of replacements for environmental reasons. These decisions
are the results of interaction between the engineering departments
-3-
of the airlines and manufacturers as well as between fleet planners
and high echelon corporate officials who deal not only with market
factors, airplane economics, and financing but also with regulatory
authorities.
Therefore, the research procedure decided upon required field
trips to the headquarters of the three major aircraft manufacturers,
the two primary engine manufacturers, most of the major trunk air-
lines, the FAA, DOT, ATA, CAB and lending officials of insurance
companies, commercial banks, and investment bankers. Additionally,
investment analysts and members of the staff of the Subcommittees
on Aviation of the House and Senate were consulted.
To provide an underpinning for the stud y
 as well as to devel-
op the broad dimensions of the prcbemt, a Lcnplete inventory of the
free world commercial jet fleet, focused ont various parameters ofS
age, was developed covering 1959 thru 1375. (Appendixes A and B).
This large data base includes categorization by airline, equipment
type, age in years, age in hours, cycler of high time aircraft, as
well as whether the aircraft were purchased new or used.
Generally speaking, the intervitAvs with the aircraft manu-
facturers encompassed several visits of more than one day each.
Interviews with airlines personne l  ranged frcc t several hours to
several nays. A sample list of quf;t ons and issues discussed is
included in Appendix C. A parlt. i a l l isi.' uf the c(Ntipanies and agen-
cies visited and persons consulted is also listed in Appendix D,
-3a-
A.3 REPORT STRUCTURE
The report is structured to present first a brief historical
background of the technology and economics of aircraft replacement
and retirement in the prejet era to determine whether useful in-
sights can be obtained applicable to the jet era. As the text
demonstrates there are very significant differences between the
two periods with several entirely new factors currently present.
These new factors are identified and explored. Secondly, the re-
port proceeds with an investigation of current technological and
operational economic perspectives. Decisions are made by humans
not by computers and hence it is the interpretation of technologi-
cal and economic data against certain past experiences, prejudices
and attitudes that result in ultimate equipment decisions. There-
fore, in the body of the report there is an attempt to flavor the
I	 pure technical and economic factors with the qualifications put
upon them by the corporate decision makers.
The final main section of the report deals with financing.
To be sure;, this is an economic element. However, because of the
adverse financial results for many of the carriers in the early
1970s the financial perspectives emerged as a focal point in our
investigations. Therefore, a separate section is necessary for
its treatment.
-^p^^	
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B.
THE SETTING: THE AIRLINES AND AEROSPACE THEN AND NOW
B.1 THE PREJET ERA, 1934-1958
A brief survey of the prejet era was made seeking clues which
would be helpful as to factors affecting current retirements. In
1934,commission type regulation of the airlines began under the
ICC. Thus, this period is the first in which public records are
available. At that time there were 56 different aircraft models
built by 21 different manufacturers. Dy today's standards, capital
costs wAre a;,,azing!y low- SomiE models cost from $30,000 to $50,000
with the first DC-2 being considered expensive at $73,000. Carriers
depreciated aircraft to zero in one to three years. Some used de-
preciation based upon hours using a life of from 1,500 to 6,000
hours. By 1938, a 5-year depreciation was considered standard for
the DC-3. As time went on, service life on the DC-3 which between
1936 and 1941 sold for from $90,000 to $100,000 was computed for
depreciation purposes at 7 years. - 1' Airlines were indeed an in-
fant industry struggling with subsidies to stay afloat.
The post World War II period of prejet operation from 1946
to 1958 was one of rapid growth. Traffic growth trade larger size
more practical, and the larger size was accompanied by lower oper-
1/ Spencer, F.A. Air Mai l
 Pa Wen t and the Government, Washington,
D.C., 1941, The Brookings InsFi 't:ion. Chapter IX.
I
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ating costs which, in turn, as result of decreased fares, devel-
oped further growth. Among the reasons for this rapid growth were
an increase in the gross national product (GNP), an increase in
disposable income, an increase in leisure time, an increase in the
frequency of airline service and a declining fare level. Not to
be overlooked was the development of the pressurized, 4-engined
long-range faster transport which combined increased comfort with
more efficient use of leisure time.
From 1946 on there were incremental technological advances
involvina, with one or two well known exceptions, superior econom-
ics which served as an incentive for carriers to replace portions
of their fleets. A further contributing factor was the price of
used aircraft during this period. An examination of capital costs
of new aircraft versus used aircraft prices is found in Gellman's
study. 2/ While certain prices did fluctuate widely, in general
it was a period in which significant amounts of capital could be
secured from the sale of used aircraft to help defray the cost of
new. Although there was an escalation of prices for new aircraft,
it was not the dramatic price jump relationship which exists in the
1975-1979 period. Table 1 lists several examples of the cost as
new and the selling price as used aircraft.
The replacement of various commercial piston aircraft with
new (and sometimes the same) types and the reasons therefore
are treated more extensively in Gellman, A.J. Effe ct of Reguu
lat ion on Aircraft Choi ce s Cambridge, mass. 1968, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Ph.D. thesis.
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The economic environment in which the carriers and manufac-
turers find themselves today is quite different from that of the
1946-1958 prejet era. However, Table 1, when integrated with the
history of carrier actions with regard to developing markets under
the regulatory regime of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and its
successor the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, shed^^ some light on
TABLE 1
SOME PREJET NEW AND USED PRICES
Model	 No. Year Pur::hased Price
	 Year of Sale Selling Price
L-049 1946 $	 800,000 1956 $	 900,000
L-749 '1953 800,000
DC-4 400,000 1951 355,000
1952 700,000
1956 700,000
DC-6B 1951 1,000,000 1954 1,400,000
DC-6 1946-53 600,000 1953 1,600,000
800,000
DC-7 1953-55 1,700,000 1957 2,100,000
1962 100,000
DC-76 19" ;5 1,900,000 1962 100,000
DC-7C 1956 2,200,000 1962 350,000
L-1649 1957 2,300,000 1962 150,000
CV-240 1948 225,000 1950 337,000
1 1,52 540,000
CV-440 1956 650,000 1958 650,000
B-377 1949 1,5001000 1960 Scrap
factors affecting the retirement of aircraft. First, the table
indicates that in periods of substantial traffic growth airplanes
with "good economics" not only hold their value bul l, may increase
in value. DC-4's which cost $400,000 were sold several years later
"R
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for $800,000. DC-6's also were successful in the used market. I!n
the chaotic scramble for new airplanes to accommodate traffic grow-
ing at a compound rate, there were cases in which carriers with
delivery positions on the production line sold aircraft at a profit
to others before ever taking delivery.
The precipitous decline in the price of the DC-7 is explained
as follows. While earlier series of planes each had lower operating
costs than their -)redecessors and, therefore, were more profitable,
the DC-7 series was the result of individual carriers attempting
to beat the competition in coast-to-coast nonstop operation. It
was, or should have been, quite clear to the purchasers that the
seat-mile costs of the DC-7 would be higher than on existing air-
craft. However, it was reasoned that since the competitor did not
have the speed or nonstop capability of the DC-7, a carrier with
a DC-7 would develop a monopoly and be able to maintain a suffi-
ciently higher load factor to be profitable while awaiting the arri-
val of the new jets. In other words, the DC-7 was an interim air-
plane. The theory worked in practice for awhile but eventually
others purchased the DC-7 or a substitute plane and the uneconomic
aspect of the DC-7 operation became a reality. As a result, the
used price declined.
One point the DC-7 did demonstrate clearly was that the public,
aided by advertising from airline marketin g departments, can be led
to believe for a time that a new type of plane is the desirable one
on wh-1-h to ride. Gellman reported several cases in which a carrier
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receiving a new route could have instituted service with the more
efficient DC-6B, but chose to wait and publicize the newer faster
(and noisier) DC-7. Using this technique, Continental was success-
ful in developing market dominance on the Denver-Los Angeles route,
Braniff on the Los Angeles-Dallas route, and American on the New
York-Los Angeles route.
Gellman, after examining used aircraft sales for most of the
prejet period, concluded that airlines sold their aircraft 7 to 10
years after purchase and generally at or above book value.
B.2 THE JET ERA, 1958-to date
(a) Narrow-Bodies: Introduction of the long range narrow-
bodied jets, namely, the 707 and DC-8 series, began with 8 deliv-
eries in 1958. In 1959, the figure rose to 98. With the addition
of the Convair line in 1960, deliveries rose to 195. Table 2 pro-
vides a complete listing for the free world of deliveries by years
and by type from 1958 to 1975 of all domestically produced jet air-
craft. The number of those still in commercial service at the end
of 1975 are listed oil the following page.
It is to the factors affecting the retirement of these air--
craft that this study is addressed. Appendix A contains a break-
down by carrier (trunks, regional/local service and supplemental/
cargo) for the United States. The breakdown includes the nuii1er in
service, the first year operated, whether any in the fleaL sc e
purchased new, the age of the oldest planes of the type,
	
1,:;qh-
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Number of O et Trans ports in Service Dec. 1975
3oein
707 & 720 --------- ------	 724
727	 --------- ------	 1,130
737
	
--------- ------	
407
*747	 ---------------	 243
Douglas
DC-8	 ---------------	 463
DC-9	 ---------------	 687
*DC-10	 ---------------	 211
Convair
	880 & 990 ---------------	 17
Lockheed
*L-1011	 ---------------	 118
*Wide-Bodies
est hour plane and the highest cycle (Landing; plane. Table 2 in-
dicates that of the 4,000 in service in 1975, 3,428 were narrow-
bodies.
The early 1958-1959 707's and DC-8's "flyaway" / cost was
in the neighborhood of $4.6 million each. by 1969, the craft had
been "stretched" and the new models were priced as high as $10.2
million for the largest versions. Deli,, eries of the 727-100 series
began in 1969 "flyaway" at $5.8 ri-lillion. by 1976, the price for
the newer 727-200 was $11 million, and by 19 719 had reached $12
3f °'Flyaway" means airfraii9e, furnishirigs, avionics and engines.
•
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million. The early Boeing 737 series entered the books at about
$3,400,000 in 1569. A 1976 new purchase was reported as $6 mil-
lion, and in 1979, $8 million to $9 million.
(b) Wide-Bodies: The same type of price escalation has oc-
curred on the wide-bodies. The early 747-100 series were sold for
$21.9 million each with the freighters running about $5 million
more. By 1976, prices had risen to about $35 million for the reg-
ular 747 with a recent announcement of a 747 combination passenger/
cargo aircraft for 1977 delivery at $45 million. A 1978 delivery
purchase has been reported as $54 million. Combining the DC-10
and the L-1011 together, we find 1972 and 1973 introductory prices
of around $17 million. Since that time, prices have moved to the
$22 million area for the lower priced models and to over $30 mil-
lion for the higher. The first order for the new long range ver-
sion L-1011-500 was reported as $37 million each.
The above figures, focusing as they do with a general model
and not with specific series of each model, are misleading to the
extent they mask the increase in the number of seats and changes
in range and missions of the specific series. ehe above figure,
however, may be generalized by referring to the U.S. Department of
Conmerce, National Income and Wealth Division, Bureau of F- ;• Iomic
Analysis table of the relative increases in new aircraft prices on
the basis of the "GNP De •.1 ator" which shows i nuex number, indicating
a 22v rise between 1956-1 0.67, a 12-year period, followed by a 20;1
rise in the next 5 years to 1971. Escalation has proceeded at a
_ 12_
faster pace since that time and, ac,:ording to the Department of
Comimerce, rose another 41% in the next 3 years to 1975. N r talks
with potential customers indicate their expectations are for a
future increase of 8% to 91" compounded annually.
To summarize, the jet era began at a time of surging demand
and adequate profits. Further, it was initiated by planes re-
quiring unit capital expenses of about $4.5 million for th:? 707
and DC-8. The first Fanjet 707-300 series began in 1962 at $6 mil-
lion. Price escalation increased the price to $10 million in 1972
and to $15 million in 1976. These aircraft are now no longer pro-
duced for domestic use because cl high fuel consumption and titeir
failure to meet federal goverivnent's noise regulations for current
production aircraft. In the middle nineteen sixties the inter-
mediate range 727 initially sold at $4.5 million and, after being
stretched in length in the 200 series, have now escalated in price
to about $11.5 million each. The shorter range 737 and DC-9 de-
liveries began in 1 1-9 68 with a price tag of j3.4 mliliolf and by 1976
had about doubled in price. The larger DC-10, t-1011 and 747 have,
in a shorter titre, experienced similar increases to the point where
commitments made in 1976 will result in capital outlays of $25-35
million for each of the smal i <.>r wide-bodies, to $45 to $55 million
for the jur:ibo 747 cuubination passenger/cargo version.
In a per-Lod of no or snail growth, or in a period of some ex-
cess capacity and particularly in a period of un,,!tisfactory cap-
ital for7fidt4on, this substantial increase in the "luvlpine-' S" of
-13-
capital has a dampening effect on retirement of current jets. In a
period of excess capacity, additional units can be supplied by o'r-
craft carried on the books at low or zero value instead of expending
$12 million to $40 million per unit. Unless the carriers see a re-
placement aircraft with significant economies (including ownership
costs), or which can be used as a product differentiation marketing
factor, the i,^;entive for retirement is limited. Government man-
dated noise regulations, as will be sewn in another section, can
significantly affect management's equipment plans.
.. _.	 ... _. _	
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C.
	 1
CURRENT
	 CONCERNS	 a
In the past, aircraft retirements have been the result of find-
ing a "better mouse trap". In economic terms this means a plane
with passenger appeal which is correctly si7ed for the mission and
has superior operating economics. Of course, where borrowing is
necessary, capital had to be available at a satisfactory price.
In recent years five new factors affecting the investment decision,
even if the other conditions were satisfactory, have arisen. They
are: (1) dergulation or regulatory reform, (2) government policies
on aircraft no « ^ control, (3) the existence or non-existence, as
well as the tilt, of special legislative financial assistance or
incentives for retirement, (4) fuel cost and availability and (5)
inflation. In this section our primary emphasis is on (1) and (2).
In subsequent sections we treat the remaining items.
C.1 DEREGULATION OR R MULATORY REFORM
During several years a segment of the academic community has
argued that because of the economic cha racteristics of airlines the
type of regulation provided by the Civil Aeronautic Act of 1938 as
amended by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 has resulted in the pro-
tection of inefficient carriers, competition in service, and higher
than necessary fares to the detriment of the public. The story has
11
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been detailed extensively in the literature in recent years. 4/
On October 8, 1975, President Ford announced a legislative re-
form program encompassed by a bill known as the Federal Aviation
Act of 1975. This bill if enacted would have been a major policy
change in regulating the airlines. The Act, among other things,
would make pricing more flexible, provide for a much freer system
of entry and exit, relax rules on mergers and consolidations, and
remove constraints from Supplemental carriers. The announcement
of this proposed legislation triggered an avalanche of hearings, 5/
Richard E. Caves, Air Transport And Its Regulators: An Indust
StgT , Harvard Universit y
 F^ress, Cambridge, ^r962.
Ricnard E. Caves and Marc J. Roberts, eds., Regulating_The Pro-
duct: Qualms a nd Va r i ety. Ballinger Publishing, Cambridge,
Cha975. See	 Q„` 1hap. 2 Lawrence J. White " C.r tty, Competition and
Reg ulation: Evidence from the Airline Industry;" Chap. 8, S.L.
Carroll, "The Market for Commercial Airliners;" Chap. 12, R.E.
Caves and L.A. Pazner, "Value of Options, Value of Time and the
Local Airline Subsidy."
George W. Dou g las and Ja ynes C. Miller III, Economic Regulation
of Domestic Air Transport__Theory_and Policy, he Brookings
Institution,^Washington, D.C., 1974.
George C. Eads, The Local Servi ce A ir-line_ Experiment, The Brook-
ings Institution. Wash rig_ton, D.C., 1972.
Almarin Phillips, ed., Promoting Coiipetion in Regulated Markets,
The Brookings Institution, Washington, ' i P.C., 1975. See Chap. 2,
George C. Fads, "Competition in the Domestic Trunk Airline Indus-
try: Too Much or Too Little V'
William A. Jordan, Airline Regulation in America: Effects and
Imperfections, Johns kopk ns Press, dal tirnare-, -1 970.
U.S. Congress, Senate Subconviiittee on Aviation, R ul for Rer"onu
i rt_Ai r Transportation, Hearings before Subconcii ttee ^,,i Aviation
of Coiiurittee on Conmierce. 94th Cony. 2nd Session, April, 1976,
pp. 1314.
k
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proposals, seminars and workshops throughout the country. b/ Sub-
sequently other proposal, and bills were drafted such as the Kennedy
bill, the CAB's Bureau of Operating Rights proposal, the CAB propos-
el, the Anderson-Snyder bill, and bills carrying Senator Cannon's
and Rep. Levitas' names. After numerous hearings, accompanied by
pressure by both the Ford and Carter administrations, legislation
entitled the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was eventually adopted
in October, 1978. However, in the interim, the financial condition
of the airlines which some attributed to faulty regulatory legisla-
tion, plus complaints by the "have not" airlines, plus a heavy thrust
by the Department of Transportation led to the conclusion that there
would be substantial changes liberalizing the existing legislation.
Even if such legislation were not to pass, public pressure plus new
members of the Civil Aeronautics Board who had different philosophies
indicated that, under the CAE, there would be a large measure of de
facto regulatory change. Under CAB Chairman Alfred E. Kahn this
did ome to pass.
The initial reaction of the airlines and the financial commun-
ity to the bills, particularly the ori g inal DOT bill, was negative
to the point of predicting chaos and bankruptc y . Publicly the air-
fines and the financial community maintained that the prospect of
Regulator y Reform and the Federa l _Aviation Ac t o f 1975, A work-
op held at the Transportation Center, Northwestern University,
Evanston, Ill., Feb. 29 and March 1, 10,76. Sponsored by North-
western University and the Program of University Research of
the Department of Transportation.
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any such legislation increased the risk of doing business so much
that all thoughts of retiring aircraft for replacement equipment
were put aside. Until the fear of "deregulation" or "regulatory re-
form" had disappeared the airlines claimed they could not consider
replacing aircraft. However, if they did, the financial community
would not loan the necessary funds. The strategy of the airlines
that could afford to consider new equipment was to conserve their
cash so as to outlast their weaker competitors. Then, when freer
entry became effective, the survivors, as :aonopolists, could recoup
their fortunes.
Our interviews with airline managements, aircraft and engine
manufacturers, and the financial community began in June, 1975.
Although at this time there had not been much change in management's
public rhetoric, we discerned in private conversations a growing
feeling that some change, though substantially different from the
DOT bill, would not only be forthcoming but actually could be bene-
ficial. By early 1978, the industry, with some striking exceptions,
seemed ready for less restrictive legislation. The "horror" with
which regulatory change was first approached had dissipated. No
longer was the fear of regulatory change a significant factor imped-
ing aircraft retirement. A growing surge of orders since passage of
the Airline Deregulation Act is proof that fears of deregulation
consequences has not caused airlines to defer plans for retiring
their aircraft.
-18-
C.2 NOISE CONTROL AS FACTOR IN RETIRL1 ENT DETERMINATION
This subsection deals with the environmental concerns of air-
craft noise control and concludes that changes not only in the fed-
eral government's FAR 36 noise regulations, but also in airport
and municipal regulations dealing with sound emissions have, de-
pending on their focus, both a positive and negative effect in the
minds of airline managements' making decisions on whether to retire
old jet aircraft. Whereas promulgation of noise rules makes manage-
ment focus attention on retirement, the uncertainty of government
policy has tended to delay decision making for retirement. This
is particularly true where financing is a problem. To put the sit-
uation in proper perspective a summary of the history and present
state of the noise regulation is necessary.
(a) History,
 of the problem and attempts to deal with it.
The first jets introduced were the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8
powered by a very noisy JT3 and JT4 turbojet engines. Shortly
thereafter, a somewhat quieter,
 and much more fuel efficient engine,
the JT3D log!-byNa;s turbofan, was introduced. Some carriers imme-
diately re-equipped their fleets with this power plant, and the
JT3D shortly became standard ;,n all new production aircraft. How-
ever, these planes were still objectionably noisy and the affected
public pressed for relief at various levels of government. Pres-
sure was also applied by private airport owners.
In 1966 President Johnson asked his Office of Science and Tech-
-19-
nology to develop a noise abatement and sonic boom progi-am. The
new DOT Act of 1966 established an Office of Noise Abatement but
did not provide regulatory authority for noise control. Legisla-
tive authority to regulate noise was given to the FAA in 1968 by an
amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, in Section 611.
The authority was not unlimited but was subject to (1) safety con-
sideration, (2) the economics of reasonableness, (3) the require-
ments of being technically Dractical and (4) the requirement of
being appropriate for the type of aircraft to which it would be
applied.
1969 saw the FAA promulgate FAR 36 as the basic noise control
regulation. _^/ Its immediate thrust was aimed not at the current
fleet of jet aircraft, the cause of the complaints, but at future
design aircraft. The new wide-bodied 747 (exce pt for a few early
ones ),.DC-10 and L-1011 jets were the first designs affected, The
rule limited sound emissions measured at three points: (1) take
off, (2) approach, and (3) side line. To describe the type of
sound being regulated a unit known as EFNdB (Effective Perceived
Noise in decibels) was employed. Whether , this or some other unit
should be used in certain situations has been the source of endless
debate and wuch confusion. Various versions of bills introduced
from 1977 to 1979 addressed this point. Additionally, heavier
Appendix E. Shortly thereafter ICAO Annex 16, essentially a
similar requirement, became an international standard.
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transport jet planes were permitted higher EPNdB limits than light-
er ones. This also has been a source of controversy.
The preamble of FAR 36 in 1969 put the aviation industry on
notice that the FAA it the future planned to regulate the noise
levels of the then current 707, 727 and DC-8 jet fleet under its
congressional mandate to provide present as well as future noise
relief. Public pressure continued and Congress, in its 1972 Noise
Control Act, amended Section 611 in an attempt to hasten FAA action
by declaring it to be the policy of the United States "to promote
an environment for all Americans free from noise that jeopardizes
their health or welfare." Federai agencies were directed to carry
out the programs within their control in such a manner as to fur-
ther that declared policy of the United States "to the fullest ex-
tent consistent with their authority under Federal laws administered
by them." The Environmental Protection Agency was authorized to
propose noise regulations to the FAA.
In 1973 the building of 2- or 3-engined jet transport over
75,000 pounds in gross weight, regardless of when the design was
certificated, was prohibited unless it met FAR 36 on and after
December 31, 1973 (December 31, 1974, for 4-engined aircraft).
However, no rule was established to require a "retrofit" of the
existing fleet. From that point on there has been a continuous
battle inside and outside the ;uvernment between environmentalists
and the air transport industry over both the need and desirability
of "retrofit" versus gradual replacement and also how the costs
-21-
should be borne.
The record shows a long history of attempts by different groups
to have the FAA cover already built jet aircraft, i.e., "retrofit."
An extensive but not complete chronology of those efforts at the
federal level follows:
Attempts at Covering the Already Built Planes, i.e. "Retrofit"
1. 11/4/70 Advanced notice of proposed rule making (ANPRM 70-44)
2. 1/3/73	 ANPRM 73/3
3. 3/22/74 NPRM 74-14 mandating 100" compliance with FAR over 4-
year period
4. 10/74	 DOT 23 airport study
5. 12/74	 Draft environmental impact statement
6. 1/75	 NPRM 75-5 proposal by EPA
7. 7/ 715	 FAA, before the Subcommittee on Aeronautics and Space
Technology, endorsed retrofit of the commercial fleet
8. 8/12/75 FAA reconriended to Secretary of DOT that he send retro-
fit plan to OMB and the White House.
9. 12/3/75 FAA, before House Committee on Public Works Aviation
Subconinittee, endorsed retrofitting.
10. 1/76
	
FAA produced two new studies for retrofit:
(7) Aircraft Noise Reduction Approaches to Mitigation
(2) International Implications to Retrofit
11. 2/76	 FAA again, before the same corvuittee, endorsed retro-
fit.
12. 2/10/76 Secretary Coleman made coninitnlent to decide retrofit
question in du days.
13. 4/6/76	 Secretary Coleman announced he could not meet the dead-
line - he needed time to analyze an ATA proposal.
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14.	 6/1/76 Secretary Coleman com`leted his
	 "Airport Noise Policy
Statement" and forwarded it to OMB.
	 It was not made
public.
15.	 7/76 The Attorney General of the State of Illinois served
nctice he would sue the FAA for violating the Noise
Control Act of 1972 because FAA has failed to carry
out its non-discretionary duty.
	 It was now 7 years
since FAA was given the authority (1968 Sec. 611) and
4 years since it was directed to act.
16.	 9/4/76 Secretary Coleman was scheduled to present his "retro-
fit" policy to the Subcommittee on Aviation of the
House Committee on Public Works.
	 Secretary Coleman
postponed meeting because he needed "a few more days."
17.	 9/9/76 Secretary Coleman again was scheduled to present his
noise policy to the House subcommittee.
	
At the last
minute, the Secretary reported he was unable to get
clearance from OMB and the White House.
18.	 9/21/76 Secretary Coleman was once again, a fourth time, 	 sched-
uled to present the administration's plan on "retrofit-
replacement."	 Hearing concelled.
19.	 9/30/76 Secretary Coleman. a fifth time, asks "indulgence" over
noise delay (Aviation Daily p. 	 167)
20.	 1011817A "President Ford indicates early noise policy unlikely"
Aviation Daily p.	 250)
21.	 10/21/76 "President Ford has instructed the FAA and DOT to ex-
tend the 1969 ar!d 1973 noise standards
	
'to all	 domes-
tic U.S.	 commercial	 aircraft	 ...	 to become effective
January 1,	 1977, and be phased in over the next eight-
years'."
	 More hearings on financing were ordered to
be held	 (Aviation Daily p.	 290)
22. 10/22/76 Announcement was made that the States of Illinois, New
York and Massachusetts jointly filed suit in U.S. Dis-
trict Coutrt, Washington, D.C., against Secretary Co+e-
man, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Admini-
stration John McLucas, and the Administrator to the
Environmental Protection Agency, Russell E. Train, for
failure to perform their non,-discretionary duties of
promulgating airport and aircraft noise regulations
under Section 7 (b) of the Noise Control Act of 1972.
23. 11/18/76 Secretary Coleman announced that the FAA would shortly
promulgate a noise control rule involving a phased
-23-
retro "'. program in steps over a maximum eight-year
period. Hearing on methods of financing were con-
firmed fot° December 1. 8/
24. 12/1/16	 A one-day hearing before Secretary Coleman was held
in Washington, C.C., on the issues of financing air-
craft noise reduction requirements.
25. 12/23/76 The FAAublished in the Fede ral Rey_ist?r (Vol. 41
p. 56016 an amendment to Part 91 of the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations (14C^R91) which added subpart E re-
quiring airplanes of over 75,000 pounds to meet the
current Federal noise standards in accordance with a
phased time schedule of not more than eight years be-
ginning January 1, 1977, and ending January 1, 1985.
Contrary to previous understandings, implementation
was not tied to any financing legislation. (Appendix F)
To summarize: The FAA, under pressure for several years by
environmentalists to require commercial jet aircraft manufactured
before 1974 to be retired ov comply with FAR. 36 as promulgated in
1969, and under pressure from the airline industry to take no retro-
ti	 active action, finally, in the last days of the Ford Administration,
notwithstanding a public coifl tment to take no action unless it
were tied to financing legislation, pronulated a rule requiring
retrofit, re-engining, or replacement to be effective in eight
yearsbutwith a phase-in by steps. In the absence of a provision
for financing, the airline felt betrayed.
Huw this breaking of faith came about in such a fashion that
the responsible persons were not accountable is a fascilaatilIg
.Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, Office of the Secretary, , AA,
^lovelmber'18, 1^37b. - `61 -^^;^..`
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story on the vagaries of politics at the time of an outgoing admin-
istration.
Airline managements are in a difficult position in the noise
controversy. On the one hand, trey cannot be against lower noise
levels for three reasons: (l) it is akin to being against mother-
hood, (2) quieter planes attract more pas,engers, and (3) the con-
sequences of failing to reduce noise may result in curfews, or even
outright bans locally on jet operations. In essence, the failure
Explanation of FAA Administrator John L. McLucas at AIAA Forum
"The Future of Transportation" Washington, D.C., January 13,
1977:
The noise regulation was being handled by the Administrator
of the FAA, Dr. John L. McLucas, while the companion finan-
cing proposal was being developed by the Secretary of Trans-
portation, William T. Coleman, Jr. As is explained in more
detail later, both the proposed noise rule and the financing
proposal became hot political issues. Both were sent to the
Office of Management and Budget in the Executive Office. After
several meetings, some attended by President Ford, no agree-
`
	
	 ment was reached. Finally, the President asked Messrs. McLucas
and Coleman to the White House to determine the final policy.
McLucas support a financing proposal involvin g a reduction in
the ticket tax by 2% and a corcommitant surcharge of 2% with
such monies to be used only for retrofit, re-engining, or re-
placement.
President Ford did not make a decision in their presence but
asked them to go back to their offices and he would advise
them of his conclusion. Sometime later Dr. McLucas received
a letter from Ford tv ing him to promulgate the noise rule.
The President at t'rte _srie time a i -^n „,ulle to Secretary Cole-
man telling hii that ttie financi nq proposal was not approved.
Thus each man received a different letter and each could say
he did not break his word to the industry. In a few days all
three participants were out of office and had no responsibil-
ity for the future.
1
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to deal with noise satisfactorily from society's viewpoint may
place serious constraints upon the industry. On the other hand,
should the costs of retrofit or replacement exceed the ability of
the industry to pay for them,either alone or with such assistance
as society is willing to give through legislation, then the in-
dustry is also constrained. Thus, for those carriers which have
significant numbers of non-complying jet aircraft (about 1,600 in
number), whether to keep, retrofit, or retire and replace, in the
absence of a known government policy, complicates and delays their
equipment planning.
The current noise problem will not go away. Fhe question is
not whether special interest groups may be able to prevent federal
legislation, but how can the differing interests of the population
close to airports, the traveling public, the public at large, air-
lines and the manufacturers be accommodated in the manner best
suited to society?
During the past several years countless hearings on noise
rules have been held not only in Washington, O.C. but all over
the United State. !—O/ Even a summary would be too long to include
10/ U.S. Congress, House Comittee or Public Works and Transporta-
tion, Current and Proposed Federal Policy on the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise,  Hearings before the Subcommittee nn_Xv_ n
of the House Committee on Public, Works and Transportation.
94th Cong. 1st and 2nd sessions, 1975, 1976. 1493 pp. See
also the same subco(wittee hearings titled A.^'ort and Air-
craft Noise R educt ion , Hearings before the Subct^ e on
Aviation of the House Committee on Public Works and Transporta-
tion on H.R. 4539 and Related Bills	 95th Cong., lst session,
1977, 567 pp.	 Y , Senate Committee on Commerce,
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here. However, to understand the delays and some of the complex-
ities of the problem which make for uncertainty in the minds rf
the decisic=. maker a few points are in order.
(b) Impact of Legal Problems. Complaints, about noise led Z;,
lawsuits. The Supreme Court in Griggs vs. Allegheny County, :59
US 34 (1962) established that airport operators are liable for
noise damages resulting from operations to or from their airports.
Thus it was not the makers of the noise that were liable. From
this one would conclude that each airport operator could make his
own rules. If so, the air carriers could find themselves in a
thicket of unworkable and intolerable conflicting regulations.
The Ford administration's view was that Section 611 of the Feder-
al Aviation Act furnished a means of preventing such a conflict
by providing the FAA with authority to preempt noise regulation
of air carriers. However, until the FAA acted. the airport pro-
prietors were free to make their own rules, subject to being non-
discriminatory and nut being unduly burdening on interstate commerce.
As long as the FAA did not make a regulation covering existing non-
FAR 36 aircraft, the carriers through the Air Transport Associa-
tion would be kept busy putting out fires around the country where
aggressive local groups were pressuring airport authorities cur-
fews and outright banning, or progresO ve banning of operations
10I cont. Science and Transportation. Aircraft and Airport Noise
keduction, Hearings before the Subcommittee Aviation,
95th -Con-9.
 2nd Session, 1978, 397 pp.
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by noncomplying aircraft.
The pressures locally are far more than mere strong expres-
sions of desires. As a result of legal prx.eedings, Los Angeles
has been ordered to pay more than $1.7 iniliion in damages because
of noise. In addition, $24 million has been paid in negotiated
settlements. What is more, the California c^­.i •ts have held that
noise damages may be not only for loss in proper :;/ galues but for
mental and emotional distress ( Greater Westchester Homeowners
Association, et al., vs. - City -of Los Angeles, et al.)--Ij Self-
supporting airport authorities must fund the payments by increas-
ing their landing fees and rentals from airlines. This will, of
course, further increase fares ana thus decrease the demand for
air transportation. One attempt to minimize the problem has been
to employ land use planning in which homes near the noise path
are acquired and the land re-zoned for other uses. Because land
acquisition is very eXpensive (Los Angeles has spent $160 million
in 5 years) airport authorities push Kara for a "retrofit" or "re-
placement" solution.
As indicated by items 15 and 22 shown on page 22, local
pressures intensified and were aggregated first to individual
state pressure and ultimately to the point where three powerful
state governments (Illinois, New York and Massachusetts) banded
11/ This 1975 lower court ruling was upheld by the California
Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District in
C--931-989, February 28, 1979,
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together to exert further pressure in the form of a suit.
Inasmuch as the federal government had the authority to im-
pose noise regulations for existing non -FAR 36 aircraft, which
constitute 75ti to 80% of the fleet, and since it is somewhat un-
usual for bureaucracy to fail to exercise authority, particularly
in the face of public pressures, one can ask why this delay which
brought such uncertainty to managements' decision process? These
are three primary answers:
(1) The time-consuming nature of the rule-making process and
attendant bureaucratic infighting
(2) Time fer solving legal and political considerations
(3) Industry opposition
(1) Rule-makint Structure and Bureaucratic Infigh ting: De-
lays as a result of hearings are nothing new in Washington. How-
ever, in this case because of the manner in which Congress has
structured the process by placing so many agencies and offices
"in the loop," the art of delay throu g h hearings has reached a
new high. The bureaucratic maze is somewhat as follows.
Under its rulemaking authority, the FAA in 1370 issued Ad-
vanced Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM) 70-44. Several
years later this was followed b y NPRM,74-14 which, of course, gen-
erated comments, In 1975 the EPA originated NPRM 75-b. The Office
of Environmental :duality it) the FAA works on these? matters. How-
ever, the FAA is not an independent agency anu' iiiust "consult" with
the Secretary of Transportation. Some space in the congressional
ff.
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hearings was devoted to "suggesting" that in fact "consultation"
was a euphemism. It was pointed out that even the testimony of
the FAA Administrator had to be approved by the Office of the Sec-
retary of Transportation before he appeared before a congressional
committee on the subject.
Lack of action by the FAA caused Congress to include in the
Noise Control Act of 1972 further legislation affecting jet air-
craft noise control. There was some debate favoring transferring
noise control from the rAA to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). However, Congress provided the EPA with the authority to
propose rule changes to which the FAA must respond affirmatively
or with the reasons for its inaction. The purpose was to continue
the FAA "in the loop" because of its expertise, but to use the EPA
to keep the FAA's "nose to the grindstone." Under this legislation
the EPA had, by the end of 1975, proposed 8 rules and were working
on others. 12/ Subsequently, by 1977, the list had grown to 11.
The EPA has its own staff independent of the FAA. The process in
making an EPA proposal takes time. Suppose, for example, that the
FAA is just about to promulgate a rule when it receives an EPA
proposal. The FAA may quite properly hold up its rule to consider
the new proposal. This procedure can trigger more hearings. The
process can be endless.
Hearings, Current and Proposed Federal Policy
 o nn the Abate-
ment of Aircraft Noise. House Subcommittee and Aviation
December 3,9^ 797 ­p.723.
PA
'	 `	 r`	 _ _;
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Another participant in the bargaining over what type of noise
abatement rules are appropriate is the Council of Wage and Price
Stability (COWPS) in the Executive Office of the President. This
agency came into being in August 1974 (Public Law 93-381). The
act, as well as Executive Order 1182 of November 27, 1914, directs
the Council to review the policies, programs and activities of the
departments and agencies to determine the extent to which these
programs and activities are contributing to inflation. COUPS has
been at odds with the FAA and EPA on various points. After analysis
of the EPA's proposal to FAA, COWPS faulted the EPA for not providing
an Environmental Impact Statement as required, and sided with the
airlines that the rule was (1) unnecessary from a health and wel-
fare standpoint, (2) that the rule only accelerated benefits which
would come about anyway, (3) that the rule failed on a cost benefit
analysis, and (4) that the rule was inflationary.
Thousands of pages of testimony, technical reports and posi-
tion papers have reached the public view as a result of activities
of the EPA and FAA. When the FAA proposal leaves the FAA and begins
its course through the Secretary of Transportation's office, the
OMB, and perhaps the State Department and other agencies and de-
partments, a curtain of secrecy descends. This is where the behind-
the-scenes maneuvering in Washington can take place. Whether these
subsequent "evaluations" are made only on the basis of the record,
or constitute a whole new ball game in which the "tilt" goes to the
participants with the most political skill is not clear.
^C^1^111►;fr".!^"^^ T.6.T ,Sar...H]T^•^ ..;nyv. _K.. .M^-.- w.;a.r.',..^""i'.
	
{.
.. ^....v......_.nv..'-.-s-^M.-. ..:-
	
.^+^......	
....»u-.r... -n(. r . a.n.. •............, ++.......... ^a^. ^..-:...ne.sw->..._.
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In the present case an FAA proposal went to .the Secretary of
Transportation. His office also has legal, technical and economic
staffs to work on the proble&-n. Inputs from industry did not favor
the FAA plan. It was reported in the press that the Secretary
adopted in general the approach of the Air Transport Association
and sent it on to the White House where the OMB became involved.
The size, if any, of the specialized noise staff on noise control
in OMB is not available. Instead of a prompt decision the matter
was hidden for months. What reports that did come from the "usually
reliable sources" were that Secretary Coleman's proposal for an
Administration position did not "fly" with the "White House OMB
staff." On various occasions, notwithstanding reported meetings
with President Ford, Mr. Coleman, as note4 above, was forced to
delay his testimony.
. 
•.
Of course rules proposed by agencies such as the FAA or FHWA
for transport operating equipment do not normally find their in-
vestigations replicated at other levels of government, so the ques-
tion is why it this case? The answer lies in the fact that the
industry has successfully argued that it would be unfair if not
unconstitutional to adopt a rule which the industry in its 1976
financial situation could not afford. Support for the logic is
found in Section 611 of the amended FAA Act which includes the
statement that the regulation must be economically reasonable.
Accordingly, in the absence of available private financing, some
governmental legislated assistance would be needed. The FAA then
-32-
adopted the position that it would not promulgate a regulation un-
til appropriate legislation was passed. 13/ However, since legi-
slation could have an adverse effect on the revenues of the govern-
ment by diverting taxes from the Airport and Airway trust fund to
private carrier accounts, the OMB and the White House became in-
volved.
2. Legal and Political Consideration: First is the problem
of federal preemption. In order to have one set of rules to live
by, the aerospace and airline operators have pressed for federal
preemption of noise control. However, wholesale transfer to the
federal government might also mean transfer to it of the burden of
combatting countless lawsuits and, therefore, subject it to enor-
m.., us liability. The government has been reluctant to subject itself
to this liability.
What rights should be left to the local governments? In July,
1975, there was proposed in the Federal Register for comment a
National Airport Policy with four options: (1) All control would
reside with the local authorities, (2) the local proprietor would
establish a policy which had to be reviewed and approved by the
FAA, (3) a proposal that the local operator be constrained by the
13/ Current_ and Proposed Federal Policy on the Abatement of Air-
craft Noise, op. cit. Testimony of Frederick A. Meister,
Associate Administrator, FAA, p. 69; also, testimony of Dr.
John McLucas, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration,
pp. 1154 and 1159.
i
r.-ro.	 =_rw:. K['11L^^•Alk,. .yam	 ^..
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FAA under a coordinated federal plan, and (4) the option of pro-
ceeding on a case-by-case basis.
Secondly, time is required to assess a correct balance of the
rights of various segments of citizens. On the one hand, the en-
vironmentalists testified to the decreasing quality of life near
the airport coupled with a decrease in property values,.nental and
emotional distress, physical damage to property, and adverse effect
on the educational system in schools located near airports. Other
interests downgraded this testimony and pointed out the catastrophic
adverse effect on local business and empioyment, on regional bus-
iness and, in fact, on the entire country if the environmentalists
were to be satisfied.
Finally, when it came to outright government provision for
aid in retrofit or replacement, a provision which the industry and
ostensibly the Secretary of Transportation favored, there were sev-
eral in the industry who secretly, and perhaps not so secretly,
were exerting pressure where they thought it would do the most good
to keep the proposal bottled up. Delta, with strong finances and
an aggressive fleet modernization program of its own, strongly felt
that it had a lower cost exposure than did its compet-Ition to a
noise regulation, whatever it might be, because of its past sound
management practices. Delta therefore reasoned that it was not
right for it and the public to be taxed to cover faulty manage-
ment of others. Northwest was in the same position. Both carriers
stood to be in an enviable competitive position should a rule be
r.^^JR.►,.lYwL+w^i'.	 wi^^',..ws..y.wJ^.+i^fe iF^ ►, 
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adopted without financial aid to the weaker carriers. At this time,
some analysts felt it was not inconceivable that less well-suited
carriers, such as Eastern and TWA, could be driven to the wall.
More detailed financial analysis is contained in section G.
Suffice to say while insurance companies, commercial banks and in-
vestment bankers applaud successful management, nevertheless, they
have immense investments in the entire airline and aerospace indus-
try. Obviously, the pressures from this group are for retirement
of non-FAR aircraft from their client airlines and replacement k , 1 th
aircraft from their client manufacturers. The financial community
favors such legislation as is necessary, short of nationalization,
to make this possible.
3. Industry Opposition: The various advanced notices of pro-
posed rule making resulted in a March, 1974, proposal which would
require jets weighing over 75,000 pounds to meet the FAR 36 on a
progressive basis, with 50 1/U' compl iance by July 1, 1976, and 100%
by July 1, 1978. The final rule made public November 17, 1976
changed the four-year timetable applicable to all aircraft to six
years for the wide bodies and 727/737/DC-9/BAC-111 and to eight
years for the old first generation jets such as the 707/720/DC-8
and 990.
Industry opposition was, except for the well-financed carriers,
identical with the points made to the investigators privately by
individual carrier managements, an indication of a deep conviction
7-35-
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on their part. Briefly, the arguments were:
1. The ATA, while encouraging more stringent rules on new
aircraft, aruged that the technology currently available
for noise control via retrofit resulted in minimal noise
relief. The extent of relief possible was vigorously
disrupted.
2. The cost of accomplishing retrofit with sound-absorbent
material (SAM), given its limiter' effectiveness, produced
an inadequate benefit/cost ratio.
3. Retrofit by refanning the engines was not a viable ap-
proach because it was five times higher in cost.
4. The cost of replacing the engines with those of newer
technology on the noisy aircraft was such a high multi-
ple of straight retrofit using Sound Absorbent Materials
(SAM) that such an option was clearly eliminated.
5. Those companies with the greatest number of old non-FAR
36 airplanes could not afford retrofit.
6. Replacement of the old less fuel-efficient and noisy air-
planes by newer technology, quieter, more fuel-efficient
planes, while very desirable, was not a viable alterna-
tive because no such planes of appropriate size and eco-
nomics were currently available from aircraft and engine
manufacturers.
7. The retrofit rule would, at great expense, only move up
in time, noise relief which would take place anyway.
8. Current noise levels were not a health hazard but only
an annoyance.
9. Acting favorably on retrofit would be inflationary.
The advisability of carefully evaluating these arguments con-
tributed to the delays.
(c) Noise Proposal of November 1976 - Impact: A few facts
can place in perspective the retrofit-replacement controversy as
it existed at the time of the policy statement of November 14, 1976.
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In the free world there were at the end of 1975 approximately 4,200
,het aircraft in commercial airline service (Table 2, p.. 8) of which
2,050 were in the United States. The ATA calculated that its mem-
ber airlines operated domestically about 1,601 aircraft which did
not meet the FAR 36 standard and only 389, or 20% which did comply.
The breakdown by aircraft type follows:
TABLE 3
NUMBER OF COMPLYING AND NON- COMPLYING
ATA MEMBER AIRLINE AIRCRAFT
Number of Number of
Non-FAR 36 Aircraft FAR	 ircraft
707	 268 0
720	 18 0
DC-8	 161 0
DC-9	 330 7
727	 620 136
737	 122 2
747	 51 44
BAC-111	 31 0
DC-10	 0 122
L-1011	 0 76
Total	 1061 387
Source: ATA, Table dated Feburary 12, 1976 furnished House Sub-
committee on Aviation, 1976, p. 797.
Various estimates have been given for the cost of retrofit
per aircraft with the following figures being representative in-
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cluding installation. The total ATA Fleet Cost was claculated at
$1 billion.
TABLE 4
COST OF RETROFIT PER AIRCRAFT
1980 L §__—
707 $	 2,160,000
720 2,160,000
DC-8 21/31 516,432
DC-8 62/63 1,678,404
DC-8 50/61 2,321000
DC-9 273,000
727 195,000
737 432,000
747 483,000
Source: Same as Table 3.
The impact of the rule affects each carrier differently, de-
pending on the age and composition and degree of modernization of
its fleet. The number of non-FAR aircraft for selected carriers
are shown on Table 5.
TABLE. 5
NUMBER OF NONCOMPLYING AIRCRAFT OF
SELECTED CARRIERS, 1976
AAL	 UAL. TWA PRA
707 88 100 51
DC-8 101
DC-9 19
727 99	 150 35 13
737 59
747 11 11 0
198
	
310 165 64
Source: ATA
-38-
Proponents of retrofit pointed out that at the end of 1975
82% of the jet fleet did not meet FAR 36 and, unless something were
done, by 1990 there still would be 48% of the aircraft not comply-
ing.
These carriers in the Table 5 are the same airlines which in
the past had initiated the re-equipment cycle with new, more effi-
cient aircraft, and indeed, the launching of a new generation of
more efficient craft depends upon orders for a quantity of air-
craft which only these carriers are of a size to purchase. Their
perception in 1976-1977, aside from their financing problem was
that if retrofit were required, in many cases, it would be more
advisable to retire their 707's and DC-8's by replacing them with
a known aircraft, such as the 727-200, even though such craft
might not be the optimum size for their operation, and even though
a new technology or derivative airplane was under development.
The carriers also expressed the fear that if legislation were passed
favoring retrofitting, the result would ba an unwise use of their
available funds which would constrain them from taking advantage
of a newly developed aircraft when it became available. Such a
situation could have adverse effects on the aerospace industry and
hence on the economy as a whole.
The total cost or retrofit alone was first presented as $536
million in 1974 dollars. In February, 1976, the ATA presentLed
cost estimates of $1 billion for retrofitting the U.S. fleet, The
figures did not include $87 million expended by NASA in efforts
to assist in developing SAM modifications and re-fan engines. Sec-
retary Coleman's mid-November 1976 press release indicated an ex-
pected cost of $5 to $8 billion for a combination of retrofit and
replacement.
Extent of Relief from Retrofit. A major source of controver-
sy between the industry and those favoring retrofit involved and
still involves, a dispute as to whether retrofitting non-FAR air-
planes with SAM affords meaningful relief. The proponents (FAA,
EPA, and various community interest groups) pointed to testimony
by a number of psychoacousticians whose thrust was that the EPNd8
reduction afforded by SAM was measurable and significant. 
14/ 
De-
fining meaningful noise reduction as 6 EPNdB, the psychoacousticians
found reductions in noise of such magnitudes as 11 on takeoff and
15 on approach for the J U D 707's and 2 to 4 on takeoff and 8 on
approach for,
 the JT8D engined smaller airplanes. Some 727's had
lower values. The 707 and DC-8 constituted only 15% of operations.
On the other hand, the opponents of retrofit (airlines and
manufacturers), while submitting reasonably similar estimates for
the 707's, found lesser figures for other aircraft. They also
vigorously pressed three other points to widen the difference of
14/ Ibid., Testimony of Paul N. Borsky, Columbia School of Public
Health; Dr. Karl Kryter, Stanford Research 'institute, and
Kenneth Eldred, Vice President of Bolt,Beranek and Newman,
Cambridge, Mass., pp. 1057-1150.
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opinions: First, retrofit was most effective on appoach for the
707 type but of little use on takeoff; and takeoff was the config-
uration making the most noise. Secondly, in general. the JTAD
(721/731/DC-9) retrofitted planes benefitted only by 7.9 EPNdB on
approach and 2.2 on takeoff. Third, the opponents disputed the
meaningfulness of a threshhold of 6 EPNdB. Using data from actual
"flyover" experiences in the field plus an audio-visual presenta-
tion of tape recorded "flyovers," an attempt was made to demonstrate
to the Congressmen that the human -t did not register the sounds
in the same way as did the instruments. 15/ The argument was that
a person hearing a retrofitted 727 cannot tell the difference be-
tween it and a non-retrofitteJ craft. W-th 851: of aircraft oper-
ations employing this power plant, the whole SAM program was said
to lack justification.
Charts 1, 2, and 3 on the following pages, depict graphically
the extent to which selected jet aircraft deviate above or below.
the FAR 36 standard for the three measuring points. Standing out
above the FAR 36 line for takeoff and approach are the early Boeing
707's and DC-8's as well as the very early Boeing 747's. Well be-
low the line for takeoff and approach are the wide-bodied DC-10's,
Lockheed L-1011's and newer Boeing 747s. For come reason the
727-100 series is rot shown. If it mere, it would be only one
15/ Ibid., January 22, 1976 testimony of A.L. McP'.ke, McDonnell
Douglas Corp., pp. 311-412.
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EPNd6 higher than Part FAR 36 for approach and 6.5 EPNdB high on
takeoff.
Additional comparisons as shown by the FAA under FAR 36 certi-
fication conditions are found in Table 6 on page 45.
Summary: During the past several years, thousands of pages
of testimony have been taken; designs for retrofit have been formu-
lated; NASA has spent $87,000,000 in re-engine and re-fan research;
the EPA has presented a number of proposals and the FAA up to the
end of 1976 indicated that no noise rule would be promulgated un-
less satisfactory financing was tied in. Experts can be found to
say that the SARI program is meaningful and others that it is not.
While certain airlines, because of their strong financial position,
equipment and competitive posture, would not be upset with a retro-
fit required without financing, the same can be said during 1975-
1977 about the large carriers who normally might be expected to
initiate a new equipment cycle. The uncertainties of ultimate
government complicated their equipment plans. If the financing of
retrofit were to be the only assistance provided, it is quite likely
that purchase of new equipment would be put off. Also, if financing
legislation were drawn so as to make re-engining more advantagious
than replacement, purchase of new planes would be held back. On
the other hand, if the financing of noise abatement were to be
tilted toward replacement, one would expect retirement of the cur-
rent narrow-bodies as fast as production of new equipment would
,.,.,,^ ,.x^rsn ^7•r'^en .^.;^.	 p..sr^^y..^, :+s.+c•^r•Ee..'^.y^re!4P.AS^'+T,.{ '9^°' p'"^a: ice*"' ,ses^:.,,.,.r r^..-.....^,. ^	 s	
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TABLE 6
. 1.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
NOISE LEVELS UNDER FAR 36 CERTIFICATION CONDITIONS (EPNdB)
FAR 36
Aircraft Condition Limit Unmodified Fully Modified
707-3208 Takeoff 103,7 113.0 102.2
Approach 106.3 116.8 104.0
Sideline 106.3, 102.1 99.0
DC-8-61 Takeo^f 103.5 114.0 103.5
Approach 106.2 115.0 106,0
Sideline 106.2 103.0 99.0
727-200 Takeoff 99.0 101.2 97.5
Approach 104.4 108.2 102.6
Sideline 104.4 100.4 99.9
737-300 Takeoff 95.8 92.0 92.0
Approach 103.1 109.0 102.2
Sideline 103.1 103.0 103.0
DC-9 Takeoff 96. 96. 95.0
Approach 103.2 107.0 99.1
Sideline 103.2 102.0 101.0
747-100 Takeoff 108.0 115.0 107.0
Approach 108.0 113.5 107,0
Sideline 108.0 101.9 99.0
Source: DOT Environmental	 Impact Statement in Response to
NPRM 74-14 and 75-5,	 Statement o f Nov. 11,	 1976.
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allow. The situation would be more certain than it is if satis-
factory replacement airplanes were "on the shelf" waiting to be
purchased. However, as will be seen in the technology and economic
sections, emphasis on the economcis of size has resulted in tech-
nological advances in aircraft capable of using powerful high by-
pass engines have not been matched by equivalent developments in
narrow bodied aircraft in the 100-150 passenger category. In any
event, until carriers and manufacturers have a clear notion of the
cost alternatives under a final determination of noise legislation,
intelligent decisions cannot be made. Thus, it can be said for
carriers with financial constraints the FAR 36 controversy up to
1978, was a significant factor affecting the retirement of current
jet aircraft. We now first turn to the efforts of the industry to
obtain financing assistance during their financially troubled times.
We then will turn to their efforts in better times to obtain through
legislation a modification of the FAA compliance rule.
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D.
FINANCING AND COMPLIANCE LEGISLATION:
EFFEUS ON	 RETIREMENT OF JET WrR—CVAFT
The preceding section dealt primarily with the controversy
over the desirability of retroactive application of the 1969 noise
rule to aircraft not previously covered. The point was made that
the uncertainty which the controversy engendered served to delay
retirement decisions. On December 23, 1976, announcement of the
implementation of a retroactive rule for 2-, 3-, and 4-engined jet i
transports weighing over 75,000 pounds removed the uncertainty of
whether there would be a rule and the details of its application.
However, absence of the promised companion financing bill coupled
with the departure from office of those promulgating the rule cre-
1"	 ated further confusion for a few months. This subsecticn traces
the changing attitudes and policies of the airlines and the ATA
from consternation and defiance to acceptance, though less than
unanimously, of the rule in concert with a determined push to ob-
tain special legislative interim financing arrangements. We begin
with the rule and its time span.
D-1 AMENDMENT 91-136 SUBPART E
Amendment 91-136 to the operating regulations (see Appendix
F) extended FAR 36 to cover earlier produced aircraft in accordance
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with the following time scale:
Compliance Date
January 1, 1981
January 1, 1983
January 1, 1985
Percent of Com pliance Required
2 b 3 engines	 4 engines
727/737/DC-9
	 707/DC-8/880/990
JT8D Engines
	 JT3D Engines
	
50%	 25%
	
100% .	50%
100%
According to the Policy Statement, in establishing these dates
the Administration took into account the length of time needed to
develop, certificate, produce, and install retrofit kits for those
airplanes for which the operators would decide that retrofit was
the best course of action. Since the 747s, 727s, 737s, and
DC-9s were newer and closer to meeting FAR 36, these would be
the prime candidates for retrofit, other things being equal. The
time needed from the production decision to first kit delivery
for the 707 and DC-8 was said to be 2 1/3 and 3 years respectively.
Therefore, these aircraft were given a longer period to comply.
A more potent reason was the belief that certain models of the 707
and DC-8 were old, noisy, and inefficient so that replacement would
be the best course of action. The passage of time from go-ahead
for a newly designed aircraft to introduction. could easily be four
years. Since no designs satisfactory to the airlines had been com-
pleted, and since financing currently would be a difficult problem,
time was needed.
y
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D.1.1 Initial Reaction to Part 91 Amendment 136
Prior to President Ford's October 21, 1976 acceptance of the
proposal of the FAA Administrator and Secretary of Transportation,
which later became 91-136, the industry was reasonably well resigned
to some new noise rule coupled with special means of financing legi-
slation. Additionally, there was cautious optimism that the rule
would not affect the 2- and 3-engine jet aircraft. The promulga-
tion of a retrofit rule which included these very planes, and, in
addition, failed to be accompanied by financing assistance, left
the industry stunned and with the feeling of betrayal. The ATA
had built its favorable reception of new noise rules for the 707
and DC-8 on the quid pro quo of financial help.
Interviews with industry decision makers in early 1977 indi-
cated that the industry would not accept the rule and would fight
in the new administration to have ;t set aside. The airlines would
simply take advantage of time and not order retrofit kits, thus
presenting the government with the dilemma of either grounding
those planes beginning in 1981 or of cancelling the noise rule.
The latter would cause the environmentalists to rise up en masse
and unleash a barrage of state and local uncoordinated constrain-
ing rules. If this scenario had held, there would have been little
or no retirement of jet aircraft.
However, on reassessing the situation a different.course
of action was decided upon. ATA and the individual Federal Affairs
..R
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representatives of the airlines and aircraft and engine manufactur-
ers had developed rather effective representation with various
i
Senators and Representatives in which they made the most of the
point that new airplanes meant Jobs at a time when unemployment
was a national problem. They also stressed that new aircraft would
be quieter and hence socially more acceptable. Accordingly, legi-
slation aimed at encouraging new aircraft would be a means to getting
'	 the environmentalists off the legislators' backs. Finally, the in-
dustry pointed out that new aircraft would be much more fuel-ef-
ficient. Therefore, the ATA decided to press for new bills in Con-
gress providing for the type of financial assistance which had been
proposed by the industry in 1976 and had only been abandoned when
President Ford sent his separate letters to McLucas and Coleman.
D,2 COMPONENTS OF A SALEABLE BILL TO ASSIST RETIREMENT OF AIRCRAFT
One of the primary reasons why the noise financing proposals
did not "fly" when they reached the upper echelon in the Ford Ad-
ministration was the fear that they would be viewed as special in-
terest bills for airlines, aircraft and engine manufacturers and
banks, and would set a precedent for other businesses to seek sim-
ilar special treatment. Accordingly, a bill which could be labelled
"the aerospace and airline relief plan" would have little chance
of success. On the other hand, hearings had clearly shown that the
noise problem developed haphazardly because of the failure of the
a
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federal goverment, the manufacturers, the airport proprietors,
the state and local governments and planning agencies, the air car-
Tiers, and residents at or near airport to take appropriate actions.
The 1976 Aviation Noise Abatement Policy document marshalled
the facts and pointed out that it would take coordinated action by
all parties to reduce the impact of noise. Control of aircraft
noise at the source - a matter for the manufacturer and the air-
lines - was just one, albeit a very important, element of the pro-
blem. As long as airport proprietors failed to acquire enough sur-
rounding land, as long as cities zoned in such a fashion that homes
could be built adjacent to the airport, or under a takeoff or ap-
proach path, and as long as the federal government failed to con-
sider adequately the noise implications of operational or air traffic
control procedures, the noise protlem would not be solved. Thus
the policy statement formed a solid basis for developing a series
of bills known as the Airport and Aircraft Noise Reduction Act.
At the time of the decision by President Ford, on October 2i,
1976, to order a retroactive application of FAR 36 (just 3 days
after he had indicated an "early noise policy" was unlikely) his
advisors had convinced him for political reasons not to include fi-
nancing legislation. The White House position was that the passage
of the Airline Deregulation Act would be sufficient. However, imme-
diately after the election while under strong pressure from the ATA,
Ford authorized a one-day hearing for December 1 to determine whether
any additional financing arrangements were necessary. Secretary of
h_
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Transportation Coleman himself presided over this hearing. Shortly
thereafter once again Secretary Coleman recommended legislation em-
bodying financing assistance. Subsequently, a few days before
leaving office, President Ford drafted a message to Congress pro-
posing legislation which would have provided for the establishment
by the CAB of an environmental surcharge on passenger and freight
tariffs to be offset by an equal reduction in the air passenger and
freight tariff tax. Grants to airlines from existing balances %
the Airport and Airway Trust Fund would assist in financing modifi-
cation of aircraft specified by the Secretary of Transportation.
Time prevented hearings from being conducted so the bill was dropped.
The basic concepts were to surface in a series of bills beginning
in March 1977.
To summarize, as a new administration took office at the be-
ginning of 1977 the airlines were faced with a "fait accompli",
i.e., a rule requiring that 75% of their fleet be retired or modi-
fied without financial aid from Congress. The policy statement of
November and the hearings in December provided the underpinning for
the components of a majority of the bills which followed. After
much maneuvering and compromise, as the next subsection will spell
out more clearly, in December 1977 the House Committee on Public
Works and Transportation completed work on H.R. 8729. Title III
of the bill was directed toward financing of retrofit, re-engine,
or replacement. Unfortunately, analysis of this bill alone will
not demonstrate the extent to which legislation can affect the pos-
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ture of airlines toward the retirement problem. The balance of
this section will give an indication of the extent to which public
policy can counteract the normal economic process of decision making
so as to in fact influence technology. Not only the timing of fi-
nancing aid and the "tilt" of legislation toward retrofit, re-engine,
or replacement, but also special tax credits have an important ef-
fect on airline and aircraft and engine manufacturer decisions.
This is particularly true in the case of airlines with weak finan-
cial statements. It is, therefore, necessary to review the major
bills with particular emphasis on the incentives they provided.
D.3 EMPHASIS ON RETROFIT - H.R. 4539
The new administration, through Secretary of Transportation
Brock Adam.: on the TV program "Face the Nation" in February, em-
phasized the desirability of replacement over retrofit for the
U	 primary reason that between the year 2000 and 2010 the U.S. would
1 1 	 run out of petroleum. New technology fuel efficient aircraft were
needed. He did not define how the replacement would be financed.
On March 7, 1971, Rep. Glenn Anderson (D-Cal.) introduced the first
of several comprehensive noise abatement bills. Each of the major
bills bore the title "Airport and Airport Noise Reduction Act" and
contained three to four titles dealing with (1) airport planning
and determining one official noise descriptor, (2) additional fund-
ing for ADAP for air carrier and general aviation airports, and
(3) financing the retrofit, replacement of engines or replacement
,. ^. nG^1:;: y"'^^^';^- °^DS+^i^!^"'s^'^...,.- - .-.^ :• :-,^r^w..- ^^"*a: .fir'	 r^ 6 =' ^i
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of noisy commercial Jet transports Weighing over 75,000 pounds.
While not in the original H.R. 4539 or in the final version
of H.R. 8729, several versions contained a Title IV which militated
against preemption by the federal government where state and local
governments were concerned. Since this study is focused on retire-
ment, it will not be appropriate to deal in detail with all the
titles of the various bills. However, since the various title III
proposals were a significant part of solving the airlines' aircraft
retirement problem, it is advisable to treat these proposals in some
detail and give an overview of the contents of the ether titles.
D.3.1 Title 1. Comprehensive Land Use Planning
First, in order to eliminate the confusion and lack of com-
parability of the various noise measurements, the Secretary of
I '	 Transportation was given the authority and duty to Establish a sin-
gle system of noise measurement. Secondly, there was a mandatory
requirement for airport operators to submit (a) a noise contour
map showing non-compatible land uses, and (b) a noise compatibility
program to control noise. The financing of the above would come
from a $2.00 head tax which an operator could levy and from grants
made by the Secretary of Transportation. To ensure prompt action,
it was provided that if the plan was not disapproved by the Secre-
tary in 160 days, it became effective.
The purpose of the Title was to force the airport operators
and local and state planners to make effective contributions to
f	 4 . ^.
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the reduction of noise. Zoning and purchasing land around airports
could move residential owners and schools far enough away from the
noise to reduce demands on the manufacturers and airline operators
for further relief. The effect of a successful application of the
title would lessen the pressure to retire current jet aircraft and
minimize demands for more stringent noise limits. By the time the
committee agreed uporr a bill the mandatory feature and the head tax
fell by the wayside.
D.3.2 Tit -I,, II. Fundine For Air Carrier And General Aviat
An additional amount of $260 million for the fiscal year
1979 and $310 million for fiscal 1980 was provided for the Air Car
Her and General Aviation Airports. These amounts were carried for-
ward in subsequent versions and in the final committee print on
H.R. 8729. Initially, Transportation Secretary Adams opposed these
additions because the last increase was less than a year earlier.
There appeared to be no further objection until a memorandum from
the General Counsel of the Treasury on September 27, 1977, opposed
the addition "as long as the costs of operating the Federal airway
system and most of the maintenance costs thereof are funded from
the general fund of the Treasury."
D.3.3 Title III. Financial Aid For Bringing Large Jets Into
Compliance With Noise Rule
As a base point from which to determine the number of spe-
S
IT
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cific aircraft for which operators were entitled financial aid,
the bill provided for an inventory to be made of those aircraft
which did not as of January 1, 197?, comply with FAR 36 as amended
by 91-136. The logic was that on this date the government changed
the rules of the game initiating a requirement that airlines spend
money which they would not otherwise have had to de. It would also
prevent a carrier after that date from purchasing a noisy aircraft
just for the purpose of obtaining government aid in its replace-
ment.
Because the source of funding was to be a surcharge on tickets,
the inclusion of private business aircraft would have resulted in
a cross-subsidy to the owners of such aircraft. The bill, there-
fore, was limited to planes used for the carriage of persons or
property for hire. Military planes were, therefore, exempt. This
section was carried forward in all subsequent bills.
Funding Source: Surcha rges on tariffs: A major problem in
legislating financial aid for a particular industry is how to
avoid the charge that the general population is being taxed to
favor special interest group 	 in this case the airlines and air
travellers. The ATA thought it found the answer when in the pre-
vious year it had suggested that since the balance in the Airport
and Airway Trust Fund had consistently been increasing to the
point where it had reached $3 billion, the taxes going into it
were excessive. It was reasoned that for a temporary period, 10
_su,-
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years in the case of H.R. 4539, a portion of the taxes could be re-
duced and an equivalent surcharge , be put upon the airline customer
with the resulting revenues placed into a fund for the sole purpose
of financing aircraft noise abatement. Thus, the user would be
paying for abating the noise.
While this concept was adopted by Messrs. McLucas and Coleman
in the spring and fall of 1976, it did not at that time "fly" with
the Office of Management and Budget and other top Ford advisors.
As a matter of record, it did not "fly" with Ford until after the
election at which time he transmitted a bill with such a provision.
The primary argument against such a plan was that it would further
unbalance the budget 'because the percentage now going into the
Trust Fund would end up going to the airlines. Although the Trust
Fund itself had a balance, the overall government budget would be
further unbalanced.
N.R. 4539 provided that each operator with a non-complying
aircraft would assess a 2% surcharge on the before-tax tariff
(passenger or property). This surcharge would be placed into a
special account for the purpose of retrofit, replacing engines, or
replacing aircraft. The offsetting 2 110' decrease in the 8% passen-
ger tax was not covered in the bill because it was in the province
of the Ways and Means Committee.
It was estimated during the hearings that the 2% tax would
yield approximately $4 billion over the 10-year period prescribed
in the bill (Table 7).
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Formula for Payment from Fund: For the purpose of analyzing
the factors affecting the retirement of jet aircraft, the section
'°	
.,,N.
dealing with the entitlement formula for allocating funds from the
special surcharge accounts is of key importance. Some seemingly
minor word or percentage changes can significantly alter the re-
tirement plans of operators. This is particularly true of carriers
in a weak financial position. As this and subseauent versions of
the bill were presented and amended, it was fascinateng to observe
the ebb and flow of changes as different interests obtained the
ear of the legislators and as the legislators bargained within
their group for a consensus.
The legislation provided that within 30 days after the pub-
lishing of the inventory of non-compliant aircraft, the 'owners"
(later changed to "operators") would advise the Secretary which
of three methods they would employ to bring their aircraft into
compliance by the dealines dates. Each method entailed a differ-
ent cost to the carrier. The formula provided reimbursement from
the special surcharge funds as follows:
Retrofit:	 75% of the cost of retrofit
Replacement of engines	 150% of the cost of retrofit
Replacement of aircraft 250% of cost of retrofit
As has been mentioned, there had been a great deal of con-
troversy over whether there should be any rule at all for retro-
fitting the two- and three-engined airplanes on the ground that
any modifiration would be barely, if at all, discernible. There
was dlmost complete agreement that the 4-engine 707s and DC-8s
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should be replaced in view of their age and fuel inefficiency.
Thus, presumably the formula was designed to encourage retirement
of these aircraft and their replacement by newer technology air-
planes with high-bypass engines. At first glance the percentages
suggest this to be the case. However, "plugging in" a few realis-
tic numbers shows that the incentive was to retrofit rather than
to retire. The "ball park" figures in Table 8 are illustrative.
TABLE 8
APPLICATION OF THE 75%, 150% AND 250% FORMULA OF H.R. 4539
707 --- DC-8 (1980 DOLLARS)
Est. Cost	 Balance	 % of Cost
Per	 Entitlement
	 to be	 From
Aircraft	 Formula	 Raised	 Fund
Retrofit	 $2,160,000	 $1,620,000
	 $540,000	 75%
E .'.
Replace engines 8,000,000
Replace air-	 23,000,000
craft
Replace air- 33,000,000
craft
2,430,000	 5,570,000	 30%
	
4,050,000 18,900,000	 17.6%
	
4,050,000 28,960,000	 12.3%
It is evident that 250% of retrofit cost for replacement pro-
vides less than 20% of replacement cost for medium sized aircraft.
Should the replacement be with the larger wide-bodied DC-10 or
L-1011 types or newer technology types in the price range of $30-
35 million, the figure would fall to around 12%. Table 5 (p. 37)
r^r7t': ^. rm....^ws ,-	 .^a-m^r-^r	 ^^, ... ,^2a..-r•-. .:rsm-,.'°z .,
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shows United and TWA each had about 100 such planes and American
88. Simple multiplication shows the enormous capital cost of re-
placement.
It is clear that the formula merely ensured that carriers in
weak financial condition would be forced to retrofit and retain
their old fleet whereas carriers with independent means, such as
Delta and Northwest, to name two, would buy new more efficient air-
craft and obtain a competitive advantage. The ATA calculated that
the total cost of retrofit for its member airlines was approximate-
ly $1 billion as is shown in Table 9. Assuming the formula was so
strongly "tilted" toward SAM retrofit that retrofit was the option
used, the ten year collections would bring in $4 billion but retro-
fit would cost $750 million ($1 billion X 75%), leaving unspent
$3.25 billion. The sum would be actually less because those few
carriers without financial constraints would replace aircraft and
use the funds, up to their entitlement, to reduce their cost of
their ongoing re-equipment program. There was no capacity limit
in the bill; it was to come later. The position, therefore, of
the carriers and the aircraft manufacturers was that the bill
would result in slowing down the retirement process, impede the
introduction of new more efficient and quieter aircraft, and fail
to respond to the unemployment problem.
D.3.4 Other Criticisms Of H.R. 4539
Unfairness to Pan American: The varying financial position
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and the status of differing fleet mixes of the carriers made it
imposc.ible for the ATA to present a unified position to Congress.
Pan American pointed out thatit would suffer a competitive dis-
advantage with its foreign competitors because it would be obliga-
ted to raise its fares 2% but its foreign competitors would not.
It recommended an additional $2 departure tax for all international
carriers.
The Cross-Subsidy Issue: The bill provided that any excess
money not used by a carrier would revert to the Airport and Air-
way Trust Fund. However, in the event a carrier needed more money
than the surcharge would provide, the Secretary of Transportation
could dip into the Trust Fund to supply the necessary amount.
This became known as the cross-subsidy clause. Delta and
Northwest were particularly hostile to such a provision on the
ground that they, through efficient management, had gone ahead and
spent large sums in modernizing their fleets, so that it was un-
fair to require their passengers to subsidize their competitors.
The ATA, to keep these carriers on the airline team, testified
against the cross-subsidy subsection. On the other hand, Pan Amer-
ican strongly supported the provision as necessary to provide a
"competitive balance of equipment." Using figures found in Table
7, p. 58, an Executive Vice President of Pan American pointed out
that American would have $6.68 million, Braniff $14.8 million,
and Delta $35.5 million to replace or modify each plane while
r-64-
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'	 PA would have $2.36 million.
	 The Secretary of Transportation
also opposed the cross-subsidy provision and it was dropped from
succeeding bills. Pan American's real objection - the fact that
the $2 departure tax failed to provide sufficient funds to replace
their noisy planes - was later met by increasing the charge to
$10 for fares of over $100.
D.3.5 The Administration Position On H.R. 4539
On May 5, 1977, the.last -day of hearings on H.R. 4539,
DOT Secretary Adams in testifying on the bill proposed changes
which, if enacted, would have markedly affected managements' de-
cisions on retrofit, re-engining or replacement. Two months ear-
lier, on March 3, 1977, the FAA issued Amendment 36-7 to FAR Part
36 requiring significant noise reductions in newly designed air-
craft.—L7/ The cifective date was Octover 1, 1977. This imme-
diately raised the question why the financing should not be struc-
tured to encourage the replacement of aircraft by the quietest
planes instead of by those merely meeting the old 1969 standard.
Accordingly, the Administration proposal was as follows:
16 Hearings on N.R. 4539, House Subcommittee on Aviation, April
21, 1977, p. 466. Testimony of W.W. Waltrip.
11/ 
Aircraft meeting the FAR 36-7 standard (subsequently modified
by Amendment 8, are now known as Stage 3 aircraft. Earlier
aircraft meeting the 1969 rule are known as Stage 2 aircraft
and complying with neither are Stage 1.
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35% of replacement cost providing the replacement
	
1
airplane met the March 3 published standards.
100% of the cost of re-engining, not to exceed
35% of replacement cost for replacing the plane.
100% of the cost of retrofit for retrofit.
If we use the same format as for the N.R. 4539 calculation we have
the following:
TABLE 10
APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATION MAY 5 PROPOSAL
707 ---DC-8 (1980 DOLLARS)
Est. Cost	 Entitlement	 Balance % of Cost
per	 to be	 from
Ef:	 Aircraft	 Formula	 Raised	 Fund
Retrofit	 $	 2,160,000	 $ 2,160,000	 0	 100%
Replace engines
	
8,000,000	 81000,000	 0	 100%
Replace aircraft)
	
23,000,000	 8,050,000 $14,980,000	 35%
Replace aircraft)
	
33,000,000	 11,550,000	 21,450,000	 35%
Assuming other factors of the bill remained the same, which
they did not, the proposal missed the target. Although the amount
available for retrofit was increased to 100%, the 100% available
	 a
for replacing engines was a much larger figure and hence was a
shift in emphasis toward replacing engines. A carrier with a large
number of 4-engine aircraft (100 in the case of TWA) and a weak
balance sheet (TWA) out of economi necessity would be forced to
choose replacing engines. On the other hand, another carrier with
a strong balance sheet and a desire to have the competitive advan-
tage of the newest technology aircraft, could opt for an $8 to $11
million discount on the purchase price of a replacement aircraft
during the years of surcharge. Another wa y of putting it is to
equate it with a 4-year rollback in inflation. While the hearings
were replete with statements which drew no objection that replace-
ment would result in quieter, more technically efficient planes,
particularly in the area of fuel consumption, together with in-
creased employment, and enhancement of U.S. technical superiority,
and an aid to the balance of payments problem, the formula in most
instances tilted a management's choice to re placing engines or
retrofit rather than to replacing aircraft.
Voluntary vs. Mandatory Surcharge: One of Secretary Adams'
proposals came as a shock to the industry. He proposed that a
carrier could establish a surcharge or not, as it saw fit. Objec-
tions from the "have nots" in the industry immediately surfaced.
They pointed out that since carriers competed with each other, a
two-tier pricing system could not survive. If one well-financed
carrier chose not to increase its fares, all the others would be 	 Is
4
forced to follow suit or lose business. Thus, the entire financing
package would fall apart. Interestingly, the press reported _18/
Aviation Daily, May 11, 1977. P. 57.
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that the surcharge financing concept, as originally proposed by
Adams, was opposed by President Carter's staff and the Office of
Management and Budget. President Carter, while accepting the sur-
charge concept ordered Adams to support only a voluntary surcharge.
D.3.6 Minority View Of Bill
The most frequent and articulate opponent of the bill (and
of subsequent bills) on the subcommittee was Rep. Gene Snyder (R.
Ky.) who, from time to time, introduced amendments which would have
emasculated the bill. His N.R. 5706 attempted to protect aircraft
operators from law suits for damages because of aircraft noise by
providing that no person would have standing to bring a suit for
compensation for damages from aircraft noise if he leased or pur-
chased the property after the airport was established. His bill
in effect repealed FAR 91-136 by providing that no aircraft manufac-
tured before January 1, 1974, would have to comply with the FAA
noise rule 91-136. Efforts to delete or minimize the application
of 2- and 3-engine aircraft from the FAA rule ultimately were un-
successful.
D.4 RETROFIT DE-EMPHASIZED - M.R. 8124
On the basis of testimony on H.R. 4539, Rep. Anderson can June
30, 1977, introduced a new bill, N.R. 8124, which changed the
thrust of financing in significant ways. Briefly, they were as
follows.
-6V-
0.4.1 Relaxing Compliance Date For 2- And 3-Engine Airplanes
As a result of the considerable testimony that retrofitting
the JT8D 727s, 737s, and DC-9s would result in little discernible
change to the human ear, the compliance date for these aircraft was
extended 7 years to 1990. Since there were 1,131 such aircraft on
January 1, 1977, over 50% of the entire fleet and over 70% of the
non-FAR fleet was involved.
D.4.2 Less Emphasis On Retrofit In The Payment Formula
(a) Retrofit: In the new bill, on the ground that retro-
fitting 4-engined, old, noisy, fuel-inefficient planes was a waste
of resources, the percentage allowance was fixed at 50% as compared
with the 75% in N.R. 4359 and the 100% in the Adams proposal. The
percentage for the 2- and 3-engined planes constructed before Jan-
uary 1, 1974 was 90% unless advantage was taken of the 7-year ex-
tension. In that case the figure was 50%.
(b) Re-engine: Here the concept of relating entitlements for
re-engining to a percent of the cost of retrofit, as was the case
in the previous bill, was replaced by one of the percentage of
cost of re-engining, with a ceiling limited to the relationship
of the cost of rep lacement. It will be recalled that in March
the FAA had issued stricter noise rules (Amendment 36-71 ¢or new
Stage 3 aircraft. The committee was anxious for modifications to
use the best technology. Therefore, the provision was for 75% of
re-engine costs, provided the aircraft then met Stage 3, but not
-69-
to exceed 35% of the cost of replacing the airplane. Here again,
a penalty was attached for taking advantage of the seven year ex-
tension. If a carrier waited until after January 1, 1985, it would
received only 26% of re-engining costs.
(c) Replacement: A similar tilt toward using the best tech-
nology quickly was used for the replacement percentages. Here also
the concept of relating replacement to a percentage of retrofit
was abandoned in favor of a relation to the cost of replacement.
In general, the amount was 35% of the replacement cost of a Stage
3 aircraft and 20% for meeting the FAR January 1, 1977 standard.
For 2-engine airplanes and 727-200s constructed before Jan-
uary 1, 1974 and being replaced between 1985 and 1990, the figure
was 10% of replacement cost to meet Amendment 7 and 0 to meet the
earl er standard. One sample calculation gives the following re-
sul is:
TABLE 11
APPLICATION OF H.R. 8124 FORMULA
Rei.ifit
Replace engines
RP,Aace aircraft 23,000,000
Replace air.:rafl^ :33,000,000
707 ---DC-8 (1980 DOLLARS)
Est. Cost
	 Entitlement
	 Balance
per	 to be
Aircraft	 Formula
	 Raised
$ 2,160,000	 $ 1,080,000	 $ 1,080,000
8,000;x:10 6,000,000
6,050,000
11,b50,OOO
	
15,95G,000
	 35%
	
21,450,000
	 35%
2,000 000
% of Cost
from
Fund
50%
Y
75%
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The formula portion of the bill was one which the airlines
could accept. Although retrofit allowances were reduced. no one,
at least of the 4-engined operators, wanted to retrofit anyway.
At this time, few airlines looked upon replacing engines as a rea-
sonable alternative, unless they could not get financing for re-
placing the entire airplane. The replacement percentage of 35%
was even 5% higher than the Vice President of American Airlines,
Donald Lloyd-Jones, had suggested as an adequate figure. 19^ In
essence, the cost to the company from its regular sources of in-
come would be rolled back to about the 1975 costs. However, other
sections of the new bill presented problems.
D.4.3 Surcharge Col lections
The collections were to be 2% of domestic passenger fares,
domestic and international freight waybills, plus a $3 internation-
al departure tax. The most important surcharge change was that
instead of accruing for ten years, it would accrue mandatorily
for the first five years and voluntarily for the next five. This
was a compromise between the Carter proposal of 10-year voluntary
and the ATA 10-year mandatory. As is detailed later, it also was
a mechanism to keep Delta and Northwest in support of the bill.
Since there was general agreement that the voluntary system would
not work, airline managements drew the conclusion that the amount
19/ Hearings on H.R. 4359, op cit., p. 507.
-	 . ,	 ,. _.^__...^..... ,........--w....,.»,..v^ru.»....vr,.r^..n......... ►-.^..,..e....^....w.:-.^^ua..'s+=..w,..m.e.+w^w^..m.,,c.w«.,.........__....-.....:.....-.:_»..
-71-
!!	 z
t
r	 ^^
available for assistance was Just cut in half.
D.4.4 Subsuent Sale Or Lease Of Re-en ined Or Replacement
rp apes
In deciding whether to retire or re-engine a plane, air-
line managements were faced with restrictions on selling replace-
meat planes for 15 years, unless they paid back the total surcharge.
A 5-year limitation on selling re-engined planes was established,
unless the surcharges were paid back.
D.4.5 The Buy American And Equal Capacity Replacement Clauses
A replacement airplane could not be bought with surcharge
money unless over 50% of the airplane price was attributable to
United States materials or labor. The reason for this was not
clear inasmuch as Col. Borman, President of Eastern, which had the
A300 under close investigation, testified that over 50% of the price
of the A300 was attributable to U.S, construction.
Finally, since replacement airplanes were likely to have a
larger capacity than the planes they replaced, some expressed the
W.	 fear that a wealthy carries could vastly increase its capacity by
buying larger planes. Accordingly, this bill and all subsequent
bills limited replacement to 107% of the non-compliant airplane
seats and to 107% of non-compliant airplane cargo capacity.
D.4.6 Su. mmary
As of July, 1977, with H.R. 8124 the airlines and aircraft
I::
^,^-^r+.r.:..^j^.v.-rw-nlh+'PSSF °°•K}+!''°^90F`n:'i'.-.,^	 .._:
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and engine manufacturers were encouraged that the 2- and 3-engine
aircraft might escape retrofit and that considerable incentive
had been given to retire the old 707 and DC-8 aircraft. On the
other hand, they were concerned that guvernmentally imposed re-
strictions on the sale and lease of aircraft might force them to
cancel replacement plans. The environmentalists were upset that
the majority of the nua-FAR airplanes which also s pade the most
flights into noise impacted regions, were being exempted. The
minority, through Rep. Snyder, considered the bill a "rip-off" for
the benefit of airlines, bankers, and aircraft manufacturers.
D.5 A REDUCTION IN FINANCING BENEFITS - H.R. 8729 AUG. 3, 1977
The optimism which the airlines felt over financing assistance
because of the provisions of H.R. 8124 soon evaporated when a new
bill, H.R. 8729, was introduced by Rep. Anderson on August 3, 1977.
As a result of pressures from environmentalists and the ranking
minority member, the changes contained in H.R. 8729 adversely af-
fected financing benefits in three significant ways.
D.5.1 Deletion Of The 7-Year Extension For 2 And 3-Engine
Jets
Although the extension in H.R. 8124 was for 7 years, the
net effect for all practical purposes was presumed to kill the
retrofitting of the 2- and 3-engined aircraft. Since Table 7,
(p. 58),, indicates a cost of over $400 million for the SAM retro-
r
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fit, this amount, if deleted, could have been applied to help pay
r
for new aircraft and accelerate the retirement of old aircraft.
However, the new bill reinstated the dates in 91-136, the 1976
FAA rule, thus requiring the expenditure of over $400 million for
retrofit. Thus, a reassessment of retirement plans, assumed before
N.R. 8124 was introduced, became a necessity. This change height-
ened the element of uncertainty in planning.
D.5.2 CMn9ing
 Of The Base Date For Detemining,Eli
For Surcharge Entitlements
Prior to H.R. 8729's introduction, the non-compliant air-
planes eligible for financing assistance were those in service
January 1, 1977. Under the new bill, the date was moved to July
1, 1977 - six months later. During the intervening 6 months, var-
ious airlines had made fleet changes toward compliance with the
FAR 91-136. For example. American added 5 new complying aircraft
and disposed of a non-complying 707. Delta had 16 changes in its
fleet, acquiring nine 727-200s and disposing of 7 non-complying
planes. The new date would remove them from application of the
formula. Faced with this kind of a possibility, retirement of
noisy aircraft would be delayed. The incentive would be to main-
tain the status quo until Congress decided upon a final bill. The
very carriers doing the most to bring their fleets into line with
the rule were being penalized.
t
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D.5.3 Reducing The Entitlement Computation Base B The Ac-
crued Depreciation
As noted, the previous formula embodied a figure of 35%
of replacement cost if the replacement airplane met the March 3,
rule, and 20% if it met the January 1 requirement. Minority mem-
bers of the House Committee argued that the carriers already en-
joyed financial offsets by reason of depreciation charges and such
charges should be subtracted from the computation base. Accord-
ingly, the new bill provided that the replacement cost against
which the percentage would be applied:
shall be the actual cost reduced by the aggregate
amount allowable under the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 for depreciation or amortization with respect
to the aircraft being replaced, for periods before
the date of acquisition of the replacement aircraft.20^
The results of applying this provision to two assumed replacement
prices for early 707 and DC-8 aircraft, whose constructive pur-
chase prices were about $7,100,000 and using a residual of $100,000,
is shown on Table 12.
TABLE 12
APPLICATION OF DEPRECIATION DEDUCTION AUGUST 3, 1977
707 and DC-8 AIRCRAFT
Estimated Accrued Amount To Reduction
Replacement Depreci- Base for	 From Fund Be Raised From
Cost ation Formula	 at 35% Privately H.R. 8124
$23,000,000 $7,000,000 $16,000,000 $5,600,000 $17,400,000 $2,450,000	 y
33,000,000
	
7,000,000 26,000,000 9,100,000 23,900,000 2,450,000
—?-0/ 95th Cong, 1st Sess., H.R. 8729 Title III, Sec. 303 (b) (3)
i
i
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These figures show a reduction in financing assistance by
$2.5 million per plane. Although there was a rationale behind
the theory of the deduction, as a practical fact, its application
not only reduced the funds available to below the desired goal
but also penalized the carriers with aggressive fleet replacement
plans in operation. Delta a.-timated the adverse effect to be
$100 million.
Some carriers, such as Delta and Northwest, had depreciated
planes for tax purposes as quickly as possible for cash flow pur-
poses. For the early planes, the rate was 7 years on the double
declining balance (DDB) method and, under current rules, on a
9-1/2 year DOB. At the other end of the scale were those using
the CAB standard of 14 years for turbofans or 16 years for wide-
bodies to enhance reported earnings under the new bill. Utili-
zing the double declining balance on a 7-year basis would entail
4 times the penalty for such a carrier, and at the end of 7 years
the penalty would still be double that for those carriers using
a maximum life. In private conversations, the carriers referred
to this as "the big wipe-out."
D.5.4 Other Provisions
Slightly offsetting the effect of reintroducing compliance
by 2- and 3-engine aircraft was a "safety valve" provision which
permitted the Secretary of Transportation to waive the applica-
tion of the regulations to such aircraft for such time as seemed
-16-
reasonable. No standards were established for the Secretary's
	 I
guidance. The most likely potential use of the waiver involved
certain 4-engined craft on which manufacturers might drag their
i
feet on building retrofit kits. Conceivably in a certain economic	 t
f
situation with an amenable Secretary of Transportation, the whole
retrofit program could be jeopardized.
Based upon complaint of Pan American that the surcharges were
inadequate for international operations, two increases were pro-
vided. One, the 2% property surcharge was changed to 5%, and,
two, the $3 U.S. Departure Tax was changed to $10 on fares of
$100 or more, and $2 on fares of less than $100.
A significant benefit to the carriers was the elimination
of the funds received from inclusion in gross income under the
Internal Revenue code - a provision which was to draw continuous
criticism from the Treasury and Representative Snyder.
Finally, the bill contained a Title IV which could be read
to be in opposition to federal pre-emption. This was a direct
blow to the ATA contention that for uniformity federal pre-emption
was a must.
D.6 RESTOP.ATION OF BENEFITS BY SUBCOMMITTEE AND FULL COMMITTEE
To recapitulate, after several years of hearings emphasizing
the desirability of replacement over retrofit, the first draft of
the Airport and Aircraft Noise Reduction Act, H.R. 4539, contained
incentives for retrofit rather than replacement. Secretary Adams
-.-. .. ....^,•,^w+.P....wr .-.	 iF b K	 .^x^,IF	 ..... ^,. .., v	 yh... .p+r.T.^. ^-..,....^.....^	 a-i^v..	 1	 w.. .rte m_.:.i	 ^^:....-.	 -^^^....-^
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proposed a marked shift away from retrofit as did the subsequent
bill H.R. 8124. Within a month, H.R. 8124 was superseded by H.R.
8129 which again reversed course in providing benefits and intro-
duced a provision said to be discriminatory against efficient self-
sufficient carriers. As a result, the adversely affected parties
marshalled their Washington forces to correct the inequities.
Earlier in this report we alluded to the initial lack of
enthusiasm for any financing bill by financially strong carriers
who had engaged in equipment modernization programs meeting FAA
noise requiremtnts. These carriers objected to helping the weaker
lines, apparently preferring to see them "go down the tube."
Secondly, they most strenuously objected to any cross-subsidy
features in which their passengers would be taxed to preserve
the existence of less efficient competitors. The A1A had a most
difficult time in developing a position upon which all carriers
could agree. It was only when the cross-subsidy was dropped and
Delta and Northwest found that they too could enhance their on-
going programs through using the surcharge funds that they became
not only willing but aggressive parties in favor of financing
legislation.
Given the strength and politics of those who considered the
whole financing arrangement as special interest legislation, all
that would be needed to defeat the bill would be for several air-
lines to turn against it using as a reason favoritism to selected
inefficient carriers. Thus the price of support from such car-
-78-
riers as Delta and Northwest was satisfying their complaint that
they were being discriminated against. Tab+le 13 shows that Delta
would have to return $48 million of its charges to the trust fund,
Eastern $188 million, Northwest $67 million, National $20 million,
and Continental $40 million. All the other trunks were eligible
to use far more than their collections.
Secretary Adams was sympathetic to some of the carrier com-
plaints and urged an increase in the percentages for replacement
as partial compensation for the depreciation deduction. He also
recommended a 100% coverage for retrofit. The depreciation de-
duction he found "counterproductive" and the 15-year restriction
on selling replacement aircraft and the 5-year restriction for re-
engined aircraft "unnecessarily restrictive." Additionally, he
favored eliminating the "buy American" provision for fear of inter-
o I .
national retaliation. On the other hand; he again reiterated the
Carter position that the whole surcharge plan should be voluntary.
Finally, he indicated that the $10 international rate for Pan
American was "excessive and inflationary."
A markup se:;3i,,,i, for the subcommittee to amend the bill was
held on September 20, 1977 but the proceedings were blocked by
Rep. Snyder's use of a parliamentary technicality. His real com-
plaint was that he had a commitment from the chairman of the full
committee. Harold Johnson, that the bill would: (1) prevent the
use of federal funds for replacing planes which would be retired
before January 1, 1985 (the noise compliance date); (2) provide
-79-
TABLE 13
COMPARISON OF SURCHARGE COLLECTIONS AND ENTITLEMENTS
U"; ERK,R.8129 AND PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
TO ALL ATA MEMBER CARRIERS
(Millions of Dollars)
SURCHARGE	 ENTITLEMENTS UNDER
AIRLINES COLLECTIONS/	 HR 8729 PROPOSED MOD.
AA 315	 524 630
BN 94	 117 144
CO 59	 17 21
DL 247	 199 227
EA 335	 147 206
NA 50	 30 40
NW 127	 60 104
PA 312	 517 598
TW 258	 622 724
UA 288	 773 947
WA 84	 115 130
^	 AL 49	 20 20
•	 FL 21	 8 8
NC 20	 5 5
0z 17	 6 6
PI 16	 8 8
RW 22	 8 8
SO 15	 7
TI 13	 5 5
FT 55	 90 90
AS 7	 18 27
WC 6	 2 2
HA 8	 1 1
TS 5	 3 3
TOTALS 2423	 3302 3961
Assuming 5 year domestic/10 year international
	 surcharges, under
HR 8729. Proposed modification have no substantial effect on
collected amounts.
Source: ATA
_80-
that  the funds would be proportionate to the useful remaining lift
of the replaced plane; and (3) explicitly prohibit banks or finan-
cial institutions from receiving any benefits under the bill.
Homer, the markup did take place days later on September 23.
8.6.1 Subcommittee Amendments_ Of September 23 - knhancing
Rep acement And Re-engini ng
The amendments can be summarized as follows:
6.1.1 The Formula. After the committee amendments, ?O!
the financing formula was as follows:
Retrofit	 90% for 2- and 3-engined planes
50% for 4-engined planes
Re-engine
	 75% of cost of re-engining not to
exceed 404/0' of the cost of replacement.
Replacement 35% of replacement cost for March 3
standards
25% of replacement cost for January 1
standards
Prior to applying the above percentages,
the replacement cost would be reduced by
the excess, if any, of depreciation over
the amount treated as ordinary income in
the disposition of the replaced aircraft.
The retrofit formula represented no change from the June and
August bills. The re-engining figure or 40t involved a 5^ increase
from previous bills and actually provided a greater dollar benefit
than the 351 for replacement. The difference was more than 5a of
the cost of replacement average because in the case of replacement
20J H.R. 8729 showing amendment adopted by the Subconmittee on
Aviation [Committee Print] September 27, 1977.
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the depreciation deduction was taken from the replacement cost
before applying the percentage. Since re-engining was 1/3 to 1/2
the cost of replacement, the balance to be raised would be much
smaller.
6.1.2 Eligibility Date Moved To January 24, 1977, From
July 1: Each airline has its own special problems
and when a few have the same problem they can combine to seek a
consensus. The prospect of success is enhanced if what they seek
does not hurt another carrier and has a rational basis. An amend-
ment moving the eligibility date back to January 24 (the true ef-
fective date of the December 23 order) benefitted the industry
by $41,200,000 according to ATA calculations. As indicated in
Table 14 below, the amounts varied widely among selected carriers.
TABLE 14
EFFECT OF DATE CHANCE ON SELECTED CARRIERS
American $8,000,000
North Central 8,000,000
Pan Am 4,300,000
Flying Tiger 51000,000
Western 5,000,000
Braniff 3,000,000
Continental 100,000
TWA 100,000
National 0
United 0
Source: ATA
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If one assumes a $24,000,000 new technolgg.!, replacement air-
plane requires 4 years from date of order to significant deliveries
L	 and that Oe manufacturer requires 30% down by date of delivery
with payments to begin at once and be amortized evenly, the
0
$8,000,000 made available by the rate change could provide one
year's progress payments on 4 aircraft which would involve the
ultimate retirement of more than 4 aircraft. Thus, this date
change was not insignificant.
6.1.3 The Depreciation Offset: Delta and Northwest
strongly argued that the depreciation deduction was a blow against
efficient operators using conservative financial practices such
as DDB. The greater the depreciation, the bigger the deduction
from their cost basis before applying the formula percentage fig-
ure for replacement money. Thus their incentive for retirement
S
was decreased while the incentive for re-engining would be increased.
Since the sale of a used aircraft over book value is an indication
that depreciation is excessive and since the amount is treated as
ordinary income and so taxed, they argued that the deduction for
depreciation should be offset by the amount realized as ordinary
income on a sale. Both Delta and Northwest have been very success-
ful in disposing of old aircraft with little or no value on the
books for prices close to or exceeding their original purchase
price. In these cases applying the offset completely eliminates
the deduction so that the carriers would be back to the benefits
under the old H.R. 8124. (See Table 11, p. 69).
. - -^ ^,-fY-	 -	
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Notonly was this type of offset important for retiring old
relatively cheap (by current standards) planes but also for newer
more expensive types. For example, suppose a carrier owning three
non-complying 747s, each costing about $22 million, contracted to
sell them for a total of $43 million after three years of owner-
ship. Having used depreciation on the double declining balance
method, $36 million in depreciation would have to be deducted under
the first version of H.R. 8729. This would be $12 million per
plane from a replacement figure using our standard $33 million as-
sumed replacement cost. Thus the money available from the fund
would be $7.35 million for each plane [($33 million-$12 million)
X 35%]. Assuming the sale price of $14.3 million each, the deduc-
tion would now be $.7.7 million so that the fund could supply finan-
wing assistance of $8.9 million. Thus the September amendment
W '.	
added $3.6 million financing assistance on this particular trans-
action.
6.1.4 Replacement Percentages: Since the 35% figure was
retained for aircraft meeting the March 3 standards (Stage 3),
while the 20% for the old standards of January I was increased to
25%, once again it appeared that a step backward was taken from
increasing the incentive for replacement. As has been just pointed
out, with a re-engine limit of 49% of replacement cost and only a
35% limit for replacing the entire aircraft the total dollars re-
quired for replacement were very much more than for re-engining.
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Considering capital constraints this split would cause carriers to
take a very close look at re-engining which would, of course, have
an adverse effect upon retirement of aircraft.
6.1.5 Other Changes Made By The September Amendments:
Several other changes of interest to us were made.
1. Im2roving the domestic market for 2- and 3-engine non-
complying used aircraft.
Some carriers cannot afford to purchase new aircraft and
often there are no new aircraft of the correct size available.
If carriers were to purchase a non-complying aircraft after Jan-
uary 1, 1977, they would be ineligible to use surcharge money to
retrofit such an aircraft. The ATA proposed that these carriers
have access to thesame financing mechanism as the original oper-
ators. The ATA suggestion was adopted including a recounendation,
the reason for which is not clear, that the replacement entitle-
ment of the original operator should then be reduced by the amuunt
of the retrofit entitlement. This reduction was criticised by
the Secretary as an attempt to cure an inequity which did not
exist. He also argued that the new provision placed an undeserved
penalty on the selling carri_.-. ?l^
2. Elimination of Title IV
Title IV had weakened the airlines' position with regard to
21/ October 19, 1977, letter from Secretary Adams to Chairman of
Committee on Public Works and Transportation, House of Rep-
resentatives, p. 2-3.
4016^•-
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federal preemption. Its elimination was gratifying to the indus-
try.
3. Reduction of the period within which a carrier could not
sell its replacement airplane without losinS a portion of
surcharge funds used to purchase the aircraft.
The former figure of 15 years was reduced to 5 thus restoring
to management some degree of flexibility in decision making and
giving management an opportunity to change equipment with changing
conditions.
4. "Buy America"
This provision was deleted, thus reducing problems with fore-
ign manufacturers and foreign governments.
5. Guidelines for granting waivers of compliance
As previously noted, an early bill gave the Secretary very
broad powers to grant waiver-. of compliance with no limiting guide-
lines. The new provision required a finding of "good cause" which
was defined as: (1) a case where the supplier could not furnish
in timely manner the necessary engine retrofit kets, replacement
engines, or replacement aircraft; (2) any case where the operator
could not obtain financing at reasonable rates; (3) any case where
compliance would result in the inability to operate the aircraft
so that service to the public would end; and (4) any other circum-
stances the Secretary deemed appropriate.
D.6.2 DDT Position: Further Increase in Entitlements De-
s ira e
The final opportunity for iiwwc for and against financing
,
__M
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assistance to Affect the legislation to go before the House came
at the full committee markup October 20. The administration in
general favored the airline view and made the following points
and suggestions ina letter to Chairman Johnson. 221
6.2.1 Formula: replacement Vs. Re-enginging: T;ie change
increasing the percentage for January 1 standards to 25% while
at the same time keeping the replacement percentage at 35% and in-
creasing the re-engine figure to 400A,
 exacerbated the basic problem
with the section which was its failure to provide sufficient in-
centive to purchase new quieter designs; it was to the distinct
advantage of the carriers to buy older designs. The Secretary
recommended that no funds be provided for replacing with eircraft
meeting only the lower standards of January 1, 1977.
6.2.2 Cost Reduction For Depreciation: The Secretary
argued that while the offset amendment modified the extreme pen-
alty of the depreciation deduction, the result would still be to
discourage replacement of older, noisy aircraft. The depreciation
reduction provision, he said, should be deleted. Of course, such
a deletion would have to contend with strong opposition from Rep.
Gene Snyder for whose benefit the prevision was inserted.
22/ Letter, Bvock Adams to Chairman Harold T. Johnson, October
19, 1977.
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6.2.3 International Conrerns: Little attention had been
paid to foreign carriers who under the bill would be required to
levy the surcharge but could not use the revenues to purchase
new aircraft or modify old ones. The inequity could be corrected
by turning the money over to the foreign carriers. However, this
would be a $112 billion transfer to foreign carriers without -bene-
fit to American carriers. The Secretary reiterated his September 	
J
complaint that the $10 surcharge was excessive.
6.2.4 Excessive Powers Given To The Secretary: The most
serious objection to the September 23 version was the broadness
of the standards by which the Secretary would judge applications
for exemptions. "They are so broad that airlines unwilling to
comply with the regu liations could by their own market decisions
force a situation where the Secretary would have little choice
but to grant exemptions." 23^
Finally, he pointed out that the requirement that the Secre-
tary establish allowable costs of retrofitting, re-engining and
replacement placed a heavy duty upon him with which he was not
equipped to cope. He could have gone further and pointed out
that the Secretary would be under great political pressure from
the airlines and manufacturers to pick figures favorable to them
with the consequent allegations of "deals."
23/ loc. cit.
1
9
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D-6.3 H.R. 8729 Final Amendments October 20, 1977 Full Commitee
6.3.1 The Increase Of The Replacement Percentage To 40%:
As a result of various pressures the full committee approved an
amendment increasing the replacement percentage to 40% which did
two things, specifically, (1) eliminate the inequity of the Septem-
ber amendment under which a :arrier could receive significantly
more torenengine at 40% of a replacement and no deduction for
depreciation than for replacement; and (2) increase the actual
dollar entitlement for replacement. Table 15 shows the collections
and entitlements estimated by ATA for member airlines for both the
35% figure and 40%.
While entitlements of approximately $600 million for American
and Pan American, $700 million for TWA and $900 million for UAL
made satisfactory reading for the respective airline managements
1 . . and their- lenders, the availability of such funds through the sur-
charges was another matter. The original bill contained surcharge
accruals for a 10 year period and was estimated to produce about
r--
$4 billion - the amount estimated by the ATA to be required in
the final bill. However, the compromise of 5 years mandatory and
another 5 voluntary cut ATA's estimate to $2.4 billion. An effort
to restore the 10-year provision failed in the markup session as
di g a compromise effort of 7 years.
f On an individual aircraft basis, assuming replacement costs
of $23 million and $33 million, and assuming depreciation offset
completely by depreciation recapture on sale, the 40% replacement
AA
BN
CO
DL
EA
NA
NW
PA
TW
UA
WA
FT
AL
FL
NC
OZ
PI
RW
SO
TI
AS
WC
HA
TS
315
94
59
247
335
50
127
312
258
288
84
55
49
21
20
17
16
22
15
13
7
6
8
5
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TABLE 15
ESTIMATED IMPACT OF MODIFIED
NOISE BILL
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Airline	 C(,:'sections l/	 Entitlements 2/	 Entitlements 41
547
126
19
275
176
35
135
522
634
821
115
90
20 3/
8
5
6
8
8
7
5
3
2
1
3
607
134
19
293
176
35
142
593
712
899
130
90
20 3/
8
5
6
8
8
7
5
3
2
3
Total s	 2423	 3571	 3911
Notes: 1/ Assumes 5 year domestic / 10 year international surcharge
collections.
Provides entitlements of 25a for Part 36 and 35 for Part 36-7
aircraft; also provides for depreciation recapture.
3/ Assumes that carriers would exercise the retrofit option.
Should they elect to replace non-complying aircraft, their
entitlements would be greater.
4/ Provides entitlements of 25 for Part 36 and 40^ for Part 36-7
___ aircraft, also provides for depreciation recapture.
Source: ATA
I;
.R
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percentages develops a $9.2 million entitlement as compared with
the previous $8.05 million for the $23 million replacement. And
for the $33 million larger aircraft the resulting figure is $13.2
million or a $1.6 million increase. A recapitulation from the
first bill to the one committed to the whole House on December
13, 1977, is shown on Table 16.
TABLE 16
SUMMARY FOR 707/DC-8 AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT
ENTITLEMENTS
Entitlements in millions of dollars)
Bill or Proposal
	 23 Million Aircraft $33 Million Aircraft
H.R. 4359, March 7, 1977 	 $4.05	 $ 4.05
Administration, May 5
	 8.05	 11.55
H.t. 8124, June 30	 8.05	 11.55
H.R. 8729, August 3
	 5.60	 9.10
H.R. 8729, September 23*	 8.05	 11.55
H.R. 8729, October 20	 9.20	 13.20
*Assuming old aircraft show maximum depreciation on the books.
Note: The figures for August 3, September 23, and December 13
are maximums. Should the depreciation and depreciation
"recapture" be different than assumed, the entitlements
would have to be adjusted accordingly.
I
i
i
Although within the ATA there was a problem of presenting a
united front (at one time or another Delta, Northwest, Continental,
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National, and even Eastern seemed ready to break ranks), the
figures in the table which in March began with a $4.05 million
maximum entitlement ended in October with $9.2 and $13 million.
This would indicate that up to this point the ATA lobby was very
successful. Of course, the ATA had a broad spectrum of supporters
in its efforts. First, were the aircraft and engine manufacturers.
However, because of differences among the customer airlines, the
manufacturer's role was less visible. Manufacturers are very
skittish about alienating customers. Obviously their interest was
replacement by new design airplanes and their testimony did not
understate the difficulties or disadvantages of retrofit and re-
engining. Given the unemployment problem, labor unions were solid-
ly on the side of financing assistance with emphasis on replace-
ment. Understandably, the investment community strongly supported
financial assistance in order to strengthen their customers, both
the airlines and the manufacturers.
	 j
Additionally the bill was strongly supported by the environ-
mentalists providing the 2- and 3-engine airplanes would not es-
cape the timetable in the noise rule. Finally support came from
many municipal authorities because of their hope for federal assis-
tance with the noise problem.
6.3.2 Foreign Carriers Made Eligible For Surcharge Fund:
Foreign air carriers have relatively the same number of jet air-
craft as the U.S. carriers, i.e. 2000. Of these 2000 about 400
c •--e . ^...,-•: a^^...r,,.,,_,.-'..- ►,v+^e-+v^..;'f,.^.-:ire-s:^-^-•ire.-os-,.
	
-r^^+c- r...7'v,•^,pR^`
i
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not meeting January 1, 1977 FAR 36 standards fly into the United
States. BecauseBecaus  of their longer range with the extra fuel loads
,required, these 400 tend to create higher noise levels. 23J
_Their retirement or modification would be looked upon with favor
by the public and the aircraft manufacturers. In the debates much
was said of the international problem of taking an action unila-
terally. However, the committee recognized the inequity of making
demands on and giving benefits to U.S. operators and not to foreign.
It developed that in certain foreign countries there were already
such things as a noise head tax and noise related landing charges
which U.S. passengers paid.
The Committee passed an amendment which provided that the
foreign carriers would be required to collect the surcharges ap-
plicable to international flights and could obtain a portion or
all of the surcharges back as soon as its entire fleet operating
in the United States met FAR part 36. To a certain extent this
was discriminatory against domestic carriers. First, foreign
carriers did not have a phased timetable as did U.S. carriers.
Foreign carriers did not have to comply until 1985. Secondly,
it was possible under the wording of the amendment for a foreign
carrier to receive 100% of replacement, re-engine or retrofit
cost. This is true because of the provision that when all the
aircraft meet FAR 36 and are so certified as to the cost the Sec-
23/ 95th Cong. 1st Session, House Report No. 95-836, Airport
and Aircraft Noise Reduction Act, December 13, 1977, p. 12.
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retary is required to return an amount equal to the certified
.expenses, but not to exceeO the amount collected by the operator.
D.7 SUMMARY OF TITLE III AS ADOPTED BY FULL COMMITTEE
As adopted by the full committee on Public Works and Trans-
portation of the House of Representatives on October 20 and re-
ported December 13, 1977, Title III of the proposed Airport and
Aircraft Noise Reduction Act, H.R. 8729 may be summarized as
follows:
1. The Secretary of Transportation would publish the list
of commercial jet aircraft weighing over 75,000 lbs.
which were in for-hire service on January 24, 1977, and
which did not meet the FAA noise regulations promulgated
December 23, 1976, to be effective Jaruary 1, 1977.
2. Within 30 days the operator must advise the Secretary
that he would comply with the rule and specify the means
chosen: (1) retrofit, (2) replace engines, or (3) re-
place airplane.
3. To provide funds to support this program each domestic
operator was required to impose a 2% surcharge on its
before tax passenger and cargo tariffs. International
cargo required a 51 surcharge. International passenger
surcho ge was $10 for fare; of $100 or more, and $2 for
lesser international fares.
4. In the case of U.S. carriers the funds were to be deposited
intu individual trust accounts to be withdrawn as needed
under terms of a formula. In the case of foreign carriers
the surcharges would go into one fund and utilized only
upon certification that all the operator's aircraft oper-
ating into the U.S. , complied with the rule. 1985 was the
final limiting date.
5. Domestic surcharges are mandatory for the first five years
and voluntary 'For the next five. International surcharges
are mandatory for ten years.
6. Surcharges in the accounts would be withdrawn for the sole
=77-1
	
...,,..,-	
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purpose of noise abatement. The "Entitlements" for with-
drawal were calculated by a formula intended to provide
an incentive to replace non-compliant aircraft with com-
pliant aircraft, preferably new technology aircraft meet-
ing the stricter FAA (Stage 3) rule published March 3, 1977.
Entitlement Formula
A. Retrofit:	 2- and 3-engines: 90% of retrofit
cost	 _.
4-engines: 50% of retrofit cost
B. Replacing engines:	 75% of the cost of replacing engines
but not to exceed 40% of the cost of
a replacement plane meeting the March
3 rule
C. Replacing the Aircraft: 40% if cost of replacement if the air-
craft meets the March 3 rule
25% if meeting the January 1 rule
Before applying the above percentages,
depreciation minus the ordiiiary income
recovered on sale must be deducted.
Non-complying aircraft could be sold
with the buyer making the modification
with his entitlement, and the seller
losing an eq;: ; valent amount.
Leasing of replacement aircraft was
restricted to leasing to another air
carrier, for 5 years.
If a replacement aircraft was sold
within 5 years, a prorate of the used
entitlement went to the Treasury.
Replacement payments were limited to
covering no more than 107% of seats
of non-complying aircraft; 107% also
was established for replacing i?dica-
ted cargo capacity.
7. Surcharges were not to be considered as gross inrame for
Internal Revenue purposes.
8. No cross-subsidy. Excess surcharges above entitlements
would go via the Treasury to the Airport and Airway Trust
Fund.
..,al
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3
' , 9:_ The Secretary, through the FAA Administrator, could waive
application of the regulations upon application by oper-
ator who showed "good faith" and there was "good cause"
for failure to comply. The good cause was further defined
as: (1) inability to obtain SAM kits, replacement engines,
or replacement airplanes; (2) inability to obtain finan-
cing "at reasonable rates"; (3) -inability to maintain
scheduled service to the public; (4) "any other circum-
stances the Secretary deems appropriate." f
D.7.1 Impact On The Federal Budget
Precise quantification of the effect of Title III on the Fed-
,eral Budget is not possible. The revenue side, consisting pri-
marily of aggregating passenger revenues of each carrier and pro-
jecting them forward for five years, is less complicated than est-
mating the crust side. The latter involves replacement assumptions
versus re-engine versus retrofit decisions using some aircraft not
yet designed and whose economic effects are under constant evalu-
ation. The changing economic fortunes of the carriers which can
be heavily influenced by route awards, by regulatory reform as
well as by technological progress, widen the forcast bands of poss-
ibilities. With this caveat we present the estimates furnished
to the legislators.
Assuming the 5-year mandatory period the Congressional Budget
Office e..timated that the surcharge "may result in excess rever:ae
of approximately $100 million."
	 24/ Such a statistic was not
overlooked by thcse pushing for thv bill's passage. In view of she
24/ 
Ibid. p. 25.
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fact that the FAA had estimated that the surcharges would produce
$2.5 billion for U.S. Flag carriers, and that the ATA had estimated
the entitlements to be about $4 billion, a word of explanation is
in order. Simply stated, no carrier could withdraw more than its
own surcharges no matter what the cost or entitlements were, where-
as carriers whose surcharges exceeded their entitlements would
have to refund the difference to the Treasury. Usinq the 1970-
1976 financial results presented at the hearing, this meant that
some of the neediest carriers would receive relatively less to
meet ti^eir requirements than some more affluent carriers. The
elimination of the cross-subsidy provisior was the initial obvious
cause of this situation.
However, a deeper explanation demonstrates the interaction
of economic and political power. Considering the problem and the
ultimate objective ATA had in keeping its members behind the bill,
perhaps Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin could consult the ATA on
composing conflicts. Key sections of the bill were the result
of successful maneuvering by Delta and Northwest whose support
was absolutely essential. profitable Northwest, led by President
and Chairman Donald Nyrop, one of the last of the rugged indi-
vidualists, was almost paranoid against permitting any money col-
lected from its passengers being used to support equioment pur-
chases by any of its competitors. The plight of other airlines,
he openly stated, was due to incompetent management. Delta also
felt that any use of its surcharges to weaken the corpetitive ad-
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vantage it had carved out for itself was government intervention
in private business of the worst sort. Northwest and Delta made
it clear that they were in a position to "blow the bill out of
the waiter" unless two primary demands were met.
The first demand was that no carrier's surcharges be used by
any other carrier. The second demand was that regardless of how
the rest of the carriers were affected these two carriers would
have to be able to use all their surcharge money. They did not
wish to refund anything to the Treasury. The original bill, it
should be noted. called for a 10-year accrual and would have pro-
vided over $4 billion. In the breakdown of entitlements this would
have provided Northwest and Delta with almost twice as much as they
could use. Thus the 5-year figure not only was a compromise with
the administration's position of voluntary surcharges for 10 years,
but handily fit Northwest and Delta's requirements. In meeting
these demands many other carriers had to sacrifice significant ftite-
fits. However, when faced wtih the choice of significant benefits,
though inadequate, or no benefits, the other Carriers, with the
sword of Damocles hanging over their heads, felt they had no choice.
D.7.2 The Minority View
As had been suggested early in this section, the opponents
to the bill were articulately represented by Rep. Gene Snyder of
Kentucky who consistently objected not only to specific provisions
but also to the philosophical basis of the legislation. His po-
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sition is outlined in a minority report. 25/
In assessing the effect of Title III of the bill on the re-
tirement of transport jet aircraft one must consider the possibil-
ities of the successful progress of the bill through Congress and
its ultimate approval by the President. The proponents of legis-
lation often become overconvinced of the success of their project
merely by rereading their own material. Therefore, it seems appro-
priate to highlight the objections of both those with a simple
lack of enthusiasm and those who in less formal conversation use
terms as "ripoff," "subsidy," or "wonderful gimmick." The contra
opinions covered in the minority report may be summarized as fol-
lows.
Three signers of the report (Reps. Snyder, Ambro, and Gold-
water) considered retrofitting a waste of money which should be
spent on new technology aircraft, and at the final markup Rep.
Snyder unsuccessfully again tried to repeal the FAA Amendment 91-
136 of December 23, 1976, which would have voided the retrofit
1'	 requirement. The minority report also commented that since FAR
91-136 did not have to be fully complied with until January 1,
1985, "There is no sane justification for giving owners or oper-
ators of aircraft financial assistance for replacing their equip-
ment which will be totally depreciated and out of use prior to
25/ Ibid, pp. 33-36.
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January 1, 1985. 261 In regard to replacement, some of the minor-
ity felt that even the dLpreciation deduction was not enough to
take away from replacement cost. It was argued that the percentage
of life left in the old aircraft on January 1, 1985, if any, should
be the percentage of cost of new replacement aircraft on Which the
40% "subsidy" is computed. This would result in a de minimis amount.
Rep. Ambro commented that the replacement formula of 25% for
the January 1 rule (Stage 2) and 40% for the March 3 rule (Stage
3) still did not provide enough tncentive for new technology. How-
ever, his proposal was not to increase the 40% but to decrease the
25% to 20%. This was opposite to the concern expressed by some
in Boeing who felt that the 40% to 25% spread was already too large
to the detriment of some of their current technology aircraft sales
potential. As an example, it was calculated that frm-n their point
of view a 10% spread was already a $ 19.3 million penalty on a 727
price.
Rep. Ambro also pointed out that the 5-year mandatory and
5-year voluntary surcharge was deficient for two reasons. First,
a 10 year period as provided in the original bill was needed to
collect the estimated needed sum of $4 billion. The 5-year manda-
tory period cut the amount collect an half. Secondly, the compe-
titive pressures within the industry would ensure that the 5-year
voluntary period would rever be utilized; thus the objective of
26/ Ibid., P. 34.
C
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the program would never be realized_ We have already discussed
the economic and political pressures which gave rise to this pro-
vision.
The minority report also expressed disappointment with the
waiver provisions which seemed to contain broad economic loop-
holes for airlines not disposed to investing in noise control.
It could well have added that whatever may be said on the merits
of a series of limitation on the Secretary's power, the addition
of the clause "Any other circumstances the Secretary deems appro-
priate" opened wide the door for possible abuses.
Between October and the end of 1977 there was no further
House action and the Senate conducted no hearings.
0.7.3 3975-1977 Reviewed
The development of the jet transport in the 1950's and
their introduction in significant numbers in the early 1960's
represented a quantum jump in productivity for the industry. The
coupling of larger size with an almost doubling of speed accompanied
by more economical operation laid the basis for an increasing vol-
ume of flights. Unfortunately for society the first jets were
exceedingly noisy. Although the introduction of the turbofan re-
presented some improvement in the noise level, the sheer increase
in number of operations more than compensated for the difference.
In 1969, bowing to public pressure, the FAA promulgated FAR
Part 36 which provided that any newly designed certificated plane
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must have a significantly lower level of noise emissions. Later
in 1973 the rules were tightened to include any currently produced
plane coming off the production line. This left 75% of the existing
jet fleet uncovered by the regulations. In descending order of
noise emissions were (1) the early pure jet 707s and DC-8s, (2)
the turbofan 707 and DC-8s, and finally (3) the 2- and 3-engined
turbofan jets such as the 727, 737, and DC-9 seriez. The wide-
body high bypass 747, DC-i0 and L-1011 met lower emission require-
ments.
Homeowners, school operators, and others located near airports
continued their pressure for noise relief insisting that the noise
rule be extended to cover the remaining 75t of jet transport air-
craft. If previous history is to be used as a guide, often a
dangerous assumption, many in the 707 and DC-8 fleets were on the
point or beyond the time of their expected retirement from their
first purchaser. Indeed they were approaching what had originally
`'y	 been assumed by many to be their design life.
However, during the 1970-1976 period the airlines were suffer-
ing reduced, and in some cases, negative earnings. Their position
was that private financing to handle nois ,2 compliance expenses was
just not available. Another section covers this changing financial
perspective in detail.
As a result of extensive public hearings and many private dis-
cussions, in November, 1976, Secretary Coleman issued a policy
statement indicating that the FAA would shortly publish a rule re-
z
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quiring the earlier manufactured, non-complying, noisy planes to
meet the 1969 rule over a period of time either by retrofitting,
replacing engines, or retiring the aircraft. Such a rule was is-
sued December 23, 1976. Although there was spread on the record
a commitment by the FAA not to promulgate such a rule without a
financing plan, the rule was so promulgated and initially the ad-
ministration argued that the passage of a deregulation bill would
improve the carriers' economic position sufficiently that financing
would not be a problem. The airlines felt betra yed and immediately
took their case to congress. At this time most airlines felt that
deregulation would have serious negative financial effects.
The foregoing section depicted the ebb and flow of the battle
between the airport neighbors and the airlines over the timing,
method, and financing of the noise abatement. After first con-
sidering and . ,ejecting the idea of refusing to take any steps to-
ward compliance so as to face the government with a "fait accompli"
and daring it to ground the aircraft, the ATA sought to support
that part of broad noise control bills which would assist in the
financing of either retrofit, replacing engines, or retiring the
planes. Their strong preference was for retiring current planes
and replacing them with quieter, more fuel-efficient airplanes.
In this they were supported by the labor movement which saw more
jobs, and by the aerospace industry which saw the need for keeping
technology moving as well as the relative effect on the bottom
line of their operations.
UPW
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In tracing through the various versions of the bills H.R. 4539,
8124, and 8729 one develops a deeper understanding of the problem
of uncertainty facing airline managements making equipment deci-
sions. Those managements under severe financial constraints need
to know the implications of their decisions. A decision made on
the assumption that H.R. 4539 with its emphasis on retrofit would
pass, would have been most unwise if H.R. 8124 with its elimination
of the 2- and 3-engined aircraft from compliance were enacted.
Similarly, at one stage H.R. 8729 had a higher percentage going to
re-engining some than replacement, and replacement entitlements
were reduced by depreciation charges. Accordingly, any carrier
in extremely tight financial condition would have been forced to
consider quite seriously re-engining some very old planes when re-
tirement was the preferred course. Although H.R. 87?9 as reported
out by the full committee December 13, 1977, was quite satisfac-
tory to the airlines, the fact that it had not been to the Ways
and Means Committee, much less the Senate, indicated that it had
a long way to go. Therefore, one must give much credence to the
view voiced by many airline equipment decision makers in 1976 and
1977 that they were in a holding pattern until they knew the final
outcome of the noise financing legislation.
However sincere these statements were, .hanging conditions
cast a cloud over their continued validity for some carriers.
The overcast of financial impossibility of the 1975-1976 period
was replaced if not by broken clouds at least by rays of sunshine
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In 1977. The change in direction of profitability wrought signi-
ficant changes in the attitudes of certain carriers. Secondly,
the overcapacity with which the industry was plagued began to dis-
appear at an accelerated rate so that playing a waiting game might
put some carriers at a competitive disadvantage with insufficient
capacity. Finally, one situation which made it easier to say,
"We won't move a muscle until a financing bill is passed," changed.
This situation was the availability of a "better mousetrap" as a
replacement airplane.
Over the past several years overcapacity and the absence of
an economic new technology or derivative plane between the size
of a wide-body and a 707 or DC-8 which also met the new more strin-
gent noise standards was given as a further reason for not retiring
the older planes. As traffic surged in 1977 some airlines became
less certain that the DC-10, L-1011 and the A300 were too large.
Further, intensive development by Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas
of derivatives and new technology models had been slowly but surely
sapping the non-availability argument of validity. Finally, the
need for more aircraft due to growth, plus more interest on the
part of lenders in providing funds, and the strong financial con-
dition of several carriers whetted the appetite of a few carriers
to participate in launching a new type aircraft, particularly if
large savings in fuel consumption were involved.
Notwithstanding these latter developments, one can safely
conclude that uncertainty concerning federal legislation over
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financing assistance for retrofit, re-engining or replacement
was the primary factor adversely affecting the retirement of jet
transport aircraft in the 1915-1977 period.
0.8 1978 NOISE LEGISLATION
As 1978 opened, the industry was optimistic that financial
assistance legislation for retiring older aircraft would be passed
early in the session. There would then follow a flow of orders
for newer, quieter and more fuel efficient aircraft and the older
equipment would be sold to countries which had nut yet perceived
the noise problem. Because the bill before the House involved a
change in the tax structure,it would have to go through the Ways
and Means Committee before reaching the floor of the House and
then the Senate. However, almost immediately the bill ran into
unanticipated trouble. On January 16 the Airport Operator's In-P	 Y	 P	 F	 ,
ternaLlonal (AOCI), which had supported financing legislation in
the past, expressed concern that the Anderson bill mighc bankrupt
the Airport and Airways Trust Fund.
The next jolt occurred just a few days before the February 6
hearing before the ! ,',iys and Means Committee when, amid reports of
better earnings by the carriers, TWA, which had consistently been
pictured along with Eastern and Pan Am as the prime example of dire
need, announced (1) vastly improved earnings, (2) that it was con-
sidering making acquisitions, (3) that it was reducing its ratio
of debt to equity, and (4) that it would spend $3.8 billion on
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aircraft by 1985. Additionally the Ways and Means Committee was not
pleased at being largely bypassed by the House Public Works and 	 +(
Transportation Committee during the previous hearings on the bill. 	 I
Notwithstanding the extensive support testimony by the ATA, the
manufacturing industry, the airport operators, and the Department
of Transportation through Secretary Brock Adams, heavy criticism
developed along the following lines. 27/
The Treasury Department objected that the financing would be
"off budget" because there would be no tax on the surcharge re-
venues collected. Such a provision would open Pandora's box for
other industries to come in and receive financial aid for govern-
ment mandated Drograms. Additionally, the amounts paid would fur-
ther unbalance the U.S. budget because they would come out of the
Trust Fund which was a budgetary item. Contributing to the Com-
mittee's unhappiness was its running battle with the FAA which had,
so the committee thought, been slighting safety expenditures and
K_
	
	
letting the Trust Fund build to unconscionable levels. The com-
mittee did not want safety needs to take a back seat to retrofit,
re-engine or replacement. Finally, rocky going for the bill was
indicated when such terms as "rip-off", subsidy", and "crazy gim-
mick" were used by members of the Ways and Means Committee. Short-
,
ly after completion of the hearings Representative Vanik noted
27! U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways ai;u Means, Airport
and Airway Trust Fund and Airport and Aircraft Noise Re-
duction, 95th Congress 2nd Session, February 6, 1978, p. 112.
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that Pan Am and American had just reported large profits. He then
told the House that since 1976 American, Eastern, and Pan American
had paid no income taxes and suggested that the airlines already
enjoyed many Lax benefits and were asking for more. His view,
which he continued to maintain throughout the year, was that no
financing legislation was in order. His motion before the com-
mittee to put off the financing issue for some months lost by only
four votes.
At this time it became clear that the "off budget" method
involving a non taxable surcharge of 2% was unacceptable. In its
place came a substitute for Title III of the Anderson bill in the
form of H.R. 11986 sponsored by Representative James Corman (D-
California), called the Noisy Aircraft Revenue and Credit Act of
1978. Without going into detail on the various sections of the
bill, essentially it solved the tax free problem in H.R. 8729 by
	 q
imposing a 2% tax on airfares, reducing the present tax by 2% and 	
1
depositing the tax in the Treasury. Carriers operating noncom-
plying noisy aircraft would be able to obtain refunds or credits
for the new taxes where such monies were spent to bring planes
into compliance by retrofit, re-engining or replacement. These
funds or credits would be treated as taxable income when received
,
by the carriers. 28/ Even this bill which would have reduced
payments from the October version was subject to acid criticism.
28/ House Report No. 95-1082, Committee on Ways and Means,
April 24, 1978, p. 45.
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Two committee members termed it the "Great Treasury Raid of 1978."
Not helpful to the proponents of legislation were the announce- 	
i
menu by Eastern of a 0* 778 million order for the French Airbus
with U.S. engines, and by Pan American of a $480 million order for
the Lockheed L-1011-500 with Rolls-Royce engines. Additionally,
an extensive article in Air Transport World (March) suggests that
lending sources were optimistic that airlines would find the money
needed for aircraft financing. Despite the aforementioned criti-
cism of financial legislation, the Corman bill was approved by the
Ways and Means Committee thus clearing the way for the House Rules
Committee to act upon it before going to the full House.
D.8.2 The Senate Approach To Noise Finan c ing !.egislation:
In the face of the difficulties encountered in the House and the
position taken by ATA that the dealines for compliance could prob-
ably not be met, Senators Cannon and Pearson designed a diffe,Qnt
approach which was introduced (April 24) in S. 3064 entitled "Air-
craft and Airport Noise Reduction Act of 1978". Titles I and II
were similar to the House version. Title III ,- ,,-lving incentives
for retiring aircraft provided for a $20 billion loan guarant`e
under which loans would be made to carriers which entered into 	
0
a contract before January 1, 1985, to purchase replacement planes
meeting "Stage 3" now^e levels as they were in effect May 1,
-IU9-
1978.--291
 An extension of the compliance date of FAR 91-136 to
1990 would be accorded for replacing 2- and 3-engine planes.
Finally, another provision permitted the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to waive compliance for a number of different reasons, in-
cluding a final open end clause reading "any other circumstance
the Secretary deems appropriate." 30/
At the hearings the Cannon bill quickly ran into difficulty.
The Airport Operators Council International (AOCI) and environ-
mental groups strongly opposed the compliance roll back for l-
and 3-engine aircraft. The airlines and manufacturers disliked
the loan guarantee concept because, unlike the surcharge arrange-
ment, there would be no "up front money." A further objection
29/ Beginning at this time reference to noise limits have, by
convention, been referred 'r, in terms of "stages". On 	 .,
February 25, 1977 the FAA adopted stage definitions in
Amendment
	 to FAR 36. Stage 1 are Lnose airplanes not
meeting stage 2. Stag y 2 are those aircraft meeting the
current Appendix C, i.e., the 1969 rule as refined. Stage
3 aircraft are those meeting still more stringent; require-
ments and to apply to all aircraft for which an appiication
for a certificate is made after May 1976. In the spring of
1979 the terms "Stage 4" and "Stage 5", although nowhere of-
ficially defined, have appeared. They refer to standards
listed as 80 FAR 36 and 85 FAR 36 respec t ively as contained
in the EPA proposal to the FAA published as NPRM 76-22,
FR 47358 October 28, 1976. As proposed these standards would
become effective 1 January 1980, and 1 January 1985.
30/ J.S. Congress, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Aviation
of the Committee oc Commerce, Science, end Transport•ition,
on S. 747, S. 3064 and H.R. 8729, Aircraft an u' Ai rport Noise
Reduction, 95th Congress 2nd Session, May 24, 25, and June 13,
14, and 17, 1978, p. 397.
-110-
-was that the loan guarantees would increase the debt-to-equiq
-	 ratio of the companies at the very time airlines were trying to
reduce the ratio to merit consideration for equity financing.
Additionally, the financial community was not happy to have the
government take over its function. Finally, in a particularly
effective 33 page presentation, CAB Chairman, Alfred Kahn, stated
that Board studies indicated returns on investment were running
so high that he could see no requirement for a noise bill. How-
ever, if Congress felt that some assistance was in order, he would
prefer the House bill approach.
0.8.3 New Senate Bill S. 3279
Opposition to the loan guarantee approach re.ulted in Senator
Cannon abandoning S. 3064 in favor of a new bill, S. 3279, which
reduced the previous 10-year financing provision to a one-year
mandatory charge with possible exten ,.ions by the CAB. The CAB
wanted no part of the matter. The rest: of Title III focused on
two primary means of obtaining waivers from compliance with 91-136.
Entitled "New Technology Aircraft Incentive", Section 303 mandated
an unlimited waiver of 2- or 3-engine non-complying aircraft pro-
viding a binding contract for replacement by Stage 3 aircraft had
been entered into by January 1, 1983. This was a tightening of
the previous bill which had contained a 1985 date. But the failure
to include a time limit on the waiver loosened the bill. Finally,
Section 304 gave the Secretary the power to waive the requirements
MS
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of compliance of 2-, 3-, and 4-engined aircraft, subject only to	 +#
a broadly defined "good cause" rule.
Less than a week later, with no further hearings, the bill
was quickly approved 13-0 for transmittal to the Senate Finance
Committee whose approval was necessary because of the ticket tax.
Carly in July the press indicated that final Congressional action
on the noise bibs would be late July or early August. 
31/
Now-
ever, political maneuvering and economic news placed this time
table in jeopardy. Although the ATA had just warned of the air-
lines financial inability to order the minimum amount of equiD-
mient needed, United. on July 13, announced a $1.6 billion order
for a new aircraft.
With Congressional adjournment only a few weeks away, and with
a great deal of attention focused on the forthcoming vote on the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the ATA had its work cut out
for it to grove the less desirable Senate bill to the floor where
perhaps a Senate-house Conference Committee could make it conform
more closely to the Anderson bill. Bad news came in late Septem-
ber when Senator Cannon and Reps. Johnson and Anderson expressed
concern that President Carter would veto the iegislation if passed.
It developed that the only way to get the bill out of the Senate
Finance Committee was to di-op the funding from the bill and re-
Lair. the waiver provisions. In doing this on October 3, the Com-
31 / 
Aviation Daily, July 10, 1978 p. 25.
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mittee left untouched one benefit, i.e., a reduction in the ticket
tax by 2 percentage points. The theory was that the carriers then
would have the same two percent available for aircraft replacement
as earmarked in the original bill. However, as the airlines saw
it, the prosperous firms would reduce their fares by 2% and so the
needy ones would have to do so to meet the competition. As a re-
sult, therp would be no money for aircraft replacement. Thus,
the airlines considered the Senate version was a total loss on
the financing side, but a gain on the waiver matter. Although
the bill still contained a provision authorizing the CAB to insti-
tute noise charges, given the CAB philosophy and its probable de-
mise under deregulation, the provision was considered ineffective.
Since the possible effects of the Airline Deregulation Act
would be more pervasive than the noise legislation, most of the
remaining time prior to adjournment was spent by airline lobbyists
in this area. As of October 12, with Congress striving to adjourn,
the Senate bill had not been called up. However, at 2:00 AM,
October 15, during the nonstop chaotic session beginning on the
14th the Cannon bill passed the Senate. Normally a conference
committee would be appointed to compose the differences. in this
case, with just hours left before adjournment and with a bill
without financing but with waive-, ,s, house managers, seeing no way
of finding a compromise between the extremes of the two bills,
let the legislation die. A last minute parliamentary move by
Rep. Anderson failed and Congress adjourned without a vote being
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taken. The airlines were keenly disappointed that $3.4 billion
assistance which the Anderson bill would have provided was lost.
D.8.4 Summary For 1978
The failure of noise financing legislation at the close
of the 95th Congress did not have the catastrophic effect predicted
when the legislation was initiated back in 1977. As earlier chap-
ters have indicated, the legislation had its genesis when the fed-
eral government, at a time of economic recession during which air-
lines were having difficulty in digesting previous commitments for
aircraft made during prosperous times, promulgated a rule which
would require the carriers over a phasing period to modif} or re-
place a large number of aircraft at substantial expense to effect
a reduction in aircraft noise for environmental reasons.
I I.
	
	 Because the government ordered this retroactive application
of the rule, the carriers reasoned that the government had an
obligation to assist in financing compliance. At the very time
hearings on proposed legislation commenced, the economic fortunes
of the companies began to improve. However, the legislative pro-
cess moved too slowly for success. By the end of 1977 profits had
substantially improved. However, the carriers argued that pro-
fits were not yet sufficient and in 1978 might be lower. Their
other thrust was that the expense of modifying the 2- and 3-engine
planes was non-productive so that a waiver should be rude for them.
behind the scenes the ATA had difficulty in keeping its act to-
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gether. Delta and Northwest, with relatively modern fleets and
plans for compliance, threatened to testify against the legisla-
tion if funds from their passengers were used to subsidize rival
carriers.
Held up somewhat by intercommittee rivalries, noise iegisla-
tion made slow progress during 1978. The longer the bills stayed
in committee the less likely became their probability of passage.
Economic fortunes of carriers improved faster than the most opti-
mistic forcasters had predicted. Again the ATA had a difficult
time maintaining a cohesive front. While the ATA was pleading the
carriers' financial weakness case, various airlines, at most in-
opportune times, announced large capital commitments for new air-
craft, high earnings, improved balance sheets, refinancing, and
even the ability to pay for new aircraft primarily from internally
generated funds. It was the combination of high earn i no r. and the
disinclination of Congress under these curcumstances to set a
precedent which caused financing legislation to fail at the end
of the 95th session.
As 1978 drew to a close, indications were clear that airline
industry would press for some kind of legislation which would un-
doubtedly be opposed by environmentalists. Within two weeks of
the failure of legislation in the 95th Congress, Senator Cannon
announced plans to re-introduce a noise bill in 1979 without man-
datory noise abatement charges. Since his previous bill contained
broad waivers which would have invalidated a significant part of
1
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FAA regulation Subpart E, 91-136, his announcement signalled to
the environmentalists (primarily the airport operators and owners) 	 j
that the ATA strategy would now be to change legislatively 91-136
where it had not been able to move the FAA administratively. Var
sous organizations asked DOT to stand firm and enforce the regula-
tion. Secretary Adams responded with letters saying that the fail-
ure of the 95th Congress to enact the aircraft noise bill "will
not affect cur determination to enforce the aircraft noise compli-
ance regulation". Thus the stage was set for the 1979 legislative
effort to which we now turn.
D.9 THE 1979 NOISE LEGISLATION AND AIRCRAFT RETIREMENT
The defeat of the two aircraft noise abatement financing bills
in October 1978 and the simultaneous passage of the Airline Dereg-
ulation Act was followed by further increasing airline profitabil-
ity. As a result, a law mandating financial assistance for re-
tiring aircraft was no longer a political reality. However, little
else had changed. On the one hand, ATA made its number one 1979
legislative priority the partial or complete elimination of the
compliance program stipulated in FAR 91-136. On the rulemaking
side, in March 1979, ATA petitioned the FAA to eliminate the Jan-
uary 1, 1981 compliance date (leaving the 1983 and 1985 dates a-
lone) and substitute the submission of a compliance plan. On the
congressional side, the ATA was pushing for legislation which
would (1) permit the CAB to establish noise surcharges, (2) wipe
„ as	 _
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out the requirement to retrofit or replace 2- and 3-engined non-
complying aircraft, and (3) provide for extensions of compliance
dates. Should the ATA be successful it could be argued that de-
cisions on aircraft retirement would be made on the basis of the
operating economics of the aircraft themselves, as they formerly
had been, and not for legislated environmental reasons. 32/
On the other hand, public groups were preparing to push in
the opposite direction. In California for example, pressures
continued with the result that San Diego attempted to ban new car-
riers from entrance because of the noise problem. The California
DOT was requesting that San Diego limit flights of noncomplying
aircraft so as to meet strict environmental regulations. In
Washington the Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD) was
proposing a new, stricter noise descriptor, Ldn, and drafting le-
gislation to include money under ADAP for noise monitoring equip-
ment and the soundproofing of homes and public buildings near air-
e,
	
	
ports. Additionally, the FAA, to defuse the growing lawsuit pro-
blem, was suggesting to HUD that owners or rentors of property,
32/
The idea that environmental and economic factors were mutually
exclusive was, however, beginning to be questioned. Since high
bypass engines brought significant fuel economies, as well as
lower noise emissions, and since continued operation of noisy
aircraft generated diseconomies in the form of curfews, law-
suits and other restrictions, some airlines began to feel that
it was good economics to work toward compliance. Later, and
not helping the ATA position, Continental, United, Delta, North-
western and Eastern began to make public capital out of their
compliance programs. Another large carrier, American quietly
was ordering retrofit kits and planning compliance.
Ii
f
4
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as a condition of receiving financial assistance, furnish state-
ments acknowledging their awareness of the noise problem. The
FAA was also proposing a scheduled closing of 9:30 p.m. for the
Washington National Airport.
There was a Congressional proposal in the mill to establish 	
F
r
a nationwide Airport Noise Curfew Ccmnission. Further, the serious
economic implications of unsatisfactory progress in resolving the
noise problem was highlighted by the February 28, 1979 decision of
the California Court of Appeals upholding the much talked about
ruling awarding damages to homeowners for mental and emotional
distress caused by noise from the Los Angeles International Air-
port, Greater Westchester Homeowners Association V. City of Los
Angeles (No. C-931-989). Finally, one of the country's busiest
airports, Atlanta, reported that noise levels were rising. The
Administration position was that there were still 6 million pecple
and 900,000 acres of land subject to noise levels above that which
was considered by HUD to be normally acceptable and that lawsuits
were still pending for millions of dollars with the potential
liability for noise damages in billions of dollars.
Except for a muting of the argument of the impossibility of
securing private financing, ATA's arguments were essentially the
same as in the previous Congress. First, retrofit made no discer-
nable difference for the planes equipped with JT8D engines and,
in addition, carried a fuel penalty. Retrofit was, therefore,
ineffective and a waste of money. Secondly, it was not possible
to obtain delivery of the quieter Stage 3 aircraft in time to
i
r
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meet the deadlines of 91-136. Third, Congress had delayed so long
in enacting legislation that it was getting too late to order re-
trofit kits for the 707 and DC-8 series. According to the ATA and
the aircraft manufacturing industry, relaxation of compl iance dates
	
	
4i
would permit the industry to intensify its efforts at noise re-
duction on the existin g
 fleets; whereas holding to the deadlines
might cause the termination of important programs to reduce noise
on future 727, 737, and DC-8 aircraft.
D.9.1 FAR Compliance, Initial 1979 Bills: S.413 (Cannon)
and H.R. 2458 Johnson/Harsha
All the 1979 bills contained a Title I involving airport
planning, a Title II involving funds for the construction of air-
ports, a Title III involving FAR 36 compliance, and several other
titles. Titles I and II were almost identical to the same titles
in the 1977 and 1978 bills and will not be treated further.
Recognizing the previous difficulty when a House move in
advance and independent of the Senate resulted in two vastly
different bills, Congressional leaders this time made an attempt
to initiate quite similar legislation. Senator Cannon led off
with a bill which required each airline to supply a compliance
plan. However, the compliance dates contained in 91-136 could be
moved by permissive or mandatory types of waivers. First, the
Secretary could waive the date for an unspecified period of time
for any noncomplying aircraft if there was "good cause" and "good
faith". Additionally, an open-end clause permitted a waiver for
- _ _.^....
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any other circumstances the Secretary deems appropriate."
The second waiver was a mandatory waiver of the date for a
noncomplying aircraft if the operator had a binding contract by
January 1, 1983 to purchase a Stage 3 aircraft to replace a 2-
or 3-engine aircraft, or by January 1, 1985 to replace a 4-engine
aircraft. In subsequent bills this paragraph took the name of
"new technology incentive provision".
Harking back to the Ford proposal of several years previous
the Cannon bill authorized the CAB to impose a noise abatement
charge of 2% of the ticket price to be used only for noise abate-
ment purposes. This permissive charge, the vestigal remains of
previous mandatory charges, given the temper and scheduled demise
of the CAB, was not considered likely to be implemented. The
House bill was identical except that there was no CAB financing
mechanism.
D.9.2 Opposition To Cannon And Johnson Waiver Legislation
The waiver provision quickly proved unacceptable to many
groups. First, the Administration, through the Secretary of Tran-
portation and the EPA, argued that waivers would erode the expec-
tations of the public; that because the Secretary already had the
power to grant waivers no additional legislation was necessary;
and that the reason for the delay for new technology was spurious
(the manufactuers would be glad to take orders for the 757, 767,
A310, of Lockheed Super 80, all of which would meet Stage 3).
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The EPA indicated that if waivers were to be granted, they should
be limited to Stage 4 and Stage 5 aircraft as proposed by the EPA
in 1976 and applicable to designs after January 1, 1980 for Stage
4 and January 1, 1985 for Stage 5.
By April further opposition surfaced in the form of eleven
public interest, environmental and consumer groups banding to-
gether to defeat the Cannon bill. By March, Senator Cannon had
whisked his bill through his committee on a 15-0 vote without pub- 	 #
i
lic hearings on the grounds that the subject had been fully ex-
plored in the 95th Congress. As a result of the opposition to such
wide inroads being made in compliance by the Cannon and Johnson {
bills, two new House bills were int-oduced narrowing the relaxa-
tion authorized in S. 413. H.R. 5347 introduced on April 9, by
Rep. Norman Mineta (D-Cal.) did not contain a "good cause" or
"good faith" waiver. Nor did the new technology waiver apply to
4-engine airplanes. To warrant a new technology waiver for l-
and 3-engine non-complying aircraft a binding contract had to be
signed by January 1, 1981 and involved Stage 3 replacement. The
date represented a two year shrinkage from the 1983 date in the
previous bills.
Two days later, Rep. Glenn Anderson (D-Cal), stating that
his purpose was to encourage the purchase of Stage 3 aircraft
introduced H.R. 3596 which, if passed, would have been more re-
strictive than the Mineta Proposal. Title III of his bill provided
no waivers after 1985, except that 2-engined aircraft could con-
-.-c , cm-'+,	 ^..	
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inue to fly indefinitely if limited to small community service.'
r
	 A second significant feature was the prohibition of the construc-
L pp, of Stage 2 aircraft after January 1, 1983.
	 i 
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D.9.3 Emergence Of Re-Engining As A Viable Alternative To
	
^a
During the preceding two years the standard litany had
been that retrofit, while not expensive relative to re-engining
or replacement, was ineffective and a waste of resources; that re-
engining was about 4 times as expensive and it would not make sense
to spend $11,000,000 per plane on old airplanes; that replacement
was the preferred way to go but that there were no suitable Stage
3 new technology aircraft currently available for purchase, even
if financing were no problem. The development of the 767 and 757,
^-,•.	 plus the DC-9 Super 80, somewhat diminished the argument that no
new stage 3 aircraft below the size of the 747, DC-10 and Lockheed
L-1011 were available.
During 1978 a substantial progress had been made in reducing
the price of re-engining and the time of certification of new
technology stage 3 a c:^aft closer. Pour-;ng over their books,
airlines flying the 60 series of the Douglas DC-8 discovered that
,
the operating costs after re-engining, would be in line with the
wide-bodies. As the capital cost of new equipment escalated and
with a still greater escalation of fuel prices, the economics of
re-engining Some of the 60 series, particularly the 61, instead
^	 ^y
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of retiring them, began to look better and better. Finally, at
about the time of the House hearings in April, United, Delta, and
Flying Tiger announced Decisions to re-engine a number of the DC-
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8 series 60 with CFM56 en.,i nes, at a cost of $8 to $9 million per
aircraft. By the time of delivery a new replacement plane would
cost as much a; $40 million. Since the re-engined configuration
not only met Stage 3 but also involved a significant reduc e 3n in
specific fuel consumption, the total result was considered a bar-
gain. Thus, aircraft which only a year earlier had been programmed
for retirement for economic and environmental reasons, would, ex-
cept for a technicality in the wording of 91-136, be continued in
active service.
As 91-136 was written, noncomplying Stage 1 or Stage 2 air-
craft could be replaced only by aircraft shown to meet Stage 3
before the issuance of the original airworthiness certificate,
which of course a re-engined plane could not do. At the time of
a
House hearing the FAA announced a proposed change In the defini-
tion of "replacement airplane" to include a re-engining which
`	 would meet Stage 3, 33/ thereby making it possible for a re-en-
gined aircraft to comply with the noise rule.
D.9.4 Senate Pas sage Of Cannon Bill With Broader Waivers
:t has previously been noted that the Cannon bill, nicknamed
33/ 44 Federal Register ?4718, April 26, 1979.
1
.-the "industry bill" by the opposition, enjoyed a quick trip through
')' ` the Committee without hearings before being approved 15-0. On
Mby 1, it was likewise speedily approved in the Senate oy a 18-5
vote with a further broadening of Ascape clauses.	 amendment by
Senator Stevens (R-Alaska) provided that aircraft which exceeded
/FAR 36 by no more than 5 decibels would be deemed in compliance.
x
; ,Jhe rationale was to take into account the argument that an indi-
vidual rarely can tell the difference in noise when the differen-
tial is less than 5 decibels. Senator Javits (D-NY), long under
pressure from his New York constituents, failed in an attempt to
have all the waiver provisions eliminated.
The Stevens amendment was looked on with approval by a major-
ity of airlines and with disapproval by the environmentalists and
a few airlines. Those who put a low value on the ability of en-
vironmental groups at the state and local level to place meaning-
ful constraints on the operation of aircraft should the compliance
rule be substantially relaxed saw:(1)the savings involved in not
having to retrofit their aircraft, (2) the savings in being able
to avoid the mandatory retirement from their fleets of noncomply-
ing planes, and (3) the avoidance of high capital expenditures for
new replacement aircraft.
As expected, environmentalists complained that the Stevens
Amendment was an obvious step backward in the government's policy
to control noise. As will be seen, the amendment was too much of
a pill for Delta, a long time believer in noise abatement as a
i
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Delta, who with Northwest, had been a thorn in the ATA side in the
fi	 previous Congress, came -out formally °aasair.st any  waiver of the noise
compl iance dates.
Z^^mppaac t cif Stevens Amen*ent a on Re i rec t o f 'lone-.
p^yshq, Aircraft: ^'iere were-conflicting YTe+^r -off
c	
iwct."of" the Stevens amen nt. ?zany. fclt-it-would prolong the
use of the 727_,:-,-73T and "JRC-9 flits thus enhancing their value on
F	 "
tiv used aircraft mar e -when it--cam;:-t=ii?iQ to replace them with
Stage s^a --aft,-which, accst.dihq # ,*.he 1?, would rat be avail-
able before the 1 g9Qs. " Tfie manufacturers arg^u that the amend-;-	 "
-meat would buy theu'"time to cen t
 inue--;irking on noise attenuation
on OC- g ," 727 aircraft: ,
 bring these airplane:.-in ."l,itie with Stagg
3 standards
	 However,`
:
a contrary o
	
^^n'.i^ dust as tnital.
Boeing, because the design CGStS are argety "wrrL ten "of g, 4:as a
f
substantial incentive to keep the 727 line producingfor as long
as possible. A number of groups in Boeing find their gobs depen-
dent: on keeping the 727 and 73: ccrmpetitivts-and envirorenta!ly
up to date. Jince the company has reported it is close to making
both aircraft meet Stage 3, it could well be that holding to the
FAR l=imits and deadlines would serve to accelerate the pressure
on the company to make the breakthrough which would enable the
Stage 3 problem to be solved.
s
One last point, the assumption that the amendment would raise
the used aircraft value because the aircraft woull be "legal" in
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the United Stages may be invalid. lrirst. the United States re-
presentw less than one-half of the world market so that a broader 	 i
view must be taken. Second,: there -is increasing disinclination,
troth in the United States and abroad, 34^ on the part of airport
neighbors and other state and 'ducal levels of government to accept
	 i
fur themselves the rules laid down by the national authorities.
1o: onf m-ation one need only observe the increasing activities
of state departments of transportation, local and other- authorities
in the area of'ctdrfc­s t operatimxj procedures. noise monitoring and
so zn.	 !;e des i re , foi- r°Llie f from noise is a world wide phenomena
so that, it- may we!-, he 'that for miis e (as well as for Fuel economy i
reasons!, t he deFi;and f0t- SU%Ch d ircraft on the Ul.e ` maa'ket n idy
slacken pub,, tan  i d I I 	 -
F
U.>.	 i'r.ioress B--fore ilie
-
 Hou se SUE- 	 Works Anti Tran sporta-
Lion torrmi,,tee +,cif tf, n. .3596^ ^nde^ •nrl	
__
Since  no Senate ieear i ngs were lielil_ -41-t  was riot unt il the
House hearings of late Apri l . 1979. convened , that A . - t?.ree par'-
.ties (Attninistration, industry, and publ ic in tere%t_	 had
the opportunity to pres ent their views o n 1970 leg mSli,,iVe 13x0_
posa 1 s . ;sere the mm;,a i n in terest wa a the Ands r ^.op approach which
involved the elements of (1) limiting wa ivers to 1985, except for
`/ See i forthcomnin g NASA report by this investigator involving
foreign noise regulations which show ,  that local .authorities
can constrain noisy aircraft operations against the desires
of, tilt.'. national guu rrvi'enll.
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twin engine flights in small community operation, and (2) the ter-
mination of production on January 1, 1983 of any aircraft which
could not meet stage 3.
The manufact.irers, wishing to keep all their options open.
strongly opposed the cut off of Stage 2 production for three rea-
sons. Fist, elimination of Stage 2 production would only change
noise by 0.5dB by 1985. This was not surprising since very few
Stage 2 aircraft would be replaced by Stage 3 in the period. No
forecast was made for the change by 1990 or 1995. Secondly, it
was argued that discontinuation of Stage 2 would force carriers
to turn to non-optimum larger size 757s. 35/ Third, it was empha-
sized that the termination of Stage 2 production would end vital
on-going noise reduction research for the 727 and 737. No one
A
35/ 
In view of the tremendous success of the 737 and 727 indi-
cating a market for this size a-irpiane, it is curious that
in later testimony before the Florio committee to which
this legislation was sequentially referred, a Boeing repre-
sentative stated that not even the first discussions have
been held on a new technology replacement for the 727 and
737. Of course Boeing has its hands full in launching the
757 and the 767 in addition to operating its other product
lines. Nevertheiess the 757 started out with a promotion
extolling its close derivation from the 727 with a great
degree of commonality of parts. However, this has been re-
placed with promotions emphasizing more new technology and
commonality with the 767. Presently there appears to be
a void in the 100-150 passenger aircraft category embodying
significant improvements in fuel efficiency and noise atten-
uation.
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asked the question why, if research was reasonably close to bring-
ing these planes to compliance with Stage 3, a date several years
hence would not accelerate research which would bring closer the
noise relief sought.
The Administration and public interest groups maintained their
positions in the hearings against waivers. Additionally they ar-
gued that because some Stage 3 aircraft were now in production,
cutting off production of Stage 2 aircraft was good for the en-
vironment and economically wise because of the significantly lower
fuel consumption of the newer airplanes. However, after the hear-
ings there continued to be strong lobbying by ATA and by the manu-
facturers. As a result, the Anderson bill H.R. 3596 was replaced
by a less restrictive Johnson bill H.R. 3942. It was amended to
be even less restrictive.
L.9.6 House Public Works And Transportation Committee Approves
Heavily Amended Bill H.P. 3942
In the committee the industry view carried the day. As a
consequence, the new H.R. 3442 was further liberalized. As finally
approved in committee, Title III contained four main changes.
First, the original provision for a January 1, 1983 cut off date
for the end of production of Stage 2 aircraft was watered down by
a "study and report" provision. The amended bile provided: (1)
that the Secretary of Transportation study whether there should
be a date and then make a report in one year: (2) that if a date
was proposed, Congress wou l d hive six months to look at it; and
-.L 14TAM-Al 2M
,
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(3) if a date was actually promulgated, action would be delayed
for another 60 days during which time either House could exercise
a veto.
Secondly, a provision, later described by the FAA Deputy
Administrator as "the biggest sleeper in the bill", rrohibited the
FAA from tightening the noise rules for 10 years. This would elim-
inate the retrofit requirement. A third change was the extension
of the "small community exemption" to permit the waiving of the
rules for 3-engine planes an addition to the original 2- engine ex-
emption. This third change would require a mountain of bookkeep-
ing as the application was limited to an aircraft (1) if 60: of
its operations were at airports which emplaced less than 1 percent
of total emplaned passengers of all certificated carriers in the
United States and (2) at least 300 of its operations at airports
which emplaned less than 114th of 1 percent. Finally, the fourth
addition was a statutory waiver for 2-engine planes used within
Hawaii.	 -Ab/
Approval on May 11 of this heavily amended but less restric-
tive measure by the House Committee on Public Works and Transpor-
tation displeased not only the environmentalists but also long
time sponsors of noise legislation. Heprtsentatives Anderson,
hineta, and Levitas voted against the bill in committee and sub-
36/ The Hawaiian change is anomalous because in a forthcoming
study involving noise regulations in the Pacific Ocean,
Hawaiian authorities reported virtually no noise troubles
with 3- and 4-engine large aircraft but problems with 2-
engined planes.
Et,
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mitted dissenting views. Representative Rosenthal called the bill
a "total disaster" The press reported that Representative Ander-
son's dissent so annoyed his colleagues that he lost all control
over the noise legislation and would not be a floor manager or a
conferee. 37/ Criticism of both the Senate and the House bills
accelerated both inside and outside of Congress to the point that
	 i
the Administration testified that each bill was unacceptable and
should not be passed. Of the two evils the House versic7 was the
lesser.
D.9.7 The House I nterstate And Foreign C ommerce Committee
Enters The Noise Legislation Aren a
T%ose interested in holding the line or tightening the
rule on noise abatement did not accept their defeat before the
House Public Works and Transportation Committee passively. Rep.
James Florio (D-N.J.), Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign
Commerce subcommittee of transportation and commerce, who also was
representative from a district subject to noise complaints around
the Philadelphia airport and a legislator whose committee's juris-
diction included EPA matters, asked for a sequential referral of
S. 3942 to his committee on the grounds that it had jurisdiction
over some of the matters contained in the bill. His complaint
was that "we are retreating dramatically in aviation noise abate-
31/
 Aviation Daily, May 21, 1979, R. 33.
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meat" and :the hand of the industry is visible in the legislation."
As a counter measure, Chairman Johnson of thA House Public Works
and Transportation Committee asked for ref .!-ral to his committee
of the Reauthorization of the Noise Control Act bill, a matter
previously under Rep. Florio's committee. Subsequent developments
confirmed than there was emerging a jurisdictional battle over who
had control of aviation legislation.
The Florio Hearings
The manufacturing industry, after first declining to test-
ify, presented its views essentially unchanged from previous ap-
pearances. Boeing supported waivers and indicated that it appeared
highly unlikely that Stage 3 replacements for 727s, DC-9s and 737s
would be available to meet the 1985 deadline, and that re-engining
altered drag, weight and balance and sometimes required an unwanted
"stretch" on the aircraft. Such testimony implied a very limited
role for re-engining. Douglas dwelled on the absence of meaningful
benefits for retrofit and, therefore, urged that legislation en-
courage Stage 3 as a long term solution. Douglas made news by in-
dicating that it not only had one narrow body medium-range deri-
vative plane, the DC-8 Super 80, which could meet Stage 3, but
had been offering in Europe, without success, a smaller DC-8 Super
80SF with a capacity of slightly over 100 seats.
The Administration through the EPA, and FAA testified against
both the Senate and House bills indicating that the new technology
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waiver in the Senate bill was a disincentive for compliance or
retiring aircraft; that Stage 3 was not new technology but was
today's technology (DC-10, 747, DC-9 Super 80, A310, t-1011);
that a "good cuase" waiver tied with new technology waivers would
merely give an airline excuses not to move; that the 2- and 3-en-
gine waivers for small community usage would require an impossible
	
f
amcunt of record keeping; and that the Stevens amendment in thre
Senate, the "study and report" amendment to the Stage 2 cut off,
and the 10 year restriction on imposing stricter noise standards.
in essence froze the EPA and FAA out of regulatory action. Finally,
the EPA witness noted that both bills penalized the "good" carriers
who had accepted Part 91-136 and were well on their way to full
compliance.
The Breaking of the ATA Ranks on Modifying or Eliminating 91-136
In previous sections dealing with the 1977-1978 legislative
effort, references have been made to the difficulties ATA experi-
enced in keeping Delta and Northwest in the fold. Both carriers
have understandable pride in their equipment programming and both,
with an eye on the noise problem, have consciously acquired quiet
equipment. Any government action which smacks of government aid
to make their rivals more competitive is frowned upon.
Delta, viewing both the House and Senate bills as legislation
which could backfire on complying carriers and the whole industry,
broke ranks by volunteering to testify against the waiving of the
-;^v.+.-^^.-Td•'-^+.-e+^!^-c^s`+^+r>'aaRfc .'nr^"^.-..S,s,r-^.9y ; .^agT^wF'^7^.""c_'m.R'+r'^r•°- s- .•^.., .^. 	 9. . -.. ^	 ^ _ _ 7	 _
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requirements of 91-136. At the Florio hearing on June 27, Delta's
Senior VP and General Counsel made the following points:
1. After exhaustive testimony 91-136 was promulgated listing
specific dates as mute as eight years in advance after
which all aircraft would have to comply with Stage 2 limits.
2. The FAA has continually stated that it intends to enforce
the regulation.
3. Airport and local authorities in the United States, as
a means of holding down the expansion of more constraining
rules, have relied upon the implementation of the rule in
their dealing with complaining aircraft neighbors.
4. Delta itself assumed that the rule would not be changed
and developed an expensive concrete noise abatement plan
which would achieve full compliance via retrofit, re-
engining and via purchase of new Stage 3 equipment by the
stipulated deadline dates.
5. Delta and others have moved ahead in good faith and spent
the necessary funds to comply. It would be unfair to give
special treatment to the laggards.
6. A relaxing of the deadlines, or giving permanent waivers,
will result in a feeling by the public and the airport
operators of being betrayed. As a result, there will be
a proliferation of uncoordinated curfews and other con-
straining regulations which will hurt the complying air-
lines as well as those who have not. In fact, air trans-
portation in general would be harmed by the actions of
a few.
Nor was Delta the only carrier to speak out against the legi-
slation. Northwest testified along the general lines of Delta
and emphasized its strong re-equipment program involving retro-
fitting and phasing out of noisy aircraft. Northwest argued that
both bills contained inequities giving preferred treatment to foot
draggers. Somewhat more surprising was the testimony of Eastern
which, until Col. Frank Borman came aboard as President, had been
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considered to be incapable of handling a noise reduction program
without government assistance. Although disagreeing with the bene-
fit of retrofitting 2- and 3-engine airplanes, Eastern did relate
the significant strides it had made toward compliance and indicated
that it might miss the compliance date for one plane only and that
by a matter of several months. Eastern was confident that under
the existing rules it would receive the necessary waiver by the
FAA. No other airline testified but reference was made that Con-
tinental had initiated a compliance program in April, that United
had been proceeding for several years on the assumption that the
rules would not be relaxed. American's commitment to phasing out
its noisy aircraft had been publicized.
D.9.8 H.R. 3942 As Amended rSy O merce Subcomaittee On Trans-
portation And Commerc e Of. tiie House
The Florio committee determined that the proposed legisla-
tion was seriously flawed in the direction of excessive waivers
and escape clauses. Therefore amendments, the thrust of which were
toward tightening provision which the Public Works and Transpor-
tation had just loosened, were added. Since Florio's committee
Clearly had jurisdiction over EPA in the past, the most supportable
mechanism for tightening was, according to Florio, to "Include
S
the Environmental Protection Agency back into the process of de-
fining noise standards and to ensure that the (Commerce) Committee's
jurisdiction is preserved as an element of deliberation on avia-
a
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tion noise (issues)." 38/ If adopted, the ^lorio amendments would
enhance the authority of the EPA and Commerce Committee. The
`	 emasculation of their bill displeased the rival House Public Works
Committee so much that it proposed a cut of $4 million in the Noise
Control Act Reauthorization Bill, a bill belonging in the past of
the Commerce Committee. 39/
To tighten the 2- or 3-enyine waiver for aircraft operating
out of small community airports, an amendment made the waiver con-
tingent upon a finding by the Secretary, after consulting with the
EPA, that there would not be an adverse effect on people's health
or the environment. However, since the Secretary is a political
appointee, politics might skew the result and there could be l,cng-
delays in the process. Because of jurisdictional problems, there
was nothing much Florio could do with the date for cutting off
the manufacture of Stage 2 aircraft other than to feed the EPA
into the loop by requiring an EPA report to Congress which would
make a comparison of DOT's recommended date and all "alternatives".
The final change in Title III modified the 10-year restriction on
more stringent noise regulations for airplanes having a certificate
by permitting the Secretary to determine after notice and the op-
portunity for hearing that health and environmental benefits of
compliance outweighed the costs to the operator. Changes ir. other
38/ Noise Regulation Reporter, No. 135, July 16, 1979, p. A-19.
39/ Ibid.
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titles enhanced EPA power, allowed noise exposure maps to be used
in court under certain conditions, required people buying property
near an airport to be furnished noise data, and required the FAA
to submit all future noise emission regulations to the House Com-
merce Committee and Senate Environment and Public Works Committee.
On July 10 the FAA and eleven airlines were sued by Neighbors
Opposed to Irritating Sound Emissions (N.O.I.S.E.) for failing to
reduce noise at Washington National Airport. Damages of $10,000
per homeowner were asked. Various states and foreign countries
were busy contemplating further noise rules. HUD adopted a final
regulation which made Ldn the noise descriptor and established
zones for acceptable, unacceptable, and formally unacceptable noise
exposure. ICAO, over objections of man y countries engaged in es-
r.	
tablishing earlier cut off dates for aircraft not meeting the fore-
ign equivalent of Stage 2, established January 1, 1988 as a date
for compliance with the international standard, Annex 16, Chapter
U	 2.
D.10 SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT OR MODIFY THE
C MPLIANCE RULE AND ITS EFFECT ON AIRCRAFT RETIREMENT
After several years of growing pressure by airport citizen
groups requesting retroactive application of FAR 36 to aircraft
previously not covered by the regulation, the FAA, on December 23,
I	 1976, promulgated rule FAR 91-136 which provided for compliance
by such aircraft via a three phase program with interim dates of
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January 1, 1981, January 1, 1983 and full compliance by January 1,
1985. Although responsible public officials during the long hear-
ings on the regulation had assured the airlines that because of
the depressed state of the industry no rule would be passed without
accompanying financial assistance legislation, no such legislation
was even proposed with the issuance of the regulation.
It was possible to comply with the rule by three different
methods at quite different levels of cost and benefit. Retrofitting
and modification to the engine and adding sound absorbent material
(SAM) would cost the least, but would result in the smallest de-
crease in noise. The industry contended and the environmentalists
denied, particularly with regard to 2- and 3-engine airplanes, that
the improvement through retrofit would not be discernable to the
average person. Compliance could also be accomplished by replacing
'	 the engine with a new, quiet, more fuel-efficient engine at a cost
of at least four times that of retrofit. Finally, replacing the
airplane, the third means of compliance, would involve retiring
the aircraft and replacing it with a new one costing at ten to
fifteen times .-he cost of retrofit but having additional benefits
in the form of new technology and efficiency in fuel and noise
emissions. Since both retrofit and re-engining involved the con-
tinued use of 15 to 20 year old aircraft where previously retire-
ments had often been between 7 and 10 years, a consensus emerged
that if financing could be arranged replacement was the desired
course of action.
-'7' ' R'r -7T'T'
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-gin 1977 and 1978 a series of bills addressing the broad area of
^',^r7ise abatement including, in addition to aircraft financing,
standardizing the measurement of noise, land use planning for noise
abatement purposes, liability for noise damages, and other matters
x.	
were introduced. Land use planning, if implemented, would in the
ir' 4
Iang run have a pronounced effect on slowing the retirement dates
of aircraft. Zoning and purr.-se of land for buffer zones would
prevent people from moving to the noise. Notwithstanding the gen-
.^`eral agreement that financial assistance legislation should pro-
Fvide incentives for replacement, the first bill actually contained
an incentive for retrofitting. A revised version, purportedly
aimed at replacement, favored re-engining. Finally, in the fail
of 1977, a revision favoring replacement was satisfactory to the
airlines and passed the House Committee on Public Works and Trans-
portation. By the time the bill reached the Ways and Means Com-
mittee; to which it was referred because of the ta y changes re-
quired, increasing airline profits caused Congressmen to raise
the question as to the need for the legislation. Additionally,
fear of setting a precedent for other industries to follow also
became a Congressional concern.
During 1978 the Senate took up the legislation in a less
sympathetic atmosphere and there was introduced the concept of
extending the compliance time contingent upon ordering aircraft
meeting the more stringent Stage 3 standards. In October, the
Senate dropped the key provision providing for airline funding
_ _ -
	
-^,-•sYq
	
^ :-^-^^.^ ^.^.±:.{ -^+'i^':mac:'°^°'°',.^°'ly'^''"-y'^a"^"
a _
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and in the closing hectic session of the Congress the differences
between the Senate and House bills were so great that there was
insufficient time to work out a compromise. The legislation, in-
cluding Titles I and II failed. As 1978 drew to a close it be-
came increasingly evident that the profitability of the airlines
was such that legislation embodying financial assistance was a
political impossibility.
In 1979 a new attempt at legislation was mounted by the ATA.
However, because of the political impossibility of financing legi-
slation, the focus of the industry was now on obtaining either a
complete elimination of FAR 91-136 or a substantial relaxation of
the deadline dates, or an elimination of the rule's application
to 2- and 3-engined aircraft. As of June 1979 the industry was
so successful in its efforts that the Administration and environ-
mentalists urged, even at the expense of losing Titles I and II,
that no bill be passed. As this is being written (July 1979),
after some parliamentary footwork, the House Irterstatc acid Fore-
ign Committee has su6TAtted amendments invctvi;rrq-modesr t 4,Qh ten i-Pa
of the House bill.
The introduction into legislation of ,u prop-:sal tt). -Ziate
production of a i rcraft which ran only Paeet Stage I: rjli -s, ^ ^.^ ztd
with holding fast to the r.offipliance gates, could, have A pro cl,n
effect upon aircraft retirement. Given 4nE pressure> from y4e.
public for noise abatement and the inc—.'casing ecunooiic penal'.i^^
imposed by the cost: of fuel for low bypass enginEs, ca.-viers
k
.r.^r.rt:.^.warw^'C^""+^:F»'^a.:!.+va""•'^"aae^i F.^^^L^"r.3^.: z ""`. - . r^,	 •v-.._ s-.r .^r±r=+: 	 ^	 - , . _	 .. - ... ^	 r _	 ^ ;^
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will be less inclined to compete with fuel ine f ficient airs(af=.
regardless of govertment noise requirements. The Situation would
be even clearer but for the absence of "off the shelf" similarly
sized replacements for nart'aw bodied 737. 177 and DC-9 using JT80
engines. Presently the alternative seems to he new technology or
derivative planes larger and Much more expell,.ive than those cur-
rently in use. At fire-sent. there app#_\trN to be no new correctly
sized. fuel-effici,^nt engine with low noise characteristics. which
can either be re-enginesd into existing 7:7. 137, or DC-9 aircraft.
of installed in newly desiyred planes of that si.e. 40`A Atten-
tls:'? hda, been cc.tered on large highpowered high bypa%s engines
b«d4se the larger Ill 's and DC-Ss needed relilacement first. and
because ecarK)mics favor the* developrent of the latge engines. As
;AR 3ti and 91 - 1.►a flow ~Land. there is no pressure to coltillly by pur-
chasitxj a Jtaye .'1 air,:ratt with their attendant higher Laltita.
cost belaule al l that is neces%arJ i^, to wt'vt :Ntallo . . At present.
to the	 S, pressure for the purchast^ Of ^-talje 3 k.-ut+tVs f ' ►r1111 two
s^ur;es:	 t'- »t,lkz *!te fear that envltvnunentalist:, will cautie ail'-
a;trt owrae^rs a tld UPl't'at4t	 to enaLL t'Uleti 1u111t1'ai111111t till' lll)erailrJ ll
of a ,1 ,- raf t W40-tl C,' U.err 1101se cali!'t lures acid; (2) f t't a tile, rapidly
40! 7e
	
.`	 a	 der ivativ e 1'_.3.l1:' ;c.r • ^-ali  l,l	 `Auoe , r •
 ;;t' which has not
^ala:^s! ur = n. ia'.'re' (16111berti. probabl% p.ir'tl) he'Laot v of .1
^;r	 ^f 11 { et`P! L : ,T :	 ? tl t °r f,1i a ;sf f1ii C'\ 1 S f 7lkt ► •loll 11•0111011t
:,%ol,, ; iris;	 o ­ r ^'; 1 a oyle nt, or' yt^w,ti: alts ii^iriy nture thalt a
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rising price of jet fuel whose effects can be significantly miti-
gated by the use of new aircraft designed to minimize fuel con-
sumption and other costs.
-1@1-
E.
AGING AS A FACTOR IN JET AIRCRAFT RETIREMENT
The conclusion reached in this section is that for current
jet aircraft "age" per se, whether it be measured by the passage
of time, the number of hours the aircraft is in service, the num-
ber of "cycles" (either pressurization, or landing) is not a fac-
tor in the forseeaale future leading to their retirement. The
reasons for this conclusion follow.
AGING
E.1 AGE IN YEARS
The conventional view is that machines wear out with use.
Provision for this is made by depreciating the machine over its
useful life. We have seen that in the prejet era . aircraft were
retired after seven to ten years of service - a period which did
not coincide their depreciation periods. It was anticipated that
the more costly jets would have a longer service life than the
preceding technology and thus spread the capital costs over more
units of service. When, about ten years later, more efficient
wide-bodied aircraft were designed, the annual traffic growth was
approximately 15%. With this demand it appeared that the cycle
of seven to ten years would repeat itself, at least, for trunk
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carriers. However. the slowing of traffic growth accompanied by
financial adversity which was intensified by the rapid increase
.-in fuel prices adversely affected the need for more capacity and
inhibited the purchase of new, more efficient, replacement aircraft
if such were available.
As the advisability or necessity of keeping current fleets
operating grew, attention turned to examining the question of to
what length and at what cost could aircraft lives be extended.
Table 17 shows the Fleet Age Distribution of U.S. Trunk lines. In
1976, from the standpoint of chronological age alone, 75 commercial
jets exceeded 16 years of age and 487 were over ten years old.
Since most of those are still in service, three more years can be
added for updating purposes.
Engineering investigations and experience by the operators
reveal that aside from some corrosion around the windows and in
the floors and underbody of the aircraft, the passage of time
alone does not cause significant deterioration of the aircraft.
Maintenance "fixes" have been able to correct for corrosion.
Appendix A indicates that the current jet fleet was introduced
into service in 1958, about 21 years ago. Since 21 years have
elapsed without significant degradation, time itself is not a
concern within the period of this study.
rar^aT^' ^" _. ..'_ •^-r_'r-fee^ .._.^,c.,,..^.yPs
:>+'^iv'^!l!TZ"^^'^.--s-..r...^..^+•W.'^+r
,Y'°^'r^'"_
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TABLE 17
SYSTEM TRUNK AIRLINE
SCHEDULED FLEET AGE DISTRIBUTION
1976
Years in Service 	 Number of Aircraft
18 3
17 27
16 48
15 --
14 17
13 67
12 87
11 91
10 147
9 160
8 304
7 152
6 90
5 65
4 88
3 110
2 75
1 65
Source: Robert R. Ross, Commercial Jet Replacement Process,
Master of Science in Transportation Thesis, Transpor-
tation Center, Northwestern University, 1976.
E.2 AGE IN HOURS AND CYCLES
In the prejet era, a convention arose to discuss airplane
life in terms of hours flown. Until the introduction of the four-
engine pressurized craft, the stage length of flights by the limi-
ted number of aircraft types were not widely different. Even in
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the prejet era, before the days of "on condition" maintenance,
much importance was attached to "hours", generally meaning accu-
mulation of 'off to on" times.
The advent of the jet, with its transcontinental and trans-
oceanic range and the further sophistication of design concepts,
brought with it the idea that the limiting factor of physical use
of the aircraft would be better expressed by "cycles." This may
be defined as takeoff and the subsequent landing.
E.2.1 Boeing Narrow Bodied Equipment
Boeing de:,igned the early 707s for 20,000 cycles which,
given their estimates of the longer stage length of the aircraft
translated into an "hours" figure of about 50,000. It also trans-
lated into a service life of about 17 years. At about
hours, a significant unanticipated "rework" program was performed
including "reskinning" certain wing panels. This brought the esti-
mated service life up beyond the original 50,000 hours to 50,000
hours.
Three situations combined to make this rework desirable.
First, the immediate public acceptance of the first jets led to
their use on much shorter segments than the designers had antici-
pated and hence accelerated the time at which the cycle limit
would be reached. Second, the market success c6upled with the
increased reliability of the jets enabled the operators to increase
utilization. This also accelerated the accumulation of cycles.
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Fnally, Boeing which had previously been accustomed to the low
utilization and relatively infrequent landing of military equip-
ment and without the years of experience with a commercial fleet
such as the DC-3, DC-4, and DC-6 of Douglas, designed the 707 to
operate at somewhat higher stress levels than did Douglas. One
result was a lighter airplane and an attendant presumed slight
fuel economy and increased payload. In the 707 series the consen-
sus is that the amount spent in increased maintenance just about
balances the economy of the lighter weight.
In 1975 a number of 707s were exceeding 57,000 hours and were
facing another but less substantial rework at reaching 60,000
hours. Some airlines undertook this maintenance expense and then
projected the useful life to 82,000 hours. Employing normal annual
utilization %igures results in a total physical life expectancy
of 28 years. Boeing engineers indicate s and this is not disputed
by the operators of 707 aircraft, that when 82,000 hours are
reached, it will be readily possible and not too expensive in re-
lation to replacement costs to undertake further work which would
extend the life to 100,000 hours or beyond. Table 18 displays
a frequency distribution of flight hours for various series of
707 aircraft as of June 1975. By January 1, 1979, "high time"
aircraft are over 70,000 hours.
Current Boeing 707 aircraft are powered by P&W JT3D engines.
Earlier non-fan craft used the JT3C and JT4. Unlike the airframe,
which in general terms stays intact but for repairs and modifica-
f
_1"
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TABLE 18
BOEING_ 707/720, 727 1 737 1 747 FLEET STATUS
IN-FLIGHT HOURS AS	 UNE 1975
Number of Aircraft
Hours 707 & 720	 727	 737 747
60,000+
;55-60 6
50-55 24
45-50 56
40•-45 99
35-40 142 7
30-35 132 66
25-30 159 207
20-25 102 228	 12 25
15-20 22 240	 109 95
10-15 8 103	 154 67
5-10 11 138	 45 39
0-5 34 165	 116 38
'	 Source: Ross (1976) See Table 14.
tion, an aircraft engine not only is moved from plane to plane
but over time undergoes almost a complete replacement of compon-
ent parts. In fact it is often said that the only part of an en-
gine which remains after a few years is the nameplate displaying
the serial number. Accordingly, as with the airframe, age per se
of an engine has no necessary relationship to the retirement of
the aircraft. The efficiency aspect will be treated elsewhere.
The next series of Boeing aircraft considered is the 727
series. Starting the design about 10 years after the design of
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the 707, Boeing took into consideration its experience on the 707;
it lowered some of the stresses on the wing and fuselage and de-
signed the plane assuming a riuch shorter average length flight.
Early 727 fuselages had a cold bond process which was unsatisfac-
tory from a corrosion point of view and hot bonding replaced it.
Thus the goal or design was set at 60,000 cycles, Subsequent ex-
perience indicates that the average stage length for the 727 is
approximately one hour. Accordingly the design life on this basis
is 60,000 hours. In 1975, the high time aircraft had over 37,000
hours, and more than 200 planes were over 25,000 hours. It will
not be until 1980 that 727s will reach 54,000 hours. Since the
727 was designed on the experience of the 707, and since no struc-
tural problems have developed thus far, the conclusion is reached
that it will be possible to push the service life another sizeable
increment.
The Boeing 737 needs little treatment here. It was specifi-
I-
	
	
tally designed for the higher cycles of the short haul and was
also a structural advance over the preceding 707. With a chrono-
logical age of less than 9 years, a high time of about 20,000 hours
and cycles of about 20,000 hours and cycles of about 32,000, age
in any one of these parameters is not a concern to the operators
of the 737.
In summary, for the current Boeing fleet, which number 2791
aircraft out of a total world commercial jet fleet of 4587, re-
tirement of these planes will not come about because of their age
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in years, or because they have reached the end of their life be-
cause of hours in the air or cycles.
-E.2.2 McDonnell Douglas Narrow-Bodied Equipment
The next largest fleet is that of McDonnell Douglas whose
commercial jet aircraft numbered 1240 in 1975. As was the case
with Boeing, the DC-8 series aircraft were designed for a service
life equivalent to 50,000 hours (McDonnell Douglas Company report
J6903, "Structural Durability of DC-8 Jet Aircraft," June, 1975),
At 8 hours a day, this is a design service life of 17 years. Table
19 shows the total flight hours of certain Douglas series.
TABLE 19
DC-8-20 -30 -40 -50 Series
FLEET STATUS- L T aOURS AS OF JUNE 1975
Total Flight Number of
Hours (000) Aircraft
15-20 8
20-25 7
25-30 22
30-35 37
35-40 45
40-45 62
45-50 55
50-55 12
55-60 5
Source: Ross (1976) See Table 14.
s
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The early Douglas planes are now about 21 years of age, are now
exceeding 70,000 hours of use and, because of the stage lengths,
have fewer cycles than hours. On the basis of current structural
studies Douglas is now predicting a mean service life of 82,000
hours which translates into a 28-year service life. As aircraft
in the data base mature, it is felt by the manufacturer and oper-
ators that the service life can be further extended. For example,
if examination at 60,000 hours reveals that 40 cracks have devel-
oped the projected life will be 100,000 hours or 34 years. If, on
the other hand, approximately 30 cracks have developed the projected
mean service life will be 110,000 hours or 38 years. As previously
indicated the Douglas aircraft is somewhat heavier structurally
than Boeing and historically has had less maintenance.
The Douglas DC-9 short-haul plane entered service in 1965
and 1966. No structural fatigue has been found and with an age
of less than ten years, with hours less than 30,000 and cycles
less than 40,000, the physical life of the series projects beyond
anything of concern in this study.
In summary, for the current Douglas fleet retirement will
not come about because of age on years, hours of service, or num-
ber of cycles performed.
E.2.3 Wide-Bodied Aircraft: Boeing 747, Douglas DC-10,
Lockheed L-1011
The wide-bodied aircraft - namely, the 747, DC-10 and L-
1011 - were designed after taking careful account of the experience
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with the DC-8, the 707 and Convair series and much interaction
between manufacturers and the airlines. As a result, the airframes
contain incremental refinements of existing technology and should
have an even longer service life than the narrow-bodied jets.
This expectancy is confirmed by the longer depreciation periods
the carriers have set up initially for the wide-bodied as compared
with their previous aircraft.
E.3 DEPRECIATION, BOOK VALUE, USED AIRCRAFT PRICES
Depreciation is often defined as "the loss, not restored by
current maintenance, which is due to all the factors causing the
ultimate retirement of property. These factors embrace wear and
tear, decay, inadequacy, and obsolescence" [Lindheimer v. Illinois
Bell Telephone Co. 29 US 151, 167 (1934)]. In the air transport
industry obsolescence is difficult to predict in advance. In
the prejet era we noted th-At, despite the development of more ef-
ficient piston aircraft, obsolescence from a financial point of
view was masked by a strong demand to fill an undercapacity situ-
ation. As a consequence, aircraft generally sold above book and
provided funds for the purchase of jets.
In the jet era there has been a wide gap between the time
one airline may start to retire a piece of equipment and that of
another line. Table 20 indicates that BAC-Ills began to leave
American and Braniff in 5 and 7 years respectively; Eastern's
720s began at 7 years and Continental's at 14. Such departures
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may mean the purchase was early proved a mistake because of over-
capacity, wrong mission, or failure to receive a contemplated
route award.
TABLE 20
JET AIRCRAFT RETIRE` FROM TRUNK SERVICE
Aircraft Type
	
Carriers	 Years in Service
BAC-11
	
AA, BN	 5,7
CV-990
	
AA	 6
Caravel Ie
	
UA	 8
DC-8-61/63
	
EA,NA	 6,8
707-100/300
	
CO,BN,PA	 8,9,13
DC,-8-NF
	
PA,EA,NA,DL
	
8,13,13,16
DC-9-10
	
CO	 9
CV-880
	
DL,TW	 13,15
720
	
EA,AA,BN,PA,NW,UA,CO 7,9,9,9,10,12,14
Source: Ross (1976)
Table 21 shows that aircraft retired from one carrier stay
in service with others much longer. For example, on Western Air-
lines the Boeing 720 is still flying after 15 years of service.
TWA and American still have the early 707s, which were once turbo-
jets before conversion to turbofans, pushing 18 and 19 years of
age.
If the Domestic Trunks plus P-T n American were to rep'ace
aircraft as their book life expired, Boeing has calculated from
public data that an average of 170 planes a year would be replaced
over the epriod 1978-1986 as shown in Chart 4.
MT
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TABLE 21
JET CRAFT REMAINING IN TRUNK SERVICE
Aircraft Types Carriers
	 Years in Service
707-100/300
DC-8-NF/50
720
727-100
DC-9-7f',
DC-8-61/u2/63
DC-9-30
727-200
737
747
DG-10
L-1011
AA,TW,PA,NW,WA
UA
WA
EA. UA ,AA,TW,UA,hW,BN,PA
E.',,TW
BN,DL,UA
EA, DL
AA,CO3NA,NW,TW,UA,WA,BN
DL
UA,WA
PA,AA,BN,NW,TW,UA
AA,NA,UA,CO,TW,6A
EA,TW,DL
18,17,14,14,9
'7
15
la,l4,13,13,12,12,il,ld
11,11,
10,10.10
10,10
9,9,9,9,9,98,6,
5
9,9
817,7,7,7,7
6.6,6,5,5,5
5,5,4
Source: Ross (1976)
The average age of the fleet (Chart 5, p. IS4) is st-own L be
9.6 years for the total fleet, 1%0.2 for the row bypass far;, aM
19.1 years for the non-fans. Different airlines have significant
differences in the rates at which their fleets are agin g . Chart
6, p. 155, illustrates trends. The largest airlines, the very
ones that launched the jet era (P.AA,AAL,UAL. TWA), have fleets
that are above the trunk average age. While initially other lines
followed the same aging pattern, beginning in 1 0.72 several car-
riers (Continental, Delta, Northwest being very visible examples)
began replacing their fleets with newer aircraft, thus 1cwering
their average age dramatically. This action comes into focus
a53-
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later during the discussion on the impact of noise regulations on
replacement of aircraft and on the policy problems of how to assist
needy carriers with old fleets without discriminating against car-
riers who feel that by good management they made the replacement
at their own expense.
For regulatory purposes, the CAB has established depreciation
periods of:
10 vears -----------------------Turbojets
14 years -----------------------Turbofans
16 years -----------------------wide-bodies
For business accounting, the carriers initially used the same or
shorter depreciation periods. For example, Delta depreciated all
aircraft over 10 years with a 10 4M residual while Northwest wrote
off its narrow-bodies over 10 years with a 15 41 residual. On its	 -
`	 wide-bodies Northwest employed 15 years with 101 residual. Sub-
sequently when it became evident that the useful life of the
narrow-bodies would exceed the book life, some airlines adjusted
the depreciation periods to longer lives. The CAB itself in a
recent economic study, has adjusted depreciation by auding 3 years
to its nur-mal ;cyu-?atory figures tabulated above. This investi-
ga;.inn revealed that on an industry wide basis, airlines arp de-
prec.iating their equiprient for accounting purposes over a longer
periad than the CAB regulatory rules. However, carriers with strong
finance: such as delta and Northwest did not readjust their de-
preci,ition practices. The changes in depreciation rates on the
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part of the carriers are a function of their desire to show earn-
ings or minimize losses as well as to take advantage of invest-
ment credit laws. Accordingly, the changes are financial in char-
acter. Depreciation rates established for equipment are not a
driving factor in determining retirement policies.
The extent to which these management depreciation decisions
representing actual experience during the years 1970-1975 is re-
flected in a study made by AVMARK Inc. 417 Table 22 taken from
that study indicates that 841 U.S. air carrier planes were sold
for $1.5 billion - a figure $232 million more than book value.
In the case of Northwest, its book profit was 47+,. The profit
may not mean that Northwest was a shrewder bargainer but that it
had a higher rate of depreciation on its fleet.
To the Extent that used aircraft prices impinge on the de-
cisions to retire aircraft, a market r.ust exist or the decision
must be made on the basis of scra p value. And to the extent that
the past gives some basis for assessing the future, a review of
where retired aircraft have been going is desirable. The AVMARK
study, Table 23, indicates that in the 1970-1975 period, 70 jets
have "trickled down" to the U.S. Local Service Airlines involving
a sum of $175,000,000. however, more significantly, 37 planes
went to the Middle East Region for about 5180,000,000. Finally,
41/ Transport Air craft Values 1970-1984, AV14ARk. Inc. Miami,
Florida, 1976.
4
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TALE 22
SMARY OF USTO AIRCRIFT SALES RY U.S. URTIFICATLU AIR CARRIERS -
1970-1975
Number Book Profit Percent
Airline Sold Gross Sale; Price_ _(loss)	 _ ProfI
Ar:erican 66 s	 213,245,000 $ 21,G63,000 10.2.•;
Braniff 36 79,912,000 3,916,000 4.7
Cor.tinantal 39 14?,(93,000 (	 722,001)	 ) (	 0.5	 )
DeIC3 68 1U6,5/4,C'J0 22,578,000 21.2
Eastern 87 26&V3,000 16,197,009 6.2
National 12 19,171,000 3,049,000 15.9
North •::est 51 166'w Soo 79,5Y,000 47.3
Pan American 57 102,442 MOO 18,021,000 17.6
114A 25 62,9?0,000 (	 5,("15,000) (	 3 . 0	 )
United 57 53,F56'600 10,1511.,090 13.9
Western 27 3?,11 ?,n0.1 9,7''F,Cr,10 30.5
Total Trunks AN 31,Loy'!51"Uui)—
Allegheny 43 $	 21,1."6,000 $	 1,913,000
`''.4:°
Frontier 13 24,131,0(;O 1,7o3,000 7.3
Nu;hes Air::est 26 11,9	 3,U'JO 4,096,020 3.1.3
North Central 3 1 ,£;r?.,("c0 (	 8,000	 j (	 0.4	 }
Ozark 3 1,654,000 1,977,000 35.0
Pi e.i Y& 6 i ,597 ,01 0 135 ,CCO 3.5
Southern 14 10,052&00 1,973,000 19.7
Texas	 Interrational 3 5,?"+,^;^^ (	 6i3O(!i	 j )_( 1 . 3
Total	 Re,ional 71.5 ^_5 ,541,000 -- (I,7ti^i,GUU 20:T)
Alaska 20 $	 6,022,01j0 j	 104,000 1.7;;
Aloha 2 1"'0'o.-J0 13,(".,0 9.3
Ilawai ian 2 7,5('-,,0^7 I'S(T)'e 0 23 7
Kodiak 10 446,(";,0 188,000 42.2
Reeve 3 141,0?0 119,0OJ F'4.11
Wien 2 11 50 52,w;) 34.7
Total Territorial 3— V--li ;d,i;,W. $ ^,uG,u .0
Airlift 22 S	 24,71 1 ,^.^1 (	 3,^	 ',(',%0) (l;'.3%)
n ioq Ti; crs 13 4051.+1 ,	 ';_} 6,1 rte,"^0 19.01
Sechcard 0rid 36,^	 . ^5 "!;)(.	 5	 1; i3	 1
TUal All-Cargo ^1' ^}C•,,:`',	 ::1
_S	 - 9,;:	 ',;6'
Capitol 23 $	 i9,,;.-,:+	 r,.	 o S	 6,i;6?, r l n 35.3'
Onhnson WerJwn) 70 771 ,"G,9
Murlcch 10 3,410	 C,J0 72r 21.3
Ecd_rn 8 3	 l',	 . 1 1:J (	 -3,C. ',` (n	 ) (J..	 )
Up r j _. i s Natic=! 1? 2.-,	 i.	 ,(:ll^ 5,'	 .'^, 1 '	 J (1.1
Saturn 20 11 ,1	 1 ,Go . 
Trans
	 IrLarn9tional 5 22,2; 7,(' 11 11 2,';0,!1!,'; 1(1.9
iutul suiglenwals 1!0 r"-
	
.',:1:;1) \	 (!,
lUT/a.	 Il,'i'.j,,U ii'rr S1,56by!,000
	
_
W1,94 ,0OU
	
_
IVY
•	 Source:	 MAP!, Inc., Miami, Florida
i +s
,,,.^..o.^-R -.-. is :^..r '-.t *.^-----:.se^-^r+e-y^^^..^-.,:+^?^a•J^S 	 .....	 "n'w'...'a`.'_'..	 "q
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TABLE 23,
USED AIRCRAFT - 1-!HERE THEY WENT
U.S. Carrier Industry
1970 - 1975
Total
Transaction Averane Percent Percent
Number Value Transaction Total Total
Purchased By Aircraft (000) 000)	 _ Value Number
Far East, Asia b African
Area 57 $221,566 $3,887 13.1" 6.65
Middle East Region 37 179.838 4,860 10.6 4.2
U.S. Local Service -
Airlines 70 173,337 2,476 10.2 8.2
Canada and Caribbean 57 144,100 2,52E 8.5 6.6
Latin America 59 137,542 2,331 8.1 6.8
U.S. Manufacturers 54 136,299 2,524 8.0 6.2
European Cargo 3 Charter
Airlines 73 131,723 1,804 7.8 8.4
U.S. Trunk Airlines 18 129,785 2,210 7.6 2.1
European Scheduled Airlines 28 97,702 3,489 5.8 3.2
Brokers in USA 117 69,861 597 4.1 13.5
U.S.	 Supplemental Air
Carriers 52 66,115 1,271 3.9 6.0
U.S. All-Cargo Carriers 3 40,045 13,348 2.4 .3
Financial	 Institutions and
Leasing Companies 43 45,770 1,064 2.6 4.8
European Brokers 25 30,837 1,235 1.8 2.9
U.S.	 Territorial	 Airlines 21 28,194 1,128 1.7 2.4
Aircraft Sold and
Repossessed 15 17,801 1,187 1.1 1.7
Sales to Third Level
Carriers,	 Flying Clubs,
Corporations, Individuals
and Oth:rs 137 43,790 320 2.6 1'_9
Total Transactions 8G5 51,694,345 51,957 100.0, 10u.^?:
The foregoing data is fro:a air carrier reports to the U.S. Civil Aero-
n ,utics Board o nd shores the purchosers l isted by the airl ir.cs.	 In curt,: in
case,, c, spccially those involving brokers and financial institutions, thv
aircraft %x re sub;enucntl; transferred to third parties. Further, data
does not necessarily accurately reflect the extent of actual ow.nor • s of the
ai rera f't.
Scurce: AVNARi:, Inc., Miami, Florida
i
i
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57 aircraft were sold to the Far East, Asia and Africar
$223,000,000..- AVWK projected an.tncrease_in the price of used
aircraft even in the face--of a--substantial potential increase in
offerings of U.S. carriers desiring or being forced to retire
their noisy high cost fleets.
E.4 CONCLUSIONS ON AGING OF THE CURRENT JET FLEET
E.4.1 Narrow-Bodied
The current jet era began in 1958 with the advent of the
coast-to-coast Boeing 707 turbojet. Following .quickly were the
Douglas DC-8 and Convair 880 turbojets. The-nomal powerplant
was the P&W JT-3 and JT-4. In 1961 a q..ieter more -efficient en-
gine, the JT-3D turbofan, was developed -and powered all subse-
r:t
quent production! aircraft. Some airlines re-equipped their existing
aircraft with the new turbofans. In 1964 and 1965. the shorter
range, smaller 727 and DC-9 were introduced powered by a new P&W
JT80 turbofan. Unless sold to other carriers, these aircraft and
their powerplants have been in use by the purchasing carriers con-
tinuously. Some of the older 707 and DC-8 series are reaching 21
years of age, far beyond the original depreciation periods set
by the original purchasers, and approaching the design life spar,
D
of the aircraft using hours as a standard.
Careful engineering analysis and structur;,l re-testing b,
the manufacturers and users have developed the tact that with some
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additional maintenance, the life span can further safely be ex-
tend ,!d by additional significant increments up to 82,000 and then
100,000 hours. This would bring the life span up to 30 or 40
years. With respect to depreciation, it is largely a management
decision which is not necessarily based on the expected useful
life of the aircraft. Therefore, neither chronological age per
se nor book life of the aircraft can be said to be a factor in
	 i
the retirement of current.-Jet aircraft.
E.4.2 Wide-Bodied
The wide-bodied jumbo 747 aircraft was introduced in 1970
followed by the DC-10 and L-1011 in 1972. The manufacturers claim
and the purchasers zgree,that additional quality has been built
into these airframes by ;raking advantage of the lessons learned
from their previous models. Thus, age will be of no concern for
some time to come. These aircraft are powered by a new generation
of high bypass engines. Airline users are not yet ready to pin--
point the life span of wide-bodies, but do agree that it will be
many years before age will be a retirement factor.
qM
^a
9
-..:..^,
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F.
ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY AS FACTORS IN RETIREMENT
F.1 PREJET PRODUCTIVITY
Up to the time of the oil embargo in 1973 aircraft retire-
meats were primarily the result of cost effecitve improvements in
technology which tended to make aircraft economically obsolete be-
fore wearing out. However, in a few cases less economic additions
to fleets (e.g., DC-7,377) tended to force retirement of some more
efficient aircraft from a route or, company. 42^ Technological im-
provements causing retirements have been of two kinds: (1) modest
improvements which have had a gradual effect, ai: ! (2) quantum jump
improvements whose effects were more dramatic. In the early 1930s
aircraft manufacturers, through interlocking stock ownership,
legally could and did control air carriers as means of assuring
an outlet for their products. However, when because of its cor-
porate relationship with United, Boeing rebuffed TWA's effort to
buy the 160 mph Boeing 247D, TWA went to Douglas and developed
42/ For a more detailed delineation of the history of factors af-
fecting aircraft selection see: F.A. Spencer, "Aircraft
Selection", AIAA Paper No. 78-1531, given at the Los Angeles
AIAA Conference on Air Transportation, August 21-24, 1978.
Also F.A. Spencer, ed., The Next Commercial Jet Transport,
Papers at the Air Transportation International Forum, The
Transportation Center, Northwestern University, Evanston,
Illinois, 1977.
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a more efficient plane, the DC-2. After legislation in 1934,
manufacturers could no longer own stock in airlines. In 1936
American and Douglas developed the 'larger DC-3 and a model called
the DST (Douglas Sleeper Transport) which carried more people
longer distances with increased comfort at lower operating costs
per seat-mile. The DC-3 was the immediate cause of the early
retirement of the 247D as well as that of the slower Curtiss Con-
dors which American had been using as sleepers. The DC-3 became
the standard of the domestic industry.
Because of World War II restricted production the Boeing 307
Stratoliner and the Douglas DC-4,both unpressurized aircraft, had
little long run effect on retirements. However, immediately after
that conflict there occured the first of two quantum jumps in air-
craft productivity, each to be accompanied by decreases in oper-
ating costs which ultimately rendered the DC-3 obsolete on medium
to long-haul segments.
The DC-6 and Lockheed Constellation compounded a doubling of
size with a doubling of speed for a quadrupling of productivity.
Pressurization added comfort, and the longer range deleted the need
for intermediate fuel stops in long-haul operations. The develop-
ment of these craft resulted in a restructuring of the air trans-
port map as carriers sought to take advantage of new marketing
opportunities. Given the economies of these craft and managements'
desires to extend their spheres of influence, some of the larger
carriers decided to shift emphasis to longer haul routes for which
,_..,.^.	 :-.+r.^.swR.-+.-- 	 ,vT +r^p^*x+'.^.p^'.'-r^++.+^y..+^wrswr. - wrogYi+.+ra^:!!s.. ^ a^aww^ t ^ ! .rrr ._s-^ .., ,q^,.w...... ^. ... ^±r +r^.. ' 7
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the DC-3 was not suited. Accordingly, the DC-3s began to be "re-
tired" from the larger airlines but found a home in lower tier 	
i
services of focal service airlines. A development of twin-engined
pressurized planes (the Convair and Martin series) put pressure
-on the local service carriers to retire the DC-3s. This first
post-war quantum jump in productivity was made possible by the
development of more powerful engines, the pressurized cabin, and
E
improved aerodynamics. Since this technological development was
accompanied by lower operating costs, the DC-3 became technologi-
cally and economically obsolete.
The continued development of ever more economical planes had
exceptions which resulted in a foreshortened life for such air-
craft. The Boeing 377 Stratocruiser introduced by Pan American
in 1949 was a specialty plane for overwater operations. Its high
operating costs were partly the result of the failure of the en-
gines to produce the power anticipated. Nevertheless, United felt
it was forced to select the plane, regardless of econonEics, to pro-
tect its Hawaiian market. Another attempt at a long-range plane,
the Lockheed L-1649, resulted in a higher operating cost than its
predecessor.
Finally, the DC-7 developed from one company's market desire
Lo have the jump on competitors in coast-to-coast nonstop oper--
ations before the arrival of jets. Featuring additional speed as
well as range, the DC-7 also had appeal for overocean operations.
The inability of the aircraft to be able to fly westbound coast-
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to-coast in less than 8 hours as required by FAA regulations
brought about a labor dispute which was resolved by the company
adding another crew member on over eight hour flights - a cost
increasing solution. Engine maintenance was high and reliability
was less than on the predecessor DC-6 and DC-6B. The foregoing
events, coupled with the introduction of the superior jets, hastened
the retirement of the DC-7 and the L-1649 at the very low prices
shown in Section B, Table 1, page 6.
At the very time the post-war multi-engined, pressurized,
piston aircraft were being incrementally improved via the "stretch"
process made possible by increased engine power, and were enjoying
tremendous passenger acceptance, the seeds for their retirement
were being sown by the development of a second post-war quantum
jump in productivity. Happily, somewhat unexpectedly, the devel-
opment of the four-engined turbojets was associated with a one
third decrease in operating costs, Lockheed, believing that turbo-
jet development would take much longer than it did and would be
confined to long-haul operations, chose to develop the turboprop
L-188, which, although more economical than piston aircraft, lacked
speed. Rapid cost-effective technological development of the pure
jet resulted in a limited production run f7or the L-188 and its
premature retirement from many of the routes for which it was
designed.
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-.F.2 JET PRODUCTIVITY
The new Boeing, Corn air, ad Douglas four -engined jets pro-
vided compound- , a d oubling of size with a doubling of speed to
this second post-war quadrupling of productivity. Adaitionaliy,
the jets provided amenities which increased their attractiveness
in comparison with the sl3wer piston and turboprop aircraft -
namely a significant decrease in cabin noise and an even greater
decrease in vibration. Notwithstanding these advantages, the
early turbojets were exterally extremely noisy, underpowered for
existing airports, and of less than desired range for many over-
ocean operations. The development of the J U D fanjet provided in-
creased thrust, reduced fuel consumption and less external noise.
Public acceptance of the jet was immediate, and the 4-engine piston
I
	
aircraft began their retirement from long-haul operations as fast
as jets could be delivered. While many assumed that the jets
would be confined to long-haul operations, this proved not to be
so. The new jet technology was then applied to developing short-
to-medium range planes (727/737/DC-9) with similar success. Oper-
ating costs provad to L;^ about one third less than predecessor
pl anes so that tA.- fares could be kept at attractive levels.
The igh r&te of traffic gro ,.rth, averaging 19% annually in
some periods, and the fact that there have been economies of scale
as air^r ft have grown led to the development of hi,'i capacity
(225-500 seat:) wide-bodied 747/DC-i0/L-1011 with low seat-m.le
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costs. The 747 was built for low-cost mass transportation and
cargo nn
 the assumption that, at least on trans._eanic operations,
supersonic travel would attract all business travel and much of
the well-to-do vacation travel. A feature of the wide-bodies was
their adoption of the new technology high bypass engines which
combined a significant improvement in fuel efficiency with a re-
quired reduction in ruse emissions to meet FAR 36 for newly de-
signed aircraft.
It was assumed that the 747 would lead to the retirement of
the 707 and DC-8 series. However, introduction of the 747 came
at a time of recessior and a relative 6ownturr, of traffic. Thus
in some cases it was the new technology 747 aircraft which was
"retired" by sale or parked in the desert and not the aircraft
originally marked for retirement. When growth still failed to
materialize, even the smaller widebodies, the DC-10 and Lockheed
L-1011, were too large to take over the routes of the smaller
craft. It became clear that low seat-mile costs provided profits
only if a high proportion of the seats were used by revenue pass-
engers. Attempts to cure lack of profitability by reducing fre-
quencies in order to increase load factors often failed because
passengers deserted the carrier for an air l ine providing frequency
of service with smaller capacity narrow bodies. As operating
costs rose, and as pressure on the govern -nt increased to develop
and enforce tighter noise rules, airframe and powerplant engineers
sought to design a quiet, low operating cost, craft in the 204
i
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passenger capacity bracket - a capacity well below the 254 capa-
ci ty widebody but well above the 100 to 150 pa ssenger capacity of
the first generation Jets.
With rep,acement of the 707 and DC-8 for economic and environ-
mental reasons	 as an objective, aircraft manufacturers flooded
the most likely clients (American. United and Delta) with a stream
of new aircraft designs.
	 The outcome was launching of the Boeing
767 and 757 series which combine (to the extent that carriers are
willing to accept them) the latest technical advances. 	 In spite
of the high cost of technology, the craft have superior economics
and two very necessary attributes.	 First is the low noise mission
level which enable them to meet stage 3 limits. 	 Sewn! is a fuel
consumption saving in excess of 35% per seat-mi le over the earliest
.jets.	 This now brims us to one of the most important factors in
aircraft ?retirement, namely, fuel efficiency.
F-.3	 FUEL EFFICIENCY AS A FACTOR IN AIRCRAFT RETIREMENT
Prior to the 1973 oil embargo the price of fuel was not a -^
factor in the design or purchase of transport aircraft.	 For dears
the price of fuel had been low -- only.12% of total operating
costs and 20% of cash operating costs. 	 Fuel prices were predicted
to go 5-till-lower.	 Before the embargo the price of jet fuel was -
13.5t per gallon. 	 Chart 7 graphically depicts the increasing im-
pcotance	 an airline of fuel costs.	 By Ma.;i 1979 the cost to
domestic U.S. carriers--was 50d a. gal lon; -international carriers
a
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paid still more. Further increases are predicted. The result
has been that fuel now amounts to about 50,00 of cash direct oper-
ating expenses and is moving toward 251 of total operating costs.
The dramatic rise in fuel cost plus the increasing cost of tech-
nological improvements, has shifted the focus in the design ob-
jectives of carriers and manufacturers. Economics rather than
technology for technology's sake is now king. Although there had
been progressive fuel consumption improvements as engines pro-
gressed from straight jets to first generation turbofan (low bypass
ratio) to the second generation turbofan (high bypass ratio), as
shown in Chart 8, still more efficiency was sought through appli-
cations of the supercritical type wing, the use of light composite
materials, and a redesign of the wing for an optimum speed for a
planned fuel price. A tabulation of changes in fuel efficiency
per seat as calculated by a major carrier in mid 1978 displays a
difference of 50J; between the early non-fan and the new Boeing 767.
Seats	 Ai rpl ane
129 DC-8 (non-fan)
II Z9 SIC-8-50
96 727-100
'32 727-200
256 DC-- l0- i 0
197 767
° Increase in Fuel Efficient
-17,'
Base airplane
1.5N
20
3 11 %
38%
It was-iot old age, lack of passenger comfort, unsatisfactory en-
gine or airframe reliability which caused airlines to retire their
non-fan DC-8s, but the escalating price of fuel which made them
economically obsolete. Escalating fuel prices have been the cause
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of the sale of the early 107-100 series and are now pushing the
727-100 series to retirement.
In 1978 many analysts considered the long-haul, high-capa-
city DC-8-60 series to be economically obsolete because of fuel
costs. However, further increases in fuel prices and the escala-
tion of prices of new aircraft have made re-engining the craft
with the more fuel-efficient CFM 56 engines so attractive that
they are programmed for reengining with an estimated additional
10 years of airline life.
F.4 ECONOMIC CLIMATE AS A FACTOR IN RETIREMENT
Another important factor in the retirement picture is the
economic health of the country, the aviation industry, and of the
individual carriers involved. Unless it is perceived that a car-
rig 's earnings will support the purchase and use of new aircraft
no matter how much better they are than existing craft, neither
the board of directors nor the banks will look favorably on new
purchases. Orders do not necessarily fo'*.ow immediately upon tech-
nological advances.
There is a saying in the manufactur'ng industry that "orders
follow earnings." This observation is aptly demonstrated in Chart
9, Net Earnings VS Airplane Orders, U.S. Trunk Airlines. Given
the 1960-1970 history, as shown on the chart, one could expect
that when the hearings on bringing all aircraft into compliance
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with FAp
 36 were conducted in 1975-5, the airlines could, with
" -	 S me justification, claim they were in no position to mod?fy or
-	 r•eti?-t_noncompfy=r: Aircraft. the chart also shows that the rapid	 i
turnaround in airline fi;xarfces, caused ty their highly leveraged
position, was accompanied by such a flaw of orders that Congress	 1
gdestioned. -and_then decided against, financial assistance. The
	 1
hanging financial fortunes of the airlines can have a powerful,
it' curt detenni na O ve, effect on corpora to equ i ptnEr3t decisions
whether they be for retirement or,acquisitivr fcc g rowth. We now
turn to a- rr,.)re de`a 11 ed exposition _or the financial perspective
-relative to retirment. of aircraft.
s
'""" ^."wr.^ fct ... ^. T .t-.^a^ ^as^'^ ten. ^,y,^:.^._	 ,—.:.;T'n•-	 -*c e- ,	 n-
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G.
REPLACEMENT DECISIONS: A FINANCIPL PERSPECTIVE
We examine financial aspects of Lite aircraft retirement de-
cision in this section. Since industry demand is generally per-
ceived as rising, the retirement decision is in fact a decision
to replace. We begin our discussion by introducing the economic
logic of replacement decision. Perhaps, the single key element
in that decision process is defining the discount rate which will
equate the sum c:' future cash flow benefits with the current cost
of obtaining new planes, The discount rate is taken to be the
marginal cost of additional capital funds. As this marginal cost
is determined by investors, based on their perception of return-
risk characteristics of the firm, we focus our attention next on
the economic performance of airlines in the 1966-75 period.
There are several qualifications to be made before we begin.
First, our :,oproach to airline industry financial problems is a
descriptive one. That is, while we focus almost exclusively on
quantitative aspects of performance, our emphasis is on the "prox-
imate" determinants of the record. We do not examine industry
financing in terms of explicit behavioral models simply because
of a lack of funding, rather than a disdain for such work. Second,
our financial analysis focuses on the "Big Eleven" trunk carriers:
American, Braniff, Continental, Delta, Eastern, National, Northwest,
lllk
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Pan ani, Trans World, United and Western. These firms own the bulk
of the domestic jet fleet, and operate nearly all of the aging,
noisy, and fuel-inefficient craft.
It is important that we distinguish the sources data used
in this section. With few exceptions, these data are derived from
the COMPUSTAT tapes supplied monthly to the financial community
by Standard and Poor's. 43/ As such, the data shown in our cal-
culations are based exclusively on the annual audited statements
of air carriers. Use of the COMPUSTAT series requires some addi-
tional clarification. We note that all balance sheet information
employed here are measured in "book" ratifier than "market" terms.
The data employed for all carriers are those of the consolidated
form, reflecting the performance and structure of airline as well
as other subsidiaries. (Our choice here is a deliberate one since
I .
	
it is the consolidated reports which are of concern to the finan-
cial institutions.) Finally, we note that our data are based on
fiscal years. For all but two carriers, the 1975 fiscal year co-
incides with the calendar year. 44/
43/ C.E. Ferguson, Jr. and W.G. Glimpse (1576). COMPUSTAT
Analysis System: Users' Guide, Investors Management
Sciences, Inc.
44/ Exceptions and final month of fiscal year ire: Delta,
June, and National, June.
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G J THE CALCULUS OF REPLACEMENT DECISIONS
The ultimate purchase decision for new aircraft is a finan-
cial one. True, the technological characteristics of the new
craft and the craft to be replaced are integral to this decision.
However, the outcome of this process will depend on several other
variables which are unrelated to the new aircraft (e.g., the
firm's capital structure and level of interest rates prevailing in
the economy). Our task in this section is to summarize the de-
cision and to describe the requisite calculations for these rules.
The distinguishing characteristic of capital equipment is
that it provides services over a lengthy period. Managers must
thus concern themselves with a multiperiod profitability calcula-
tion. For each future period up to its retirement date the equip-
ment is presumed to generate cash lows ("profits" plus deprecia-
tion) which can be well estimated as of the current date. Re-
placement decisions require that we examine two distinct series
of future cash flows: (i) those specific to the existing equip-
ment, and (ii) those implicit in use of new equipment. That is,
replacement implies that new equipment will displace current equip-
ment in some given service activity. The differential cash flows
resulting from replacement must be sufficient to justify purchase.
The cash flows resulting from co.;t:_inuing use of existing
equipment are not difficult to project, since the service in which
these craft are used is well understood, as are the craft's oper-
ating characteristics. Indeed, the only real difficulty here is
d
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in anticipating inflation in the unit prices of associated inputs
(e.g., fuel and wage rates). The future cash flows specific to
new equipment are often more difficult to project accurately.
This is typically the case where a new type of aircraft is under
consideration, since its operating characteristics are often not
established and the plan may well provide a different type of ser-
vice (thereby altering demand).
Should an airline consider replacement of existing craft with
new ones, the extended cash benefits will be of four types:
i) revenue gains through improved availabiltiy or
altered service characteristics
ii) operating cost reductions produced by lower weight,
reduced fuel consumption, etc.
iii) increased cash flows as the result of larger
depreciation allowances; and
iv) decreased tax levels associated with the higher
levels of depreciation or wit>> any legislated
special tax treatment.
In the context of the current debate some important qualitative
views of these benefits can be made. We note first ° that the rev-
enue gains from new aircraft will be slight indeed sL ice new craft
will not per se generate increased numbers of passengers. True,
where higher capacity planes are substituted for DC-9s and 727-
100s there will by passenger gains in certain limited capacity
markets. However such market's are few in number - and additions
to this market classification are not developing rapidly. Our
analysis indicates that compared with current wide-bodies only
limited operating cost reductions wou'id be associated with a new-
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uasign aircraft. Reductions in operating costs will be largely
in the form of fuel savings - these the result of improved engine
efficiency and lowered gross takeoff weights. The weight reduc-
tions now in view appear largely due to limited use of composite
materials.
The "tax benefits" of new aircraft are immediate and are
supportive of replac:-rent. That is, the fir,,ncial community fo-
cuses on the cash flow - net income plus depreciation - implica-
tion of an investment decision. The value of depreciation allow-
ances, however, is conditioned on positive values of taxable income.
To the extent that pre-tax earnings are minimal, the tax savings
associated with increased depreciation are slight. The latter
situation, of course, has be :-n typical of U.S. trunK carriers in
the 1970s.
Replacement implies that the older aircraft in fact leaves
the fleet, thus generating immediate cash benefits. In a world
of stable prices the sale price of the old plane will closely
approximate its book value. As such the sale of older aircraft
will not affect the firm's tax liabilities. However, the extreme
inflation rates of the past decade have produced an understate-
ment in aircraft book values. Thus aircraft which are current
replacement candidates have market values we l l in excess of book -
and their sale will produce taxable income. Consider the follow-
ing: the Boeing B-737-200 which was purchased for $4.4 million
in 1970 had a 1977 market value of $3.5 million. Employing a ten-
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year service life, sun-of-the-year's-digits depreciation scheme,
and a $1 million salvage value the 1977 book value of this plane
is but $1.6 million. Thus the sale of a six year-old aircraft
could produce a tax liability as high as $912,000 A In 1978
and 1979 the used value escalated.
The replacement decision involves comparing the purchase
price of the new aircraft (less the proceeds from sale of the old
craft, net of tax liabilities incurred in that transaction) with
the stream of future benefits obtained from operating the new
plane in place of the older one. Since these future cash flows
are obtained over time, they must be discounted to allow for eani-
ings foregone by the firm as a result of the new aircraft purchase.
The appropriate interest rate for such discounting would be the
rate attached to a risk-free asset (e.g., short-term treasury bills)
if the future returns were a certainty.
Considerable uncertainty is associated with the cash flows
produced by a fleet of new aircraft. This stems from lack of in-
formation on technical performance, changing regulatory Rttituudes,
competitive forces, etc. Accordingly, the case can be made for
using a discount rate (in excess of the "risk-free rate") which
reflects the risk characteristics of the new craft. By most con-
ventional measures of trunkline risk, this sector is one of the
These data are taken from AVAMRK, Inc., Transport Aircraft
Values, 1970-1984. Miami, 1976.
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more risky in the U.S. economy. It follows that the discount rates
used to analyze new aircraft purchases will be high relative to
those used by other firms in capital budgeting.
The final step in the replacement calculus is to ask if the
discounted future benefits from purchase exceed the net cost of
the new equipment. If this result obtains, the aircraft will be
purchased because this investment will increase stockholders'
earnings and thus raise the market value of the firm's equity
shares. Should Vle net purchase price exceed the discounted val-
ue of the future cash flows associated with purchase, then the air-
craft would not be purchased. And this because the returns from
the investment would fail to match the stockholders' earnings
expectations, thereby producing a decline in the value of the
stock.
The key ieatures, then, in the replacement decision are the
following:
i) uncertainty associated with cashflows from new
aircraft;
ii) tax implications coincident with retirement of
older planes and depreciation of new ones; and
iii) derivation of discount rates applicable to the
future cash flows which adequately reflect the
risk structure of the firm and industry.
The following paragraphs of this section review the current per-
formance of the trunkline industry. This performance gives key
indications as to the nature of uncertainty, tax considerations,
and risk structure. From these findings, we go on to examine
. _
	 y
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qualitatively the prospects for fleet replacement under alterna-
tive economic and regulatory scenarios.
G.2 LEVERAGE AND RISK STRUCTURE
The cost of obtaining funds - as well as the potential bar-
rier to any funding - is tied to the capital structure of a form.
That is the relative size of debt and lease obligations in all
corporate capital funds (leverage) influences the rate which must
be paid to produce new capital funds. This is especially the case
when "fixed obligations" (debt service and lease payments) bulk
large relative to cash flow.
Table 24 examines the leverage position of the trunk carriers
in the period 1971-1975. Part A of this table shows the ratio of
long-term debt to all long-term (or "permanent capital") funds;
that is the proportion of long-term funds obtained from creditors.
While the tax deductibility of interest payments makes debt an
attractive form of fund raising to the shareholders, when debt
becomes too high the possibility of default - which places at risk
the assets held by shareholders - discourages high debt propor-
tions. In this context the data of Part A are interesting. While
no trend emerges for the carriers, it seems clear that long-term
debt has remained a fairly stable proportion of all capital.
In recent years firms have engaged in a good deal of 'off the
balance sheet" financing - i.e., leasing of capital equipment.
That this has been particularly true of ;,rank air carriers is seen
-183 -
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Table	 24
SELECTED FINANCIAL RATIOS: 1911-1915
U.S. Domestic Trunks Plus Par; Am	 i
i
Item	 Firm	 1971	 1972	 1973
	 1974	 1975
A. long Term D r-ht/Long Term	 AAL
	
.5;2	 .573	 .579	 .531	 .5?5
Debt plus Equity	 BNF	 .652	 .658	 .655	 .618	 E108
CAL	 .744	 .696	 .709	 .717	 .746
DAL	 .550	 .517	 .493	 .56a	 .580
EAL	 .654	 .c?n	 .716	 .6°6	 .701
NAL
	
.594	 .E,67	 .658	 .579	 .5:110
MIA	 .446	 .410	 .438	 .387	 .397
PAA	 .708	 .717	 .708	 .739	 .760
T11A
	
.732	 .724	 .730	 .739	 .760
UAL	 .672	 .674	 .653	 .030	 .644
WAL	 .680	 .626	 .590	 .; 54	 .550	 1
Q. Long Term Debt plus	 AIL	 .768	 .118	 .796	 .7E8	 .:AO
Lea se Pays ,ents /L 	T.	 Bt 7F	 .855	 .8.1?	 .832	 .829	 .825
Debt plus Equity p lus	 CAL	 .804	 .769	 .732	 .784	 .810
Lease Payrents	 DAL	 .619	 .593	 .599	 .629	 .640
F.Al.	 .859	 .817	 .863	 .866	 .879
NAL	 .700	 .7 3 1)	 .732	 .690	 .696
MIA	 .497
	
.463
	
.':99	 .462	 "'n
PAA	 .802	 .811	 .812	 .844	 .853
T91
	 870	 .'GI .0-7G	 F   / J	 r
UAL	 .sOG	 R11i06	 169	 .780
VIAL
	
.795	 .773
	
.765	 .760	 .777
C. Times Interest Earned*
	
AAL	 4.0	 4.6	 2.8	 6.2	 4.3
BMF	 4.2
	
5.0	 4.6	 4.1	 4.2
CAL
	
3.9	 4.2	 2.9	 2.4	 1.9
DAL	 8.4	 12.7	 13.9	 10.2	 6.4
CAI.	 3.2	 1.2	 1,6	 2.6	 1.9
NAL	 2.6	 6.0	 5.7	 6.3	 4.4
NWA	 7.8	 12.8	 10.7	 9.9	 9.2
PAA
	
1.9	 ?.4	 2.5	 .8	 2.3
P.-A
	
3.8	 6.5	 6.2	 2.6	 1.4
UAL	 3.8	 4.7	 5.9	 7.8	 4.0
1•JAI.	 4.9	 6.3	 8.0	 8.2	 5.5
4' Includes book deprcciation.
Se
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TABLE 24 (continued)
Item Firin 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
D. Coverage"* AAL 1.6 1.6 1.0 1.9 1.1
B:.'F 1.9 2,1 2.2 ?.1 1.9
CAL 2.7 2.7 2.0 1.9 1.4
DAL 4.6 5.0 4.5 4.2 3,0
- EAL 1.4 1,8 .8 1.4 1.0
N A L 1.6 3.7 3.5 3.8
3 N1dA 3.?. 3.9 4.3 +.7 3.8
PAA 1.2 1.5 1.6 .5 1.4
T;tA 1.7 2.3 2,2 1.3 .7
v:,L 1.8 2.2 3.0 3.7 1.9
WAL 2.9 3.4 4.0 3.9 2.1
E. Retu+n on Equity f,,?!. .005 .010 -.039 .3G -.035
SNF .1CG .158 .17G ,169 ,122
CAL .070 .0611 .001 ,052 -.OEIG
DAL 10 6 133 .181 .204 ,102
CAL .017 061 -.167 .022 -,190
Nil
'
L -,032 140 .126	 , •	 .163 OSS
1+'JA. air .036 007 ' 1 10 .0-0
PAA -.103 -.070 -.0', 7 -.zG7 -.180
TWA .004 .11:8 .120 -. 0 %n -.315
UAL -.C13 .031 .079 .130 -,00'
I-JAL .068 .11F ,179 .182 .037
F. Return on Assets AAI_ 075 .023 -.Ols 034 -.CC?.
CNF .074 01114 .102 .123 XV
CAL 0:8 0'IU ,037 .074 0?b
DAL .07t? 101 .1 "5 .159 .0,13
- CAL .014 .0[,2 -.009 .056 .003
NA I, .092 "f'5 C90 .133 .0114
N!!A .026 .027 .065 .107 .053
PAA -.001 .003 .014 -.050 -.001
T!:A U29 .0	 1 .055 .020 -.020
UAL .0%4 .0,10 .OG i loo V1
IfAL .058 .C31 .121 .134 .132
:z
ii
Z
i
** InC1vdOS 600K dCjreciaLion.
	 Coverd9C i`; Patio of carnl;Iq r. Lefurc interLSt
and taxes to interest plus ore-third 0f rent.ils.
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in Part B of Table 24. Here we adjust the long-term debt-to-
permanent-capital ratio by adding lease obligations to both numer-
ator and denominator. The resultant ratio more fairly reflects
the firm's fixed obligations and the relative position of the
stockholder. A different picture of leverage now emerges. To
wit, trunk carriers are extremely leveraged. And in the case of
six carriers this lev -age_has increased with time. These ratios
are very high relative to other firms in the U.S. economy.
Parts C and D of Table 24 focus on the ability of trunk car-
riers to meet fixed obligations. These are the so-called coverage
ratios. The first of these stresses interest coverage, the second
provides for coverages of both interest and capital rentals (leases).
In both cases the diversity of averages is of interest. The fi-
nancial strength of both Delta and Northwest is the most striking
E - `	 finding: the tenuous -Wand deteriorating - situation for American,
Continental, Eastern, -Pan Am and TWA, the most perlexing.
Extreme leverage and poor coverage performance require ex-
planation. One must ask how, in the face of poor coverage, the
trunk carriers have developed such a high debt structure. The
answer to this question lies in the economic history of the in-
dustry. The period bounded by 1946 and 1955 was one of strong
traffic growth. Financing of early postwar equipment was made
possible by retained wartime earnings and current internal funds
(cash flow). With the advent of commercial jet aircraft, capital
needs grew very rapidly. During the 1956-61 period, some 40% of
* 1
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all funds were obtained through the sale of long-term debt. The
specific debt instrument employed most often was the debenture;
life insurance companies were the purchasers.
The first 4-engine jet aircraft provided a substantial shift
on both the nature and guantity of air passenger service. During
the 1961-66 period, capital spending continued at a high level as
twin- and tri-jets were substituted for prop and turbo-prop equip-
ment. Carriers turned to the substantial cash flows (especially
profits) generated by these jet craft- and their predecessors to
finance this accumulation. Dividend payout remained low (consis-
tent with the pattern of growth industries), declining slightly
as a relative use of funds. The developments of the early six-
ties, then, caused little concern on the part of the senior lenders
as carrier leverage declined and profitability appeared growing.
The 1966-71 period gave rise to substantial spending on
flight and ground equipment. This, of course, involved the refine-
ment of twin- and tri-jet configurations and the introduction of
wide-body aircraft. During the period, funds came from a multi-
plicity of sources: convertible debt issues, bank borrowing, and
(late in the period) leasing. Unfortunately, the heavy commit-
ments of this period coincided with a rapid deterioration in the
profitability of the carriers. 43/ This declining profitability
43/ While this decline is partly the result of excess capacity
associated with the high level of purchases, it is not our
task her;. to explain the determinants of profitability. Rather
we seek only to describe the implications of shifting profit-
ability for industry financing.
K__.
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made the financial commitments of the late sixties loo': unattrac-
tive almost immediately. While insurance companies' unsecured
position worsened, these lenders took hope in the promise of im-
proved financial performance. This improvement was ascribed to
two factors; a seemingly sympathetic regulatory agency and pro-
jected demand growth which would alleviate excess capacity. Neither
of these materialized.
1971-75 witnessed both demand instability and a call for re-
gulatory reform. Slow and fluctuating demand for air passenger
service - coupled with severe input cost escalation - produced a
worsening economic record for nearly all carriers. In several
cases, the results were nearly disastrous (Eastern, Pan American
and TWA). High interest rates brought those carriers which had
relied on bank financing into continuing difficulties with these
lenders, and worsened relations with long term lenders. Indeed
the decliM ng fortunes of the carriers served to cut off insurance
sources since these lenders porfolio decisions are narrowly cir-
cumscribed by regulators who focus largely on coverage performance.
That the rising call for "regulatory reform" (especially easing
of entry restrictions) caused concern among these lenders, as well
as aircraft lessors, is hardly surprising. While the demand for
funds was limited during the period, the supply was more constrained.
True, financing was arranged; but at rates which were increasingly
tied to forces in capital markets and at maturities which were ever
shorter. Not surprisingly, depreciation and increases in short-
Zt
t
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term liabilities provided about two-thirds of all funds, 1971-75.
In sum, the 1966-75 decade wa:; one of changing fortunes for
the trunk carriers industry. Substantial commitments of capital
funds failed to )field the projected cash flows. And this failure
produced an ever-increasing tension between borrower and lender.
The 1976-7 aircraft financing was limited. Where equity was used
it was very expensive. This statement, however, does not char-
acterize all carriers and one must examine the record of each car-
rier more carefully to determine future financing possibilities
in the industry.
G.3 INVESTMENT PROFITABILITY AND SOURCES OF EARNINGS
Relatively high debt levels are a desirable result under cer-
tain circumstances. As noted earlier, the tax deductibility of
interest payments means that debt funds can be obtained at a lower,
after-tax rate than equity funds. To the extent that earnings are
stable, the returns on the assets financed by debt will increase
stockholder weal'!?. However, unstable (uncertain) earnings'
streams are not consistent with high relative levels of debt
funding, since this instability increases default probabilities.
Even instability of earning may be tolerated should average re-
turns on invested funds be sufficiently above zero.
The data in Parts E and F of Table 24 allow us to review
the level and variation in trunk carrier profitability. Return
on equity is simply the ratio of after-tax profits to equity.
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The generally low level of prof; ability observed is most striking.
Indeed, any industry mean will be distorted by the performance of
two carriers: Braniff and Delta. It is axiomatic that highly-
levered firms will experience greater after-tax earnings variabil-
ity than less-levered firms, and this is seen in Part F. Of de-
finite concern here is the return on assets record. Return on
assets is here defined as the ratio of taxable income plus inter-
est obligations to total assets. With the exception of the two
carriers mentioned earlier, the record is not a good one: (i)
several carriers recorded persistent growth during the seventies
(NAL, NWA, UAL, WAL) only to have the trend destroyed by the re-
cession of 1975; (ii) the remaining carriers exhibit trendless and
chronically low returns throughout the period.
Return on assets is, however, but one ingredient in the re-
turn to equity holders calculation. And it is the equity return
which required our attention. Specifically, given the highly
levered capital structure in the industry, the major future ex-
ternal source can only be equity (i.e., income retention or sale
of stock). The extent to which equity financing can be obtained
depends on the return-risk characteristics of any new issue. To
determine the prospective return, we turn to a detailed analysis
of the sources of after-tax profits in the trunkline sector.
The level and growth of after-tax profits is the result of
two forces: economy-wide developments in prices and income, and
managerial decisions on supply, financing and tax policy. One
I
i
Kr
--^Mr,-..^,
-190-
i
approach to sepat^ating these influences follows. D.tfine the follow-
s
ing variables:
a
Y: after tax profits
L: total liabilities	 d
E: equity
X: before tax profits
I: interest payments
T: all tax payments	 !
We also define several ratios of interest,
1
= IL-1
i
e = TX-1 i
Using these definitions one may derive an expression for the prox-
imate determinants of profits:
Y = (1-e) (n - q L
With a stable capital structure (constant E and L) shifts in pro-
fitability may come from chanvzs in: (i) operating profitability,
(ii) interest charges, and (i i i) tax policy. Rising fuel prices,
for example, would lower iT certerus paribus. Similarly a decline
in short-term interest rates will lower average interest costs;
and a switch in depreciation policy to accelerated methods will
raise depreciation charges and lower tax liabilities.
,
This view of equity returns gives rise to Table 25 which
examines the ten-year history of earnings sources in the trunk-
line industry. Data are shown for eleven carri ,,,rs. The following
II^erlrr._--- —	 -	 /	 J
TABLE 25
COMPONENTS OF EQUITY EARNINGS 1966-1975
Return Finan:ial Effective Earn iny.
Fi rm Year on Assets Gain Tax Rate Per Share
AAL 1966 .097 .057 .378 2.90
67 .072 .033 .295 2.33
63 .055 18 .211 1,75
G9 .056 .819 .210 1,90
70 -.002 -.035 .232 -1.30
71 .0215 -.016 .093 .11
72 .023 -.011 .121 .20
73 -.015 -.051 .213 -1.69
74 .0•.5 .003 .250 .72
75 -,002 -.023 .221 -.72
BNF 1966 .02.1 .057 .147 .95
67 .0116 .002 .000 .25
63 .012 .023 ??3 .55
69 .053 _0 :7 .206 3?
70 .026 -.0?3 .311 -.13
71 .073 .0:4 .2F0 .49
72 .039 .0, 5 .247 .66
73 .102 .0^,0 .263 1 . 16
74 .1?3 .C5O .311 ',	 31
73 .087 .030 .243 i.02
CAL 1966 .201 ,169 .474 1.59
67 .120 .089 .401 1.57
68 .040 .004 .190 .37
69 .039 -.002 .244 .25
70 .010 .Doti .?S5 .29
71 -.057 .010 .3192 .59
72 .060 .014 470 .64
73 .037 -.01C 1.01'6 .01
74 .074 -.008 .277 57
75 .02G -.040 .430 -.68
DAL 1966 .213 .191 .r.,6 1.81
67 .260 .222 ,459 2,57
69 1';5 .117 .449 1.f'9
69 .1 .092 .466 2.05
70 .112 .072 .431 2.33
71 .073 M. .289 1.57
72 .104 .060 .383 7,20
73 .145 .101 .432 3.32
74 .159 .104 .438 4.56
75 .033 .021 .340 2.44
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TABLE 25 ( co , .i.iued)
Return Financial Effective Earnings
Firm Year or. Assets Gain Tax Rate Per Share
EAL 196E .047 .018 .n00 '1.47
67 .057 .030 .240 2.12
68 .017 -.027 .748 1.02
69 .033 -.013 .282 -.19
70 .0118 -.003 .256 .46
71 .014 -.009 .139 .33
72 .052 .011 .?42 1.21
73 -.009 -.056 .199 -2.69
74 .056 -.003 .240 el
76 .003 -.051 .000 -2.61
NAL 1966 .23; .199 .464 2,62
C7
.163 .129 .450 2._03
68 .139 .111 .4 G9 2.51
59 .132 .0031 .461/ 2.25
70 .037 x.004 .192 .61
71 .002 -.051 .650 -.46
72 .M G .041 .331 2.32
73 .090 .039 .396 2.36
74 .133 .062 .429 3.58
75 .054 -.011 .12G 1.33
NWA 1966 .243 .22.1 .465 2.90
67 .237 .210 4r3 3.21
68 .157 .140 .4i? 2.74
69 .112 .101 .364 2.16
70 .055 .036 .003 ?..10
71 .026 -.013 -.£;10 1.01
72 .026 -.001 -.025 .82
73 .065 .030 .069 2.40
74 .107 .043 .342 3.00
75 .053 .012 .078 2.01
T',!A 1966 .036 .013 .359 3.29
67 .064 .031 .i20 4.12
fi g .035 .00i -.396 2.15
69 .035 ;j p .17,1, 1.95
70 -.031 -.073 .?95 -6.09
71 .02! -.010 -1.269 .27
72 .051 .016 .157 3.50
73 .0'.,1) .029 .329 3.71
74 .0?0 -.022 -.033 -1.82
73 -.019 -,OG?. .166 -6.35
d
r
e. d
-193-
Firm
UAL .
WAL
r^.
TARLE 7.5 (continued)
Return Financial Effective Earrinc:s
Year on Ass^_ts Gain Tax Rate Per Share
1966 .068 .040 .3F6 2.31
67 .039 .059 .324 3.96
68 .063 .0:10 .460 2.27
69 .067 .025 .453 2.",3
7C -.003 -.037 .187 -2.22
71 .024 -.019 .144 -.24
72 .040 -.001 .406 .97
73 .068 .025 .500 2.41
74 .109 .066 .549 4.17
75 .021 -.020 -.023 -.72
1966 .191 .151 .4fi7 1.22
67 .110 .082 .453 .82
68 .056 .027 .359 .56
69 -.034 •-.092 .553 -.81
70 .035 -.023 1.360 .04
71 .058 .Ocs .346 .39
72 .081 .033 .360 .74
73 .121 .075 .424' 1.35
74 .1?? .031 .424 1.59
75 .032 -.609 -.190 .34
^_ ^._ -
	
.. ,(..y.. V.. -rn'..^ • r ^ ...	 ^r^ ^i^ll1	 .-.. -.s' yer	 rrr	 __ -
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series are presented: return on assets as defined above, "finan-
cial gain" (the difference between return cn assets and average
interest cost), and the effective tax rate. The last of,these
Would have a maximum value of .48 were there no "other taxes" in-
cluded in T, no income averaging procedures available to corpor-
ations, no tax on capital gains, or special treatment of foreign
income. (That these conditions do not always obtain accounts for
effective tax rates outside the interval 0 to .48).
Perhaps the best way to examine the Components of Equity
Earnings, Table 25, is on an average basis. The trends developed
for the industry can then be compared with individual carriers
at the reader's convenience. Return on assets statistics were
earlier examined only for the 1970s. Within the context of the
past decade further remarks are in order. Specifically, dramatic
declines in asset profitability characterize the 1966-1975 period,
with the exception of BNF and UAL. Of greater concern is the fact
that return rates for the industry have fallen dramatically rela-
tive to economy wide returns. While the sources of this decline
in profitability are manifold, two factors seem critical: (i)
rapid escalation or input unit prices - first labor, then fuel;
and (ii) inadequate productivity gains associated with aging, or
oversized, craft and fleets.
Financial gain (n - i) measures the extent to which asset pro-
fitability exceeds the average cost of borrowing to provide these
assets. In a sense this statistic describes corporate gains from
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leverage. We noted earlier the extremely high leverage in the
industry, as well as the potential value of debt instruments;
and turn now to ax post performance. The reported values of this
statistic are extremely disappointing. The rapid inflation rates
of the past decade caused problems through the business sector:
interest rates rose rapidly to reflect inflationary expectations,
while asset returns failed to keep pace. In other sectors, how-
ever, this development simply narrowed the amounts of financial
gain. In the air trunkline group, the same trend caused numerous
carriers' financial gain to become negative, i.e., or, average these
firms were actually obtaining less from all assets than the cost
of borrowed funds. A painful result under any circumstances, the
impact of after-tax earnings in such a highly leveraged industry
was devastating. (This remark is simply a restatement of the
"double whammy" implicit in leverage).
A few carrier-s pecific remarks on financial gain are in order:
Note first that, with the exception of DAL, all of the trunks are
experienced in negative financial gain. In several cases these
problems were associated with the rapid growth of interest en
short-term business loans durir ,  the 1969-1970 period and were ,ot
persistent. However, several carriers have faced regularly nega-
tive values for financial gain, and in some cases the situation
had worsened. Finally, we note that the inflation of 1975, anci
the resultant increase in short-term borrowing rates, produced
negative financial gain figures for all but three (BNF, DAL, NWA)
-fir	 - - -- -	 -	 -
I
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carriers. Worst hit by the events of 1975 were those carriers 	
f
which have substantial bank revolving credit agreements (GAL, EAL,
PAA, TWA) since these loans carry interest rates which float with
the money market rates. It should be added that the problems of
1975 were made the more severe by credit agreements which required
higher effective rates above prime and further restricted finan-
cial management practice.
Tax policy can, of course, exert a strong and potentially
counter-cyclical influence on corporate earnings. While there are
numerous ways of lowering the effective tax rate, thus raising
after-tax profits, the leading technique in the airline industry
has been accelerated depreciation. Acceleration is only a tempor-
ary avoidance, but in a world of postive interest rates it is a
desirable strategy. And in certain firms asset growth may proceed
at sufficiently high rates to produce indefinite postponement.
(While this situation is unusual, it is not far from the case which
existed when wide-bodied aircraft started to join the trunk carrier
fleet).
Effective tax rates for the trunks are given in Table 26.
With the exception of Delta these rates are not typical of the
economy. This is due to: (i) the high levels (and age) of capital
investment in airlines relative to other sectors, and (ii) the pro-
pensity of airline management to select accelerated depreciation
schemes. The following Table 26 - derived from. the CQMPUSTAT data
base - illustrates this point.
1 t
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TABLE 26
COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVE TAX RATES
Industry or	 Effective Tax Rate
Firm	 1966	 1975
Communication	 .48	 .45
Utilities	 .38
	
.32
Transportation	 .38	 .35
AAL
	 .38	 .22
BNF	 .15
	
.24
CAL	 .47	 .43
DAL	 .47	 .34
EAL	 .00	 .00
NAL
	 .46
	
.13
NWA	 .47	 .08
PAA	 .39
	 .15
TWA	 .39
	 .17
UAL
	 .39
	 -.02
WAL	 .47	 -.19
Clearly the airline industry has employed investment tax credits
and tax deferral schemes to an extent not at all common to other
regulated, capital intensive sectors. We emphasize this point be-
cause the value of such deferrals is conditional on the level of
taxable income. To the extent teat the low return record of the
past several years continues through the remainder of the decade,
one must conclude that tax policy will not continue to provide
substantial capital fund sources.
Equity return data are of interest because they condition the
level of capital sources: return levels provide measures of the
extent to which new equity can be sold in the industry, as well
-198-
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as determining the desirability of investing income retentions.
If equity returns are adequate then the firm can obtain new equity,
or re-invest cash flows, without lowering the wealth of its stock-
holders. The picture for future equity financing is a mixed one:
two carriers, Braniff and Delta, have produced substantial per
share earnings. As the earlier discussion shows, Delta has accom-
plished this with substantially less debt per share than Braniff;
and has not relied as heavily on tax deferral schemes. For these
carriers - and Delta in particular - equity financing remains an
easy source of funds. National, Northwest, and Western have pro-
vided positive returns to equity holders throughout the decade
with two exceptions (NAL, 1971; WAL, 1969). The critical question
is one of trend. While the 1975 results were not favorable, the
return trends for these carriers are upward.
During the 1971-1975 period four carriers exhibit improving
equity returns if we abstract from 1975: National, Northwest,
United and Western. However, since Northwest and United begin
from extremely low bases, we must distinguish between the four.
The growing equity returns for these carriers were not the re-
cult of leverage since liability-equity ratios remained relatively
constant. In the case of National and Western, the return records
are simply the result of increased operational profitability in
the face of rising interest costs. Northwest and United produced
equity return growth via different strategies, the former relying
heavily on tax reductions via acceleration schemes, while the
i.
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latter depended on efficiencies in operations and balance sheet
management. Distinguishing again between the four carriers, we
note that only National and Western generated equity returns which
would make retention investments attractive.
Equity returns at Pan um have been persistently negative and
do not warrant further discussion here. We turn instead to the
remaining trunk carriers: American, Continental, Eastern, and TWA.
All of these firms exhibit declining returns on equity in the 1911-
1915 period. While the rate of decline for AAL is almost imper-
ceptible, the trend in the other cases is definite. However, the
poor performance of these carriers can largely be laid to the
following factors: first, persistently low return on assets.
Second, all of these carriers maintained large revolving credit
agreements with commercial banks during the period, and in most
cases paid interest rates in excess of their return on assets.
This performance has been such that it will be difficult indeed
to attract new equity to these firms, much less to justify income
retention should earnings not improve in the near tern. That both
AAL and TWA appeared in this group was a source of concern here,
since these carriers held a large proportion of the older craft
in the trunkline fleet.
The leverage and coverage statistics discussed in Section
G.Y go a long way toward describing risk associated with airline
industry common stock. That is, high levels of debt relative to
permanent capital imply high fixed charge:,, and low values of
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coverage ratios indicate possibilites of default on these charges.
In recent years it has been suggested that the relation of changes
in specific security returns relative to average shifts in the
securities market average returns provide a measure of the "risk"
which is specific to a given firm. Define the following variables: -
Rj : return on security j (dividend yield plus
capital gain)
RM : average return on a "market portfolio"
composed of all securities:
Now, from the equation
R  = aj +^jRm+ei
	 (3)
we derive the following view of risk: the variance of returns on
security j ( Qj 2 ) is the sum of systematic or market, influences
(a2 2 )and firm-specific risk ve. Accordingly, computed values
of sj derived from fitting (3) to prior years' experience are
thought to express the relationship between risk in a given se-
curity and market risk, i.e., values for B  in excess of unity in-
dicate greater "systematic" risk in security j than in the port-
folio of market securities, and vice versa. Stocks with computed
values of a  in excess of one thus rise faster than a bull market,
and fall faster than a bear market returns.
One security research firm provides regular reports of a
a
statistic very similar to the R in (3). This is the Value Line
service which excludes dividend yield from its return definition.
However, given the paucity of airline industry dividends, we have
in the Value Line statistics a useful measure of risk in equity
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instruments. For the eleven carriers the computed values are:
Firm	 S
AAL 1.45
BNF 1.60
CAL 1.60
DAL 1.35
EAL 1.45
NAL 1.70
NWA 1.60
PAA 1.50
TWA 1.85
UAL 1.60
WAL 1.60
As these coefficients are derived by least-squares of fits of (D-3)
for the 60 months prior to October 1975, the values reported are
random variables. Accordingly it is difficult to conclude that
there exist important differences among these values. Rather
these values are reported because of their excess over unity. On
this measure of risk, airline equity investments are risky indeed.
Note that the lowest estimate in the group is 1.35 - a value
exceeded by only 118 of the 1600 firms in the Value Line sample.
(Excepting the DAL figure, trunk air carriers constitute 8.5% of
the 188 firms) .
G.4 REPLACEMENT FINANCING POSSIBILITIES: THE 1970-1975 RECORD
The preceding remarks clearly documented the disastrous finan-
cial performance of the domestic trunk airline industry, 1970-1975.
b
The message in this record for replacement decisions in the short-
term was clearly negative. To wit, excess leverage had produced
4i
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debilitating impacts on equity returns, and had raised borrowing
costs to unusually high levels. Further debt financing without
improved earnings and better balance sheet management was an im-
possibility for all but a few carriers. Indeed, deteriorating
coverage positions raised serious questions as to the appropriate-
ness of further leasing - and this in spite of the substantial tax
incentives for such activity. Our work indicated that greater
equity financing (either through income retention or new stock
issues) would be the only serious long run approach to form a
base for the massive replacement program ahead. The same work
shows that future equity funding would require :Huth higher rates
of return than have previously been typical. These higher rates
follow from several developments: (1) declining rates of return
on assets produced by quantum jumps in fuel costs and what proved
to be overbuying of wide-bodied aircraft, (2) increasing interest
rates associated with excessive leverage, and (3) investor uncer-
tainty generated by deregulation discussion and uncertainty as to
noise abatement retrofit, refanning, or replacement financing
legislation.
G.5 REPLACEMENT FINANCING CAPABILITY 1976-1979: A TURNAROUND?
Based on economics, academic theorists in 1976 could say that
the market place was working well to deny financing except at very
high rates to most airlines. To add or replace capacity where none
was needed was unwise and the financial institutions were only
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following sound economic principles in shunning airlines and in
loaning to other industries who could employ assets more produc-
tively at much lower risk. Unfortunately this did not answer the
question of where the money would come from to retrofit, re-engine
or replace aircraft to comply with the proposal to require such
action for enviroranental reasons -- a proposal which became a re-
gulation in December 1976. This regulation, 91-136, led to an
intense drive by the airlines, through ATA, the aircraft manufac-
turers and the airport operators, to obtain financing legislation
which would reduce risk so that the financial community would lend
the necessary sums at reasonable rates. Details of this legisla-
tion are chronicled elsewhere in this report.
A series of cost cutting moves, including the disposal of
some excess capacity, coupled with traffic growth, resulted in
1976 financial figures better than those cf 1975. However, it
I-
	
was not until the first quarter of 1971 that the financing picture
began to change positively. American Airlines, a carrier with a
high degree of financial leverage and a relatively high proportion
of older aircraft in its fleet, moved to begin replacement of its
707-100 aircraft so as to comply with the new 91-136 rule. Amer-
ican's past irregular return on equity, associated with high in-
terest costs relative to return on assets, had made future debt
financing nearly impossible. American offered 5 million shares of
$2.1875 preferred stock (with 5 million warrants to purchase shares
of its common stock at $14) for $25 per unit on March 20, 1977.
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The net proceeds of this issue were $18.5 million. The impact on
&cirican's balance sheet was substantial: debt declined from 41%
to 37% of its long-term capital structure. While it would be easy
3
to over-state the impact of this move, it was an indication of
sound financial management. Later in 1977 EAL and TWA engaged in 	 a
similar financing.
While such financing was astute, it did not seem entir-,y
congruent with the positions taken in some of the Congressional
	
r
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hearings that any of financing was out of the question. The ATA
maintained its posture that there was no way airlines could re-
tire their fleets and replace them unless a financial assistance
bill was passed. However, by the end of 1977 further improvements
in airline operating results, coupled with the need to replace
aircraft for noise compliance.led to rumors that some of the better
situated carriers would not wait for a noise financing bill before
ordering new equipment.
This information was riot missed by those in Congress opposed
to legislation involving financial assistance; and in February,
the Treasury Department and others, concerned over political and
budgetary implications of the Anderson noise bill, testified be-
fore the House Ways and Means Committee against the type of finan-
cing involved. At the same time, ATA %sas having difficulty in
keeping the actions of its members consistent with the party
line of financial inability. Beginning in January 1978, the press
began to carry accounts of an impending purchase of Airbus A-300s
1:
-2054°
by Eastern and of Lockheed L-1011s by Pan American. Additionally,
the Chairman of TWA told a Society of Airline Analysts meeting in
New York that TWA was in its strongest financial position in years.
Thus it was not the well financed Dpltas or Northwests that were
subject of rumors of orders, but several carriers which had been
depicted at death's door a year earlier.
As time moved along there were each month reports of increas-
ing load factors and profits. A special report on aircraft finan-
cing capability was published in the March 1978 edition of Air
Transport World. The report, in covering the opinions of analysts,
banks, insurance companies, consultants, lessors and airlines, con-
cluded that the airlines would have no difficulty in financing
equipment. In April, Thomas Craig, Boeing's Director of Market
Research, made a country-wide tour publicizing the company's re-
port on "Airline Capital Formation and Boeing's New-Airplane Family"
in which it was concluded that of a total capital need of $50 billion
for the next decade of aircraft purchases,the carriers could fi-
nance two thirds from internal sources. A 10% Rol would be suf-
ficient. During the same month (April) Eastern announced the pur-
chase of a number of Airbus A-300s involving a $778 million pack-
age of which $552 million would be externally financed. Pan Amer-
ican's announced purnhase plans for the Lockheed L-1011-500s in-
volved about $500 million. Initially it was argued that the Pan
American and Eastern purchases were made possible by overgenerous
subsidies from foreign government sour ,„es. However, it developed
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that American banks would have liked to have financed the purchases
but "could not get a piece of the action." The ability of these
two carriers, who not long ago had been said to be on the verge
of bankruptcy, to obtain financing is indicative of the rapid
change in the assessment by the financi a l community of airline
earning power.
While announcement of the Pan American and Eastern purchases,
just as the noise rinancing bill was getting into trouble,was less
than a stroke of managerial genius from the standpoint of obtaining
legislative aid, it did unscore the brightened outlook of the car-
riers. As hearings on the Senate noise financing bill approached
there was more good news concerning financial viability. Late in
May Eastern filed for a $50 million issue o f convertible subordin-
ated debentures. Additionally, publication of the first quarter
financial results indicated that various airlines were "awash"
with cash and short term investments. Three examples are listed
below:
Com an	 Cash & short-tend investments
American	 $ 447,600,000
United	 529,000,000
Pan American	 178,000,000
By the time of the Senate hearings on the noise bill (May
and June 1978), members of Congress began to question the need
for ary financial assistance at all. Senator Cannon attempted
!:•
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to substitute a $20 billion Joan guarantee concept for the idea of
tax money going into a separate fund. However, it gathered no sup-
port. Although the 1977 testimony of the financial community con-
cer,oing the need for financing assistance was positive and exten-
sivp,tne correlative June of 1978 testimony was brief and low key.
In general the financial community was reasonably optimistic about
earnings but stated that financing would be more readily available
if the uncertainty over reform and noise legislation could be turned
to certainty. Alfred Kahn, then Chairman of the CPS•, was more
blunt in concluding that with earnings of the carriers running
around 12% on investment, and some over 16T_ on equity, the airlines
would have little trouble in financin g equipment purchases. 46J
As if to punctuate Chairman Kahn's testimony, a series of con-
firming eve'ats took place in midsummer and early fall. On July
17th the Wal' Street Journal carried the story of United's pur-
chase of 30 new technology jets and 30 current technology jets
for $1.6 billion. The timing was two days before the House rules
committee was to consider moving on the noise bills. Rumors were
rife that American was about to announce a similar order. Glowing
second quarter earnings were regularly being released to the press,
including a whopping increase of 71% by TWA. Not surprisingly
some tiew bills we..- •e now being introduced in Congress without any
46/ U.S. Congress, Senate Subcowittee on Aviation of the Committee
on Commerce Science & Traisportation. 95th Cong. 2nd Session
1978. Aircraft and Air ort Noise Red ucti ons, Hearings on
A.747, . 06 , and ;R 8729 pp	 -300.
9
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funding mechanism for replacement airplanes. Early in September,
with the final processing of the noise legislation at the end of
the 95th Congress just weeks away. Eastern, in announcing the pur-
ct.ase of $560 million worth of new technology airplanes, predicted
that a large portion of the financing would be internal. Two weeks
later both Eastern and Pan American called for redemption issues
of their Convertible Subordinated Debentures. The financing pro-
vision in the Senate bill was withdrawn and the noise legislation
never reached the floor in the last hours of the session - too
late for a compromise with the House version.
At the end of 1978 the U.S. scheduled airlines reported a
net profit of $1.2 billion, a dramatic change from the $84 million
loss of 1975 a mere three years previously. Lest one jump to the
conclusion that the rosy picture represented the solution to the
airlines' problems, let us up-date Tables 24 and 25.
Cur previous analysis, based upon the financial misfortunes
of the 1970-1975 period, indicated that a continuation of past
experience would indeed force most carriers to retain old inef-
ficient equipment. In our progress report to NASA early in 1978
we noted the beginnings of carrier efforts at balance sheet
strengthening to provide a basis on which lenders could make
loans. We now move from these isolated examples to a general sur-
vey of what has happene6 the last three years.
Table 27, Selected Financial Ratios, and Table 28, Components
of Equity Earnings, up-date Tables 24 and 25 and provide compar-
E
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TABLE 27
SELECTED FINANCIAL RATIOS
U.S. Domestic Trunks Plus Pan Am
A. Firm 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978
Lonq Term Debt/
AAL •572 .528 .493 .492 -
Lon9 Teri: Debt BNF .682 .608 .591 .590 -
Plus Equity
IAL .744 .,46 .703 .635 .516
DAL .550 .580 .547 .489 .419
EAL .654 . 700 .626 .572 -
NAL .594 .580 .548 .502 .417
NWA .446 .397 .327 .326 -
PAA .708 .760 .679 .753
TWA .732 .787 .754 .649 -
UAL .672 .644 .631 .577 .567
WAL .680 .550 .599 .583 -
6. AAL .768 .800 .794 .780 -
Lona Term Debt 8NF .855 .825 .812 .799 -
Plus Lease Pay- CAL .804 .810 .786 .150 .675
ments/L.T.	 Debt DAL .619 .755 .657 .606 .556
Plus Equity Plus EAL .859 .878 .857 .861 -NAL .730 .696 .681 .666 .633Lease Payments NWA
.497 .470 .416 .406 -
PAA .802 .863 .827 .812 -
TWA .870 .905 .893 .867 -
LI AL .	 O6 .7£0 .778 .747 .652
WAL .795 .777 .82 6 .789 -
C. AAL 4.0 4.3 9.5 9.2 -
Tim,es 'Interest SNF 4.2 4.2 4.8 5.1 -
Earned* CAL 3.9 1.9 3.1 4.0 5.0DAL 8.4 6.4 8.5 13.4 18,8
EAL 3.2 1.9 4.3 4.4 -
NAL 2.6 4.3 3.7 5.1 9.3
NWA 7,8 9.2 14.5 25.9 -
PAA 1.9 2,3 2.9 3.2 -
TWA 3.8 1.4 4,0 5.6 -
UAL 3.8 4.0 4,5 5.9 7,3
WAL 4.9 5.5 7.4 7.0 -
* Includes book depreciation.
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Firm 1971 1975 1976 1977
D.
AAL 1.6 1.1 2.0 2.2Coverage" BNF 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.4
CAL 2.7 1.5 2.2 2.6
DAL 4.6 3.0 4.5 5.9
EAL 1.4 1.0 1.8 1.7
NAL 1.6 2.4 1.9 1.9
NWA 3.2 3.8 5.1 6.8
PAA 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.4
TWA 1.7 .7 2.0 2.2
UAL 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.6
WA` 2.9 2.1 2.7 2.9
E. AAL .005 -.038 0.92 '.107
BNF .106 .122 .139 .166
Return on CAL .070 -.066 .059 .144Equity DAL .106 .102 .130 .149
EAL .017 -.190 .102 .103
NAL -.032 .058 .026 .016
NWA .045 .070 .078 .124
PAA -.103 -.180 -.024 .125
TWA .004 -.317 .110 .151
UAL -.013 -.008 .024 .102
WAL .068 .037 .128 .111
F. AAL .025 -.002 .056 .051
BNF .074 .087 .096 .109
Return on CAL
.058 .026 .064 .078
Assets DAL
.078 .083 .098 .121
EAL .044 .003 .071 .062
NAL .002 .054 .031 .021
NWA .026 .053 .098 .125
PAA -.001 -.001 .030 .076
TWA .029 ••.020 .067 .072
UAL .024 .021 .033 .053
WAL .058 .032 .078 .071
TABLE 27 (Continued)
S
1978
	 z
3.1
x
7.0
3.0
4.5
.215
.178
.071
.257
.113
.150
.067
.117
3 .'4
V
** Includes book depreciation. Coverage is ratio of earnings
before interest and taxes to interest plus one-third of
rentals.
i
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ative data for the eleven trunk carriers. At first glance viewing
the last three years in comparison with the immediately preceding
years, there has been an impressive recovery. Specifically the
most dramatic area has been Item C. Times Interest Earned, where
a number of carriers (AAL, DAL, NAL, NWA and UAL) have doubled or
more than doubled coverage. On closer analysis, using other tabu-
lations, one finds qualification to optimism. Although there has
been a long term decline in the ratio of Long Teir! Debt to Long
Term Debt plus Equity (Item A), the ratios are still higher than
for Delta and Northwest back in 1971. Thus there is still a way
to go to reach desirable figures.
A look at Item D which is coverage (including book deprecia-
tion) indicates that the situation has not improved a lot through
1977 except for Northwest. However, in 1978 United and Delta
showed a large improvement.
Turning our attention to Table 28, Components of Equity
Earnings, we see that American's Return on Assets were less in
1977 than in 1969. However, the Earnings per Share had a substan-
tial increase from $1.90 to $2.86, in large measure because of a
zero effective tax rate. Continental's change to a return on
assets is a spectacular 11.313 in 1978 in comparison with it's
3.9% in 1969. Braniff has doubled it's ROA and has carried a lo';0
down to net. It is interesting to note that proverbial industry
leaders in profit, Delta and Northwest, are not a great deal more
profitable than they were back in 1969 - Delta's return was 13.6
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TABLE 28
COMPONENTS OF EQUITY EARNINGS
t
f
1
Return Financial Effective Earnings
Firm Year one s ets Gain a^ xate 'Per Share
AAL 1969 .056 .019 .210 1.90
1970
-.002 -.035 .282 -1.30
1975
-.0O2 -.028 .221 -.72
1976 .057 .034 .241 1.97
1977 .053 .030 .000 2.86
BNF 1969 .058 .007 .206 .32
1970 .026 -.023 .311 -.13
1975 .087 .030 .243' 1.02
1976 .096 .041 .256 1.32
1977 .109 .052 .256 1.82
CAL 1969 .039 -.002 .244 .25
1970 .040 .000 •285 .29
1975 .026 -.040 .430 -.68
1976 .064 .002 .3i5 .64
1977 .078 .021 .036 1.79
1978 .113 .050 .034 3.30
DAL 1969 .136 .092 .466 2.05
1970 .142 .072 .431 2.33
1975 .083 .021 .340 2.48
1976 ,098 .043 .359 3.53
1977
.121 .071 .404 4.65
1978 .150 .109 .417 6.60
EAL 1969 .033 -.013 .282 -.19
1970 .044 -.003 .256 .46
1975
.003 -.051 .000 -2.61
1976 ,011 .023 .240 1.77
1977
.062 .013 .000 1.75
NAL 1569 .132 .081 .464 2.25
1970 .037 -.004 .192 .61
1975
.054 -.011 .126 1.33
1976 .031 -.028 -.829 .59
1911
.021 -.024 -.508 .35
1978
.067 .022 .397 1.68
Firm
NWA
TWA
UAL
WAL
Year
1969
1970
1975
1976
1977
1969
1970
1975
1976
1977
1969
1970
1975
1976
1977
1978
1969
1970
1975
1976
1977
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TABLE 28
(Continued)
Return	 Financial
on Assets
	
atn
.112 .101
.055 .036
.353 .012
.098 .046
.125 .094
.035 .001
-.039 -.073
-.020 -.063
.068 .024
.073 .034
.067 .025
.003 -.037
.021 -.019
.033 -.007
.054 .017
.118 .073
-.034 -.092
.036 -.023
.032 -.009
.078 .039
.071 .030
Effective Earnings
Tax Rate Per Share
.364 2.46
.003 2.10
.078 2.01
.473 2.39
.395 4.29
-.174 1.95
.295 -6.09
.166 -6.35
.407 2.62
.218 4.10
.453 2.43
.187 -2.22
-.023 -.22
.31^ •77
.061 3.77
.105 11.52
.553 -.81
1.360 .04
-.190 .34
.377 1.18
.376 1.13
♦ 	 ^,	 ^	 i ..a 1M Ili ,.. ^	 ^-Y	 ^	
__
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1
in 1969 and 15% in 1978. Northwest earned 11.2% in 1969 and 12.5%
it 1977. Two companies significantly ahead of 1969 and fantasti-
cally ahead of 1970 are United and Continental which Joined North-
west and Delta in double digit return on assets.
Conclusion
The financial history of the airlines in recent years in one
of a highly leveraged industry which is very sensitive to business
cycles. Therefore, excellent as are the 1977 and 1978 results
which if continued would enable the carriers to arrange financing
at will to retire undesirable equipment, one cannot assume with a
high degree of certainty that the problem of financing replace-
ments has disap peared forever. Within the industry there is a
disparity of financial quality with only a very few comparing
favorably with sound companies outside of the air tranport field.
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H.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study of factors affecting aircraft retirement indicates
that prior to the introduction of the narrow-bodied 707, DC-8, and
Convair turbojet aircraft in 1958, retirements were the result of
progressive development of technically and economically more effi-
cient aircraft -- i.e., the better mouse trap syndrome. Age of
aircraft was not a factor. Nor is age as such a factor with the
current turbojet and fanjet planes. However, several new factors
i.e., (1) noise regulations (2) fuel efficiency (3) inflation have
become important elements in the retirement equation.
H.1 NOISE REGULATIONS AS A FACTOR IN RETIREMENT
Developed at a time when fuel was cheap and when the previous
type of piston engine noise had not resulted in significant public
disapproval, the jets introduced higher and more annoying noise
levels. Public dissatisfaction with the noise emissions was almost
instantaneous. Within two years the somewhat quieter fanjet was
introduced. Some carriers retrofitted their existing fleets and
all new aircraft were delivered with the quieter and more fuel-
efficient fan jets.
Nevertheless, so extensive were the noise complaints that the
federal government took action in 1969 by promulgation of a rule
^a
rpb
l
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(FAR 36) requiring that future aircraft be quieter than current
fanjets. After 1974 all transport production was required to meet
the 1969 standard. However, this rule left 80% of the existing
fleet exempt from noise limits - limits already being criticized
as too lenient. Proposals were made which would require the 80%
to be retired or modified to meet tine 1969 standards. As airlines
were suffering fron poor or negative earnings, they wished to re-
tain the status quo arguing that economics should decide retirement
and not a retroactive rule. If the government required retirement
or modification of aircraft, it should, they maintained, assist in
the financing involved.
Late in 1976 the FAA decreed (FAR 91-136) that all aircraft
would have to comply with the 1969 rule. No financial assistance
was suggested. The next three years saw efforts by the ATA to ob-
tain legislation which would assist the carriers in replacing their
noisy fleets, or provide relief from the requirements of 91-136.
During the 1977-1970 period various bills alternately favored retro-
fit, re-engining or replacement, thus making it impossible for car-
rier managements to make the most economic decision as to retiring
or modifying their noisy aircraft. Conflicting bills on the extent
to which, if at all, FAR 91-136 should be modified made their ap-
pearance in 1979. Further, sine carriers now openly support the
rule feeling that long run noncompliance will alienate the public
to the point where the entire industry will suffer from operating
constraints imposed by airport authorities at the behest of af-
fected citizens. Thus it can be said that noise emission is a
powerful facter 4a pus4ing certain aircraft towards retirement.
H.2 FUEL COST AS A NEW ELEMENT IN THE RETIREMENT DECISION
For a number of years, fuel was such a small portion of oper-
ating costs that it played no part in acquisition or retirement
decisions. However, between 1973 and 1979 a four-fold increase
from 13¢ a gallon to over 50t resulted in an increase from 20%
of cash operating costs to as much as 50%. The figure is higher
when related to an early turbojet. Accordingly, those carriers
which had not converted to fanjets began to phase out the fuel
guzzling JT3s and JT4s as early as 1975. By 1979, with much
higher fuel prices, their use could not be justified.
The deterioration in the economics of narrow-bodied aircraft
because of rising fuel costs generated intense activity by the
engine manufacturers to develop more fuel-efficient engines. For-
tunately, the high bypass engines developed for wide bodies com-
bine significant fuel efficiency with low noise. Efforts to de-
sign new engines such as the CFM56 and the JT10D for narrow
bodies, have continued.
The following aircraft became progressively slated for re-
tirement because of fuel costs: the 707, DC-8 and early models
of the 727 and DC-9. Illustrative is TWA's announcement of dis-
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continuance of some 707 service because increased fuel prices
made the operation unprofitable at a 100% load factor. Recently,
a number of airlines concluded that re -engining the DC
-8-61 with
the CFM56 engine will save that aircraft from the retirement pre-
dicted less than a year ago.
H.3 INFLATION AS A NEW ELEMENT IN RETIREMENT OF AIRCRAFT
The rapid rise of inflation has had a delaying effect on air-
craft retirement. While technological progress has continued,
its costs effectiveness has been blunted by inflation. Each unit
of technical progress has become more expensive to develop so that
the capital cost of the finished product has reached the point
that, when ownership costs are amortized, the economic benefits
are sharply reduced if not eliminated. Managements wince at the
prospect of retiring a 707 which cost between $5 million and
$10 million with a somewhat larger 767 for $40 million, even
though there may be a stream of savings in operating expenses for
as long as 15 or 20 years. Applying present value computations
to such a stream of benefits ma':z^, r',em look small in comparison
with the contemplated capital outlay.
H.4 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AS A FACTOR IN AIRCRAFT RETIREMENT
Air transport has been an industry sensitive to the business
cycle. Additionally, many firms have been highly leveraged. As
{
a
i
1
x
.ry
.i
j
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a consequence the industry experiences periods of low or nega-
tive earnings during which some carriers have neither the desire
nor the ability to make capital commitments for replacing old
aircraft with new. Our survey showed that on an industry-wide
basis, orders followed profits. As a consequence, retirements
often have noc followed an orderly replacement plan. This study
began in a period of economic gloom. Overcapacity existed and
there was little ability to finance compliance with new environ-
mental regulations. Cempletion of the study occured during a
period of high profits and an increasing surge of orders. It is
quite clear that the financial ability to support replacement
purchases is an important factor in retirement decisions.
H.5 TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AS A FACTOR IN AIRCRAFT RETIREMENT
Two quantum jumps in productivity after World War II ((1)
four-engined, pressurized, long-range piston aircraft and (2) tur-
bojet aircraft), both compounding the effect of multiplying in-
creases in speed and size, and embodying lower operating costs,
were the key factors in accelerating the retirement of predecessor
aircraft. The technology which made this possible was all the
more effective because it occured during a period of a relative-
ly stable price level so that technological gains were not ad-
versely affected by inflation.
Currently, increases in speed would require the use of more
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of scarce and expensive fuel to reach supersonic levels. The im-
practibility of this approach is illustrated by the fact that the
Concorde, despite heroic bookkeeping adjustments, 47/ is approach-
ing retirement for economic reasons. In additiot,, increases in
size, while having some limited future application, are not nearly
as needed as significant fuel and noise emission improvements in
the narrow body category. Thus the focus of technology is now di-
rectly on economics without the aid of the very elements which have
previously contributed so much to the construction of more econom-
ic aircraft and the subsequent retirement of predecessor aircraft.
The unavailability of speed and size as a means of increasing pro-
ductivity, coupled with high rates of inflation, have presented
aircraft designers with a most difficult challenge. Since the con-
sensus is that there are diseconomies in shrink;ng the size of a
transport, the challenge to technology for designing economical
smaller aircraft is monumental. It was primarily run-away fuel
costs which kept making the development of aircraft such as the
751 and 767 look better and better to the potential customers.
In any event, aviation history has shown that technology has
been the mechanism by which larger economical and technically ef-
ficient aircraft have been developed. When environmental concerns
(primarily aircraft noise) became a problem, efforts, again first
47 / 
First, development costs were written off followed by a de-
cision to omit depreciation.
r.►" _. _ `.,"	 a1a'	 ,fir
. 	 Tom..— a.s .'T'
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applied to large aircraft, led to the second generation high by-
pass ratio, quiet, fuel-efficient, turbofan en g ine. This devel-
opment was the beginning of the end for fast generation large
narrow-body jet aircraft. Over the years technolcg cal progress
has been a prime factor in bringing about an aircarrier` lW decision
to retire one series of aircraft ,in favor of another::
H.6 CONCLUSION
The application of technology to produce ever lower costs per
seat-mile or ton-mile while at the same time emphasizing noise con-
trol, reached its peak in the high capacity, long-range 747 with
high bypass engines. The need for a smaller aircraft to take over
high density domestic stage lengths, led to application of the
same technology to the DC-10 and L-1011. Higher than expected de-
sign and maintenance operating costs, plus a slackening of demand
because of a recession, dampened the profitability of these tw,
types of aircraft. From the standpoint of traffic levels, car-
riers had no need for fleet additions. Given the foregoing sce-
nario, plus the consensus that there were diseconomies in the de-
sign and use of smaller aircraft, it is understandable why manu-
facturers placed their attention on the large aircraft.
When traffic growth resumed manufacturers were happy to sell
their existing model narrow bodies. Since a large portion, if
not all, of the development costs had been written off, and since
manufacturing processes and techniques were well down the "]earning
R^
L
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curve", aircraft manut%^, turers were able to quote a very attractive
capital cost in comparison with that for a newly designea aircraft
whose current labor, design and material costs would be increased
by years of inflation. A further reason for the reluctance of a
manufacturer to intiate a move which would render his own produc-
tion obsolete was his reasoning in regard to federal noise regula-
tions. Air carriers, whom the manufacturers try zealously not to
offend, were striving to avoid having stricter noise rules imple-
mented. However, even under the rule in dispute, all current pro-
duction aircraft (meaning 727/737/DC-9) met Stage 2 requirements.
Thus, as long as these aircraft were considered as compliant air-
craft there was insufficient motivation to build something new
with a doubling of capital cost.
The first generation of narrow bodies (701/DC-8) fell into a
different category. They were, first of all, substantially above
FAR 36 noise limits, and secondly, they were becoming economically
obsolete primarily because of escalating fuel prices. Given the
conventional desire to buy a plane a little too large "to grow
irto% designers attacked the objective of a 200 passenger plane
which would satisfy more strict environmental rules for future
aircraft and meet. a target of very substantial fuel economy. Over
several years of efforts diseconomies of scale (to which was added
inflation) more than offset technological progress so that the re-
sulting aircraft did not meet the airlines' required rate of re-
turn ("h.u rdle rate"). However, growing environmental pressure,
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plus rapidly rising fuel prices (which magnified the disadvantage
of old aircraft over the new), turned the tables in favor of the
767 as a replacement for the early long-range narrow bodies. A
slightly smaller capacity sh- ,ter range 757 was developed. Orig-
inally designed as a derivative of the 727, it has been growing in
size and sophistication to the point that it more resembles a 767
than a 727 derivative.
Until recently, because of the difficulties in achieving econ-
omies and noise control in smaller aircraft,and because is was
hoped that the public would accept continued unconstrained oper-
ation of narrow bodies which meet the legal noise requirements of
FAR 36, a maximu., effort was not launched to develop d new tech-
nology replacement for the first generation medium to short range
narrow bodies. However, recent experience suggests that the state-
1 i ment that an aircraft "meets Annex 16", or "meets FAR 36", is no
longer acceptable to airport neighbors. For example, when the
Swiss public found that certain new Annex 16 airplanes (DC-9-50s)
were noisier than the non-Annex 16 planes they were replacing
(DC-9-30s), their reaction was such that Swissair felt that to
continue operations it had to buy a quieter plane (DC-9-Super 80)
even though the plane was not of the desired size. In Japan, as
a study underway will show, still higher fuel costs and public
pressure to constrain the growth of aviation by severe curfews
and operational restrictions, make new technology mid-range air-
craft necessary. Additionally, recent statements in the U.S.
by the general counsels of the CAB and FAA, have given airport
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operators encouragement to prescribe further limits and charges
for aircraft noise. The foregoing suggest that notwithstanding
that (1) current narrowbodies are not "worn out" and (2) that
their relatively low capital cost makes thei attractive to purchase
s
vis-a-vis a "clean sheet" new technology aircraft, there are strong
environmental and economic reasons for their replacement.
The number of the narrowbodies in existence suggest a large
market for this size aircraft. As of April 1, 1979 there were
about 5,500 jet transport aircraft in the free world fleet 1^-1
of which about 80 percent were narrow bodies with low bypass en-
gines. One manufacturer alone, Boeing, has indicated total orders
for 3,980 aircraft of which 3,359 were of narrow body low bypass
ratio design and 621 with high bypass ratio powerplants.-A
4
During the past six months the European aviation press has carried
stories of increasing activit y
 of European airframe and engine
manufacturers focused on aircraft in the 100 to 160 passenger
range.
As fuel prices continue to escalate and as noise is a world
wide problem, the continued viability of the current offerings in
the short to medium range aircraft is a matter of concern. Owners
of 727-IOCs, some DC-9s, the BAC 111 and other narrow body aircraft
--4-6^ Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Group, U.S. & International Commer-
ciai Fleets, May 15, 1979.
49f Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, " goeing Jetliner Monthly
Summary, Month Ending July 31, 1979.
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are already seeking to retire them. Unfortunately, because of the
lack of concentration of research on this size category, there are
now no new technology replacements available. With resources of
private firms in the manufacturing industry fully committed to new
larger offerings, and with some manufacturers being financially
unable to take the big gamble in the development of a new high
technology medium capacity aircraft, it would seem in the public
interest for the federal government to support additional economic
and technical research to hasten the development of a new technol-
ogy aircraft in the short to medium range category. Such support
would assist the United States in meeting its energy and environ-
mental goals and help maintain our leadership in international air
transportation.
More specifically, NASA's energy efficient aircraft program
1-14,	 should emphasize those portions of research which are particularly
0,
	
	
appropriate for the short to medium range category. The 200 pas-
senger 767 design went through many changes to establish its mis-
sion, fuselage cross section, number of engines, number of aisles,
passenger capacity and its degree of onboard sophistication. The
solutions to these problems, though difficult, were less unmanage-
able because a limited number of companies large enough to launch
an airplane had to be satisfied. Even here the slightly differing
missions caused problems.
The solution for the smaller airplane is much more difficult.
Under deregulation routes and airlines are in a state of flux so
that each carrier may want a slightly different airplane. Thus
.—ov .-...r--r - i•^'±,...^n+a+^.'1R^!^^'F	 ..,T-^ ,-g.c -K^e .e.<f,	 .	 . n.-s :.. .. ^
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it is difficult for a manufacturer to freeze a design on size and
configuration. Joint meetings on an " industry" agreed upon air-
plane are inhibited by antitrust laws and by pride of individual
airlines. Thus independent research is indicated.
Because midsize midrange aircraft are used the world over,
international needs must be considered. If small cities are to
continue to be served with reasonable frequencies and at reason-
able load factors, designers must be careful not to be swayed by
economies of scale, and design an airplane whose seat -mile costs
may be admirable but whose revenue passenger-miles result in lower
than break even load factors. Because of the difficulties in en-
gineering economies and noise control into smaller aircraft there
is a great challenge for both technical and economic research.
I-	
H.7 FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Fuselage cross section. In the design competition which
resulted in the 7 abreast 2-aisle 767 - a clean paper approach to
downsizing - many cross sec t ;,•iis were analyzed. Despite the fact
that the ultimate selection was a smaller crass section than some
preferred, it won out because of lower operating costs while still
retaining the desirable two aisles. Since there are those, mainly
marketing departments, who think that two aisles are necessary,
further aerodynamic studies on cross sections of this type could
be made.
2. Range and payload (passengers and cargo). To hold down
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operating costs, range and payload must be closely tailored to the
optimum needs of the carriers. The recent proliferation of routes
under deregulation may be shifting the desired range and load.
While air carriers like to look for an all purpose machine to cover
short and long hauls, such a design entails economic penalties re-
sulting from carrying needless structural weight and the payment
of landing charges based on maximum certificated gross weight.
Research aimed at developing the cost penalties associated with
oversizing and undersizing would be appropriate.
3. Configuration studies. Given the cross section, range
and load, the design of the wing and how the engines are configured
are subjects for research. Currently engineers indicate that be-
cause of the larger diameter of a high bypass engine there is no
practical way to insert such an engine into the tail of a 727 or
on a 737. This would seem to suggest that practicality and econom-
ics will dictate a twin-engine replacement. However, since no
company has attempted to design a "clean sheet" transport of this
U	 size for a specific thrust, the matter of the number of engines
should not be considered closed. The operational flexibility and
possible safety advantages of three engines must be evaluated.
4. Engine research. When one talks with air carriers or air-
frame manufacturers about replacements for the 727/737/and DC-9
series, one is immediately told (and the engine manufacturers con-
tern) that currently no manufacturer has an engine in production
specifically tailored for that category. Generally suggested are
-228-
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heavier, higher thrust engines (designed with larger craft in mind)
which can be de-rated to the desired power. The technology is at
hand for the desired thrust, fuel economy and noise control, but
the engine manufacturers point out that there is no airplane in de-
sign on which to place such an engine. The decision to develop
such a plane would have an immediate impact on engine research.
Although one or two manufacturers have preliminary designs waiting
in the wings, further research is needed. Essentially we do not
have a plane because there is no engine for it, and we do not have
an engine because there is no plane for it. Since the basic reason
for neither plane nor engine has been the manufacturers' fear that
the high capital cost of replacement would inhibit sales as long as
alternate planes i.e., 737/727/DC-9, were environmentally "legal"
and profitable, and since these aircraft are losing both their
environmental acceptability and their fuel efficiency (relative
tj high bypass engines) federally assisted research is needed to
accelerate the development of a specifically tailored low noise,
high fuel efficiency, low operating cost engine.
5. Noise regulation research. This study has indicated that
while economics has, over the years, played a major part in retire-
ment decisions, more recently aircraft noise has spawned a series
of regulations and legislative proposals (domestically and inter-
nationally) which significantly affect the life of commercial air-
craft as well as the design requirements of future aircraft. Ac-
cordingly, there is an ongoing need for NASA not only to monitor
the legislative and administrative flow of aircraft noise proposals
TO"W . .
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at various levels of government in the United States and in fore-
ign countries, but also to receive interpretative reports as to
their significance for U.S. carriers and the air transport manu-
facturing industry. Early recognition of, for example, inter-
national trends will enable research to be chant-elled so as to max-
imize this country's participation in the growth of air transport.
6. Research on still smaller size transports. At present
the smallest new technology aircraft with high bypass engines is
the 174-passenger 757. A direct 727/737/OC-9 replacement would be
closer to 135 to 150 passengers. The question then arises is this
a new floor on transport size? if so, what will we use on low den-
sity short haul routes which have, in the past, been the preserve
of local service carriers. If government policy is to be that
essential service must be continued to the towns now certified,
research toward new technology aircraft in this category is a
matter for consideration.
Evanston, Illinois
August, 1979
r••r+---^s^-^c^..-fl 1. r.^^^raa'+rT!^.-'°^i 	 "^""+!.eav►-r	 ..-	 - :	 -	 ^.	 ,
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APPENDIX A
INVENTORY OF COM4ERCIAL JET FLEET, U.S. CARRIERS
Source: Rrns, Commercial Jet Replacement Process, Northwestern
>University, The Transportation Center 	 977)
. '9
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APPENDIX B
INVENTORY OF NON-U.S. COMMERCIAL JET FLEET (Free World Only)
Source: Ross, Commercial Jet Replacement Process, Northwestern
Univ2r—siTy­,7he Transcortation tenter
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APPENDIX C
Sample Interview liuestlens cn Retirement of Conniercial Jet Aircraft
1. When do yot. estivate retirt-went of specific types and why?
2. Vhat is the '.init of use of 707s and DC-8s without further
;-^dintenance u-odificaticn?
.1
,
3.	 What neces sary wort. has .o be done ano Acre+ EAtensive is it
tc, reach (a) 80,000 hrs.. (b) 100.000 hrs'
4.	 Will they be scrapW or sold f(ir other operations?
5.	 What and ..,Pre w i ll b^ the market for used aircraft?
6. What is the eco ►:nric efficiency of the narrow bodied plaies?
i.e. are emit UX costs rising?
7. tWhot i, th•? i,aact of FAR 36 and the current noise nroix sal
hearings on decisions to retire the older narrow bodies?
J.	 Do the ct.. resi t- fuel costs aM rou .* estization of fut:. rc fuel
cost sign ificantl ,)
 influcncc your dtcision as to retirii.9 aircraft?
9. 4hat is the maxivii:n dc-crease it, direct olrer.tirul tests tfti.t i.n
k	 now be built into new aircraft -- various scerirrios?
10. ror Airlines: flow oreat a decrcasc it Dr %-vuld fie e •rcr«ary to
ma;e you .:cnt to ,w rchase a neu ter= or d ,.r;va-ive aircra^t?
ll,	 ti:hat is , e eapi t el co=t cif a fle:t ree:3ui;;;ciiV
(0 a^rline vie-,s(l,) manufactui(r vic s
1?.	 Wh-It <, the effe-c: c r-I .,hil ity of new te ►hnt,loi'y?
dal	 a;: , , ne view
b) rion.:fo ,7turcr vices
-W-
ILI
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Sample lntervic^, Questions on P,etircment of Ccn.nercial Jet Aircra!t
Page Z
13. On derivative and new aircra f t or enoine techne ' oay, how ►ranch
"up front" money is necessary dod hew can it be financed?
14. Hoar can airlines finance replacement aircraft?
15. Ho.; rany separate new types will be built?
16. 11hrA irVact do the derenulation prq.:sals in I'a:hinatnn have on
your equiprent olan--?	
4
17. is thi	 a satisfactory r.cvt technolony ur Jerivative on the
drawing board?
(a) winufacturer response
(b) a;rline response
1£. Vtat i5 the „issicn of tt.= t y re of airplane you desire for
replacement?
i
3 Kt	 `^
	 j6dc
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INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED OU g lt,'f, STUDY
ALLIMCE ONE, SIAI'MPD, CMNECIICUT
Harry Kilr,briel, Vice President
AIR TRLANSPORT ASSOCIATION, IiASNI1IGT0 14, D.C.
William 0. Becker, Assistant Vice President-Oeerr.tiors
William M. Ha:+r.ins. Assistant Vice President-Economics S Finance
K. William Morn, Assistant Vice Pre-, 4.
lec R. Howard, Director-Data Systems and Forecastirq
G, or•ge :4. James, Vice Presidcnt-Cconoraics & Finance
MERICA'I AIPL1t:F S, TULSA
Lee Cody,
W.P. Hannon, System Director of Engineering
A"^P,IUJi AIRLINES, NFU YORK
Earl E. Ditnars, Assistant Vice President-Traffic Analysis b Research
Richard Klaas, Director-Financial Systrrrs rvcvvlo^Tent b Industry Analysis
Frar.L1 in 11. Koll., Vice President-Systems. Pl-rining
y	 Richard Linn
Donald Lloyd-Jones, Senior Vice President-Operations
John T. Stavin, Assistant Treasurer
6ANK OF Air RiCA, NEW Y ORK
.',aces B. Murray, Assistant Vice President
Sanford Sacks, Vice President
BXI;: r 't; TP.UST COITthY, ftlol Y0^.K.
M	 Jaslxr H. Arnold, I11, Assistant Treasurer
Jour. S. BliVt_r, Fiat Vi[C PreSidCiZt
Dcn C. Hawley, Scnior Financial Analyst
re-hzirt S. loran, Assistzr.t dice Pl-t•sidcr.t
BOEir.G MMERC1A 1._AIPPIANE M_'A:lr, SFATTLE. MSI 1rr•IN.
G^Or ge N. 8or-r, F'mar-r-Adwwed F ► riehtcut
Jarrrs L. Copenl. . vt-r, Dirm.tnr-Lcntr, I Ewinrcriru Dcsi!!n
1h^1^S R. 	 ur Ss.•IrCir
Richard A. Miclelcon, rssi::,int Dirrctcr-S..les Techn,,loyy
6M
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BOEINfi COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COMPANY, SEATTLE, WASHiNGTON
Gene A. Pace, Managor-U.S. b Canadian Airline Analysis Marketing
Requirements
Gordon Rasmussen, Manager-Sales Technology
John E. Steiner, Vice President
Robert E. Watson, Chief Engineer-Structures ;achnology
H.W. "Bob" Withington, Vice President-Engineering
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, WASHINGTON, D.C.
J.C. Constant2, Chief -Economic Analysis Division
Roy Pulsifer-Cureau
 
of Operating Rights
Arthur Simns, Director-Bureau of Eccnomics
CHASE MANHATTAN CA.NY, MFU YORK
Harry Colwell, III, Vice President
Raymond V. Nelson, Jr., Vice President
CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK, CHICAGO
Arthur J. Bruen, Vice President-Transportation Division
DELTA AIRLINES, ATI.A ITA, GEORGIA
Cecil 0, Bro.tin, Assistant to Assistant Vice President
Arthur C. Ford, A-I stant Vice President-Long Range Planning
Gerald Mayo, Senior Attorney
B.L. Terrell, Chief Engineer-Aircraft
EASTERN AIRLINES, MTAMI, FLORIDA
Frank Davis, Vice President--Operations Services
Morton Ch rlich, Vice President- Planning
D. Roger Ferq ison, 'dice Pr_­,idcnt . Advwcn Schedule Planning
P•;ul Johnstone, Vice President•E:ngireerinq
Roy M. Rawls, Asst. Controller, Financial Planning and Analysis
Wayne A. Yunnan, Vice Pros ide;,t, Finance
Fes( UYrllri.0 Li VE IN SIJI A CE i, Irl•l YOU
William A. McCurdy, Vico President
U "DCRAI. A`;TA*tIO:J AD: IfNISTRAII11ii, FIAS ILIE,,1'(N,
Join Reynolds Carriage, Orfice of Cnviron pivntal Qtwlit:y
Charles J. (loch, P.C. Office of Envi!onwont.al Quality
1
l
N
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FIRST NATl0,:-'%1 GANK Of CHICAGO
I
Rodncy F. Qjainton, Tice President
FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK, i LW YORK
Barnaby C.F. Blatch, Vice President
Frederick ... Bradley, Vice President
George E. Moyer, Jr., Vice President
GENEPAL ELFCTRiC, CINCINNATI. O1110
John D. Karra!er, Mana9or, Cor^!trcial Market Analysis
Karl triter, Co:rmercial Market Analysis
GREYIIOUt1D, PHOFiIlX, ARIZONA
Robert Dell'Artino, Executive Vice President, lease and Finance
LOCi:HEFD CAl IFORUTA CO., BURBANK. CALIFOP;:IA
Richard L. Foss, Department of Engineer'ina, Commercial Advanced Design
Michael 1. Grove, Cwre-cial Sales F.naineering
Henry H. ttontuo.nery, Airline Plannin g , Commercial Trarsportation Research
Walter Nobel, Advanced Design
George N. Sa ► ,,nres, Mana ger, Airlir._ Systems Analysis
Joseph A. Schr:art. , Division I!anayer, Mar-Let Oevelofnent
Ray A. Tedrick, Market Enpincer
O.W. Traber, Product Plans and Aprlieations
Wiliam J. 1•11olff, Division ttinane. • , Technical Sales Support
Duane 0. Wood, President
LOCKIIHO-GUIXIA (O., MARL! TTA, GLORGiA
Jys Ruys, Coirzwcial tlarkct Planning
Mt
	 LING SLf it C!'.LIi'D^NiA
Edward A. Danner, Deputy Mana ger, Airline Firl.rlcial Nannir,l
B. F r os.."
Sidney J. Griffith, Vice. Presid ent, Treasurer and Secretery
C.H. llcathco, Deputy Director, Advar.:ef! lransjortatien Concerts
R.C.P. Jackson. Vice President, =inns
R. V. r. ac
N. f%. V.irgtii ics, rner•ty Cvor-lin.!or
John F. r:cGrath, tLinrger, Airline Analysis
R. P. lliltnn, t +arager, Special Planning Ar.lysis
G.P. 1 1orr'issey, Senior Icwlar,t 	 Advar:ccd Pusign, Con 7.,!re1,11 Sy%ten)
Cat, I T. Norris, Econo;rist. Ecor-nit Cesearch
H.h. Norris, Manager, Airllnt '.eel Mannino
—, ,	
----	 — - - -
-268-	
App. D
MC DO?WELL-DOUGLAS, LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA (continued)
Bill Richards, Market Research
Jcl.n A. Stern, M.rnaner, Commercial Research
John 1•I. Stroup, Manager, Commercial Operations Research
Andy Tung
June C. Van Abkoude, Airline Systems Analyst, Advanced Design
PC DONNELL-DOUGLAS, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI
Kenneth Velten, Section Manager, Comnercial ilarket Analysis
MET"OPOLiTAN t1FE 111SOPANCE CO.. 11EW YO--:'K
George M. Crandlcs, Vice President, Corporate Investments
Stuart l:. Kennedy, Vice President
NATiMAL AIRCMUT LEl.SICG, LOS P'IGELFS, CALIFORNIA
Eric Anderson
NATIONAL AIRLICFS, MIA-11, FIORIPA
Fred Luhm, Fitet Planninq
K;ub:rt J. Sherer, Controller
NORTIr!•1FST Ai!'.LIl1ES, 111PNEAPOLIS, 1lIMUSOTA
Donald W. Flyrop, President
PAN AMUICAN AIRLiLlS, NEW YORK
Henry P. Hill, Staff 1,:ce President, Schedules
J. l:eesncr, Vice Presid,:nt, t!•:intenance Operations
John N. Vulgost. !enior Vice President, Technical Operations
SALU3! C. fMIF!!-, CC!' YORK
Julius 1-:aldutis. Tice Presid.-o , transportation Group
Swim non. C01 rri 1"r . , in , YC"^
Fdtrund S. Greenslet, Cr:%, Vice Presid:-n:, Research Division
l k: S U 1RLP A]! , ! I t:•_S , hFll YNC.
Velvin irenc:^r, Vice Presiueni, lhrU-0r.,.j et.d Planninq
R.A. Garlin. F-jna^er, Fle.t Pl,nning
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UNITED AIRLINES, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
Edward A. Beamish, Senior Vice President, Corporate Planninq
Richard 1'. Brannon, Director of Fle^t Planning
Andy H. UeVoursney. Grou p
 Vice President, Finance and Planning
Harry Lehr, Director of Re q ulatory Affairs
Sven E. Madsen, Schedule Research 1•lanaaer, Schedule and Resource Planninq
Colin D. Mirray, Vice President. Schedule and Resource Planning
Robert A. Ross, Economist
Irving Roth, Vice President, Investor Relations
UNITCD STATES DEPARTI;FNT OF TRANSPORTATIO,-1, WASHINCTON, D.C.
Don Bliss, Deputy, General Counsel
James J. Gansle, Industry Analysis Division, Office of the Secretary
of Transportation
Lawrence P. Greene, Assistant fo- Aeronautical Research and Develolracnt,
Office of the Secretary of Transportation
Dan Maxfield, TPI-12, Transportation Systems Analyst
Wynne Teel, Office of General Council
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVFS, WASHINGTON. D.C.
David L. Mahan, Assistant Cou,isel (Aviation), (-oTmittee of Public Works
and Transportation
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES, FASI NARTFOP.D, CO1;t1FCTICUT
N. George Avram, Manager, Business Planning
Frank N. Gobetz, Chief. Systems Performance Evaluation
Richard Hoff. "ice President, JTIOD Program
Albert A. LeShane, Va-iager. Systeoc [valuation
Richard 1 1olready, General Manaqer, JTIOD Engine Preqram
S.M. TA)lor, Vice President, Mirk.tirg U.S. and Canada
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APPENDIX E
FAR 36
36.1 Effective 12/1/F
	 3E.2 Effective 1211173
Part 36—Noise Standards: Aircraft Type and Airworthiness Certificatica
Subpart A--General
136.1 Applicability.
(a) This Part prescribes noise standards
for the issue of type certificates, and change9
to thosa certificates, and fm the issue of cer-
tain standard category airworthiness certifi-
cates, for subsonic transport category air-
planes, and for subsonic turbojet powered
airpl acs regardless of category.
(b) Each person who nnplies under Part 21
of this chapter for a type ceitiricate must shoe
compliance with the a p plicable requirernenta
of this Part, in addition to the applicable air-
worthiness rcq uirements of this-chapter.
(e) Each person who applies under Part 21
of this chapter for 3pprotal of an acoustical
change described in 5 21.93(6) must show that
the airplane meets the following requirements
in addition to the applicable n irworchutcss re-
quimments of this chaptcr:
(1) Ti.e noise limits prescribed in Ap-
pendix C of this Par:, for airplanes that can
achieve those noise levels, or lower noiso
levels, prior to the chant a in type desi ji-
(2) The noise levels created by the air-
plane prior to the change in typo design.
measurrd and evrnluated as prescribed in All-
pendism A and B of this Part, for airplanes
that cannot achieve me no1 ;J Emits pre.
scribeJ in Appendix C of this, Part pn•rr
to tiro change ill type design.
(d) Each person who app lies for the
original issue of Standard Airwor.hinc..s
Certificu:e31 under 321.I53, mast, rr-;ardle-3 of
d_te of epplic-tCon, show compliance c-ith this
Part (including Appendix C), as etLctivo an
December 1, 100, for atrplane y
 that hose not
:;ad any flight timo befnre-
(1) December 1, 1973, for airplanes with
maximum weights g reater 0—* 75,000 lbs.,
except fur airplanes that arc powered by
Pratt and Whitney Turbo Wasp JT3D series
ene Des;
(2) December 31, 197 .1, for airplanes
with maximum %icights greater than 75,non
lbs. and that are powered by Pratt and
Whitney Turbo Wasp JT3D series engines;
and
(3) December 31. 1971, for airplanes
with m3ximurn weights of 75,N0 lbs. and
lets
136.1 Special retroactive requirame-ih.
(rt) Not v%
	 § 21.17 of 06s chanter,
and irrespective of the date of application,
each applicant covered by SM.201(b) and
(c) (1), and 3 C3G.5(c) of this Part who ap-
plies for a new type certificate, must sh<,w
compliance With the applicable provisions of
this Part.
(b) Notwithstanding §21.101(a) of this
chaptcr, each person who applies for an ncous-
tical change to a typo design specified in
§ 21.93(6) of tilis chapter must show enmpii-
ance with the applicable ; , rovisions of this
Part.
136.3 Cowratihility with airr. •orthtnca re-
quirtmonts.
it r ust bo shown that the airplane rnwts
the airworthiness reTrlatioua constituting the
type certification basis of the airplane t.nd_r
Fill conditions in which cr.;.pli.;n,c with this
Part is
	 and that all 1—ft;edures used in
complying with this Part, Find all p.-medures
and inf, ^ttnatinn for the flight crew cievuluped
nnarr this Part, am consistent with the air-
worthiness regulations constituting tho type
certification basi3 of the airplane.
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1 36.5 limitation of Furl.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 1131(b)(4), the noise
levels in this Part have been determined to be
as low as is economically reasonable, tech-
nologically practicable, and appropriate to the
type of aircraft to which the y apply. No
determination is made, under this Part, that
these noise levels are or should be acceptable
cr unacceptable for operation at, into, or out
of, anv airport.
Subpart B—i;^ i se Measurement
and Eva% Ton
1 36.101 Noise measurement.
The noise gen-rated by the airplane must be
measured under Appendix A of this Part or
under an approved equivalent prucedure.
1 36.103 Noise evalualion.
poise measurement information obtained
under § "6.101 must be evaluated under Ap-
pendix B of this Part or under an approved
equivalent procedure.
Subp art C—Noise limits
1 36.201	 Noise limits.
(a) Compliance with this section must be
shown with noise levels measured and eval-
uated as prest7ibed in Subpart B of this Part,
and demonstrated at the mensurin g points pre-
scribed in Appendix C of this Part.
(b; For airplanes that ha%c tnrbojct engines
with bypass ratios of 2 or more and for
which—
(1) Application nas made before January
I, 19G7, it mast be shown that the noise levels
of the airplane are no grea'e than threw
nrescribcd in Appendix C of this fart, or
are reduced to the lowest levels th.tt are
ceonomically reasonable, technologically
Practicable, and appropriate to the particu-
lar typo desil-n; and
(2) Application seas or k made on or after
January 1, I9G:, it must be Iwwn that tha
noise levels of the airplane are no greate
than those prescribed :n Appendix C of this
Ps rt.
(c) For airplanes that do not have turbojet
engir.es with bypass ratio of 2 or more and
for which—
(1) Application was made before Decem-
ber 1, 19G'J, it must be shown that the lowest
noise levels, reasonably obtainable through
the use of procedures and information de-
veloped for the Might crew under § 36.1501
are determined; and
(2) Application was or is made on or after
December 1, 1969, it must be shown that the
noise levels of the airplane are no greater
than those prescribed in Appendix C of this,
Part.
(d) For aircraft to which paragraph (b) (1)
of this section applies and that do not meet
Appendix C of this Part, a time period will be
placed on the type certificate. The type cer-
tificate will specif y that, upon the expiration
of this time period, the type certificate will be
bubjeet to suspension or modification under
Section G11 of the Federal aviation act of
1058 i49 U.S.C. 1 .151) unless the tvl)e design
of aircraft produced under that t y pe certificate
cn and after the expiration date is modified to
show compliance with Appendix C. With re-
spect to any possible suspensions or modifica-
tions under this paragraph, the certificate
holder shall have the same notice and appeal
rights as are contained in Section C^9 of the
Federal Aviation Act of ID53 (49 U.S.C.
1429).
Subpart G-01 , ^rntincd Information
and Airhlc:ne fiig ;tl
 f.:unual
1 35AL31 Pioccdures and olher information.
All procedures, ao v
 other information for
the ill.',ht crew, that are employed for obtain-
inq the noise reductions prescribed in this Pnrt
must bo de%elopcd. This must include noi,o
lo%cis achieved during type certi`catiou.
S 36.1'_C1 Airplano Flight Manvul.
(n) The approved I.ortion of the Alrpin.le
Flight 'Manual must contain procedures and
A?p. E
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other information approved under § 36.15DI.
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this
section, no operating limitations may i,e fur-
nished under this section. The following state-
ment must be furnished near the listed noise
levels:
"No determination has been made by
the Federal Aviation Administration
that the noise levels in this manual are
or should be acceptable or unaccept-
able for operation a:, into, or out of,
any airport."
(b) If the weight used in meeting the take-
off or landing noise requirement., of this Part
is !ess than the maximum weight or design
landing weight, respectively, established under
the applicablo airworthiness requirements,
those leaser weights must be furnished, as op-
eratirg litnite:ions, in the operating limitations
section of the Airplane Flight Manual.
App.E
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Appendix C
Noise levels for Subsonic Trunsport Category and Turbojet Powered
. Airplanes Under Section 36.201
1 C36.1 Noise measurement and evacuation.
Compliance with this :Appendix must 5e shown
with noise levels measured and evaluated as
prescribed, respectively, by Appendix A and
Appendix B of this Part, or under arproved
equivalent procedures.
1 C36.3 Noise measuring points. Compliance
with the noire level standards of § C36.5 must
be shown—
(a) For takeoff, at a point 3.5 nautical
miles from the start of the takeoff roll on the
extended centerline of the runway;
(b) For approach, at a point 1 nautical
mile from the threshold on the extended cen-
terline of tLe runway; and
(c) ror the sideline, at the point, on a line
psrall-M to aad 0.25 nautical miles from the
catcnded center!ine of the run%vly, Where the
noise level after liftoff is greatest, except that,
for airplanes powered by more than three
turbojet engines, this distance muA be 0.35
nautical miles.
1 C36.5 Noisa levels.
(a) Ceneral. F,xcept as provid-A in pira-
Ensphs (b) and (c) of this scctiun. it must be
shown by right test that the noise !evils of
the airplane, nt the measuring points described
in § C3G.3, do not exceed the following (with
appropriate interpolntion bet .N re% weights) ;
(1) For (approach and sideline, 103
1,;P dB for maximum wei ghts of GCJ.O(uJ
11)9. or nitre, less 2 El"N(lli per halving;
of the GOO,ODC lbs. naxinuim weir lit down
to 102 EPNdli for maximum ncights of
75,000 lbs. and under.
PA1tT 30
(2) For takeoff, 109 EP ;dB for maxi-
mum wei.lits of 600,000 lbs. or more, less
5 EP\dB per halving of the 600.000 lb.
maximum weight down to 93 EP\dh for
maximum weights of I5,OW lbs. and under.
(b) Tradeoff. The noise levels in paragraph
(a) may be exceeded at one or two of the
measuring points prescribed in § C33.3, if—
(1) The sum of :he exceedance is not
greater than 3 EP sdB;
(2) No exceedance is greater than 2
EP\dB; and
(3) The exceedances ore completely offset
by reductions at other required measuring
points.
(c) Prior appl;c•aliona. For :applications
made before December 1, 1967, for airplanes
pawered by more than three turbojet engines
with bypass; ratios of two or more, the value
prescribed in pam mrnph (b) (1) of this scctiun
may not exceed 5 EP\'dB and the - alue pre-
bcribe! in Iaragraph (b)(2) of this section
may not exceed 3 EI . dll.
106.7 Tekeufl Icst conditions.
(a) This section applies to ull takeoffs con-
ducted in showing compliance with this Part.
(h) Tnkeoif po-er or thrust must be used
from the start of the takeoff to the point at
which an altitude of at least 1,WO feet move
the nannay is reached, oxc^pt that, for air-
planes pnwcrcd by mono Ih..n three turbojet
eneines, this altitude must nut be less than
00 Net.
(c) Upon reachirg tho vltitude sper i fted in
pars-raph (b) of this section, the portr or
thrus, may not be reduced below chat power
PA'a- IS
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-.)r thrust that will provide level flight with
one engine inoperative, or below that power
or thrust that will maintain a climb gradient
of at least 4 percent, whichever power or thnlst
is greater.
I'd) A speed of at least V,+10 knots must
be attained as soon as pncticahle after liftoff,
a41 must Lu maintained throupllout the takeoff
incise test.
(e) A constant takeoff configuration, se-
lected by the applicant, must be maintained
throughout the takeoff noise test, except that
the landing gear may be retracted.
4 C36.9 Approach test conditions.
(a) This section applies to all approaches
conducted in showing compliance with this
Part..
(b) The airplane's configuration must be
that used in showing compliance with the land-
ing rrouirements in the airworthiness rein tla-
tions constituting the t y pe certification basis
of the airplane. If more than one configura-
tion is used in showing compliance with the
landing rtnuircrnents in the airworthiness
regulations constituting the type certification
basis of the airplane, the configuration that
is most critical from a noise, standpoint must
be used.
(c) The npproaches must be conducted with
a steady glide angle of 3 '1 _0.5 0 and must be
continued to a normal touchdown with no air-
framu configuration change.
(d) A steady approach speed of not lcsa
than 1.30 N',+I p
 knjr^ must be -stablished
and maintained ovEr the approach measurin g
point.
(o) All engines must be opemtin; at ap-
proxilr,:.tely the same power or thrust.
US. GOVERNMENT PRINTING JsLICE 1911— 151,10 @ai)
-275-
FAR 36
	
AMENDMENT 7
APPENDIX E
Part 36—Noise Standards: Aircraft Type and Airworthiness Certification
.1
Subpart A---General
f 36.1
	 [Applicability and deflnitions.]
(a) This Part prescribes noise standards
for the issue of the following c•erl ificates:
(1) Type certificates, and changes to
those certificates, and standard airwor:hiness
certificates, for subsonic transport category
large airplanes, and for subsonic tm-hojet
powered airplanes rt mrdless of c,t(egrn•y.
(2) Type certificates and changes to those
certificates, and standard airworthiness cer-
tificates and restricted ca t-gory airworthi
ness certificates, for propeller driven small
airplanes, except airplanes that are designed
for "agricultural aircraft Operations" as
defined in a 137.3 of th i s chapter, as effective
on Jannar y 1, 1966, or for dispensing fire
fighting materials.
(b) Each person who applies under Part
21 of this cltawer for a type or airworthiness
certificate specified in this I'art must show
compliance with the applicable recptirements
of this Part, in addition to the applicable air-
warthiness requirements of this chapter. .
(c) Each person who applies under Part
21 of this chapter for approval of g ut ac•oastic•al
change described in 9 21.93(b) of this chapter
must show that the airplane complies with
[the applicable provisions of i 36.7 or ^ 36.9
of this Part] in addition;o the applicable
airworthiness requirements of this chapter.
(d) Each peron who applies for the origi-
nal issue of a standard airworthiness certificate
for a subsonic transport entegory large air-
plane or for a turbojet powered airplane under
§ 21.183, must, reglu •dless of date of applica-
tion, show compliance with the applicable
provisions of this Part (including A ppendi :
C), as effective nit Illecentler 1, 1969, for air-
planes that have not had any flight time
before—
Ch. 7 tAmdt. 36-7, Ell, 10/1/771
(1) 1)erembcr 1, 1973, fir airphines with
tttaxitilinti weights greater than 75,000 Ills,
excei,t for airl'lmles that are powerod by
Pratt and Whitney Turbo Wasp
series engines;
(2) December 31, 1974, for airplanes with
uiaxinurlrr weights greater than 7.5,000 Ills.
and that, are powered by I'ratt and Whitney
Turbo Wasp J'I73I) series engines; and
(3) December 31, 1974, for airplanes with
maximum weights of 75,000 lbs. and less.
(e) Emch person who applies for the origi-
nal issue of it stuulard airworthiness certificate
under 5 21.18:1, or for the original issue of a
restricted category nirtvorthiness rertifir,i.te
under §21.185, for a pro peller driven small
airplane that lilts not had an y
 flight time be-
fore .lanuar•y 1. 1980 '
 must Show compliance
with the applicable provisions of this fart.
[(f) For the pnrposcl of showing compli-
ance wilh this l'art for transport cats-ory
L•trgc ail-plane, ai'd turbojet powered airplanes
reg;lr,Ilctis of cats _Dry, tile. fullmving tct•ms
have the folloxving ,manings:
[0) A "Stage 1 noise level" meals a
takeoff, Sideline, or app.^ac! n visa level
greater than the Stage 2 n .t<e li , tits pre-
sc • i I d in 4 C36.5(a) (2) of 1pper ,ix C of
this l'art.
[('_') .1 "Stage l airplane" means cut ail.
plan t .
 that has not been shown raider this
fart to compl y
 with the takeoff, sideline,
and approach name levels required fur • Stage
l cn • titage.:1 airplanes.
[0) A "tinge 2 noire level" mean: it
noise Icv ­ l at or below the Stage '2 •::,;se
limits prescribed in
	 036.5 f n)	 of Ap-
pendix C of this I'ar, hurt higher (113111 the
Slage :1 noise limit, prescribed in ; C:16.5
(a) (3) of Appendix C of this fart..
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[(4) A "Singe 2 airplane' means ail
 that has been shown under this fart
to comply with Stage 2 noise levels pie-
scribed in §C36.5 of Appendix C of this
Part (including lisp
 of the applicable trnde-
o$ provisions) and that sloes not comply
kith the requirements for a Stage 3 airplane.
[(5) A "Stage 3 noise level" means a
noise level at or below the Stage 3 noise
limits prescribed ill C36.5(a) (3) of Ap-
pendix C of this fart.
[(6) A "Stage 3 airplane" means ail
 that has been shown under this Part
to comply with Stage 3 noire levels pre-
scribed in § C36.5 of Appendix C of th:s
Part (ineludin" asp of the applicable trade-
off provisions).]
4 36.2 Special retroactive requirements.
(a) Notwithstanding § 21.17 of this chapter,
e of the elate of application,and irrespectit 
each applicant covered by §36.201(b) and
(c) (1), and § C36.5(c) of this Part who ap-
plies for a new type certificate, must show
compliance with the applicable provisions of
this Part. III for applications for
new type certificates made after September 17,
1971, compliance must be shown with the ap-
plicable provisions of this Part.
(b) Notwithstanding § 21.101(n) of this
chapter, each person who applies for nn acous-
tical change to it type design specified in
§ 2i.93(b) of this chapter must show compli-
ance with the applicable provisions of 11ii
Part.
§ 36.3 Compatibility with airworthiness re-
quirements.
It must be shown that the airplane meeN
the airworthiness regulations constituting the
type certification basis of the airplane ender
all conditions in .which compliance with this
Part is shown, and that all procedures used in
complying with this Pnrt, and all proredures
and information for the flight crew developed
under this Part, are consistent with the air-
worthiness regulations constihntir, the type
certificntion basis of the airpllute.
4 36.5 Limitation M Part.
1'ut•snunt to '19 1 T .S.C. 1431(b) (4), the noise
levels ill 	 ]'art have been determined to be
ay low its is economically reasonable, tech-
nologically practicable, and appropriate to the
type of aircraft to which they apply. No
determination is made, under this Part, that
these noise levels are or should ile acceptable
or unacceptable for operation a ► , into, or out
of, a y airport.
[4 36.7 Acoustical change: subsoni. transport
category Ierge airplanes ano subsonic
turbojet powered airplanes.
[(a) Applicability. This section applies to
c,ll subsonic transport category large airplanes
and subsonic t111l10jet powered airplanes for
which an acoustical change approval is applied
for under § 21.93(b) of this chapter.
[(b) Cencrn' vrquirenirnfs. Except as
otherwise, specifically provided, for each air-
plane coveted by this section, the acoustical
chtut"e approval requireme nts are as foll m s:
[(1) In showing compliance., foist; levels
muA be meast,red and evaluated ill
 with the applicable procedil ves ant:
crioditious prescri l.led in .Appendices A and
13 of this Part.
[(2) Compliance with the noise limits
prescribed in §C36.5 of:lppenlli^ C must
be shown ill accor,l nnce with the applicable
provisions of §§ C3t3.7 and C'36.9 of Ap-
pendix (' of this Part.
[(c) Stagr I airhlrancs. For each Stage 1
nrrpinllc prior to the shall"e in type design,
ill addit ion to I he provisions of para'rapll (b)
of this Sectirn . ills followin" apply:
[(1) If 1111 airplane is a Stage 1 airplane
prior to the shun"e in typo de.si"n, it Inay
not, aftel- Ills' shall"e ill type hest"ll, exreetl
the noise levels created prior to the change
in type Ilesi"n. Tlly
 trndeofl' provisions of
C36.5(h) of .Appendix C of this Part play
not he used to increase the Stage I noise
Icvels.
[(2) In addition, for an airplane for
which ltlllliclttion is Matte after Svptember
17, 1i1 I-
[(i) There limy he no redaction in
power or thl-11 "t below the highest air-
Ch. 7 IAmdl 36-7. Fn. 1611/771
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worthiness approved power or tbrrr-t,
during the tests conducted before and
after the change in type design: nml
[(ii) During the takeoff and sideline
noise tests conducted I-efore the change in
type design, the quietest airworthiness
approved configuration available for the
:ji-hest approved takeoff weight arrest be
used.
[(d) Stage o airplanes. If nn airplane is
a `tare 2 airpinne prior to the change in type
design, in addition to the provisions of parn-
graph ( b) of this section, the following apply:
[(1) Applications before ,1'orember 5,
1975. For an airpinne for which an appli-
cation for acoustical change approval is
.Wade Ix-fore November 197:5, the airpinne
may not be n Stage 1 airplane after the
change in type design.
[(2) applications on or after `'rvrmher
5, 1975. For an airplant for which an ap-
plication for acoustical change approval is
made on or after November 5, 197.--
[(i) The airplane may not ie a Stn-e
1 airplane after the cl, ,irr;*e ; n tylve design:
and
[(ii) During the takeoff and sideline
noise tests conducted before the chan-e in
type design, the quietest airworthiness
approved configuration available for the
highest approved takeoff weight nwst be
used.
[(e) StayP 3 airplanes. If an airplane is a
Stage 3 airplane prior to the chnngr in type
design, in addition to the provisinns of para-
graph (b) of this section, the ftdionin. npply:
[(1) ' nlicatio ►re befurr .flay 5, 19176.
For an .::rpinne for which nn npplicntion
fns I.Lousticnl change approval is made lw-
fore May 5, 070, the airplane niny not 6 . it
Stare 1 airpinne after the change in the
type design.
[('') Appliratimi on or aft e r May 5,
1976. For an airplane for which nn appli-
cation for acoustical change approval is
CA. 7 tAmd1. 76-7, IN 10/ 1 /771
made on or after May 'i, 1976, the folloiving
apply:
[(i) If compliance with Stage 3 noise
levels is not required before the chnnge in
type design, the airplane must—
[(A) Ile a Stare 2 airplane after
the change in type design and compli-
anre must be shown under the provi-
sions of parrtgrnph (d) (21 of this
section; or
[(13) Remain n Stage 3 airplane
,after the change in type design and
comldinnce mnst be shown under the
provisions of paragraph (e) (2) (ii) of
this section.
[(ii) If compliance %vith Stage 3 noise
levels is required before the change in
tylu' design, the airplane inust lie a Stage
3 airplane after the mintage in t y pe design.
[ 1 36.9 Acoustical change: propeller-driven
small airplanes.
[For prop ell: r-driven small airplanes in t'
nor-rnal, utility, acrobatic, transport, and re-
stricted categories for whirli an acoustical
changr npprovnl is applied for under ;21.93
(h) of lhis chapter after .January 1, 1975, the
followin;; apply:
[(a) If the airplane was type certificated
under Appendix F of this Par: prior to the
change in type design, it may not, after the
cluurge in t ype design, exceed the noise lin ► it
that was applied to that approval.
[(b) If the airpinne wets not type certifi-
cated under Appendix F but can achieve the
noise limits prescrilxId in c F-36.301 (b) of tilt
ApIK-ndix prior to file charge in type design.
it may not exceed those limits, measured and
corrected as prescribed in Appendix F, after
the change in 'rypc design.
[(c) If the airplane cannot achieve the
noise limits prescrilx-d ill a F36.:361(b) of
Aplmndix F Prior to the change in type de-
sign, it may not, after the change in type
design. exceed lite noise levels created prior
to the change in type design, measured nml
corrected as prescribed in :Appendix F.]
C — '-^
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Subpart 8—Subsonic Transport Category
Large Airplanes and Turbojet Powered
Airplanes
9 36.101 Noise measurement.
The noise grnerated by flip airplane at,tat Ile
measured under A p lv4x A of this 1'111 .1 ot-
under an approved equivalent prwethire.
fi 36.103 Noise evaluation.
\oise measurvinent information obtained
under §36.101 must lw evaluated under Ap-
liendix I3 of tills I'nrt or under nit
equivalent procedure.
Subpart C—Noise limits
1 36.201	 Noise limits.
ka) Compliance with 'his section inubt be
shown with noise levels inensured and eval-
uated as Ip rescrilled in subpart 13 of this 1',att,
and demonstrate! at the nteasnring - points pre-
scribed in Appendix C of tills I'nrt.
[(b) 4irpl,rncs frith high bypasr ratio ern-
tJincs. For airplanes that have turbojet en-
gines with bypass ratio, of 2 or mote, the
noise limit iequireinents are as follows:
[ (I) .-Ipplictttions before January 1, 1967.
If application is made before Janunry 1,
1967. it mutt Ite shown that the noise levels
of the airplanes are no greater than the
Stare '? noise limas prescribed in . C36.5
(a) (2) of Appendix C of ti.is fart, or are
reduced to the lowest levels that are eco-
noni.callN reasonable, technologically l+rnc-
ticul'e, and appropriate to file particular
type desip.
[('l) elloplications on or after January 1,
19(,7, and befo	 Vorrmber 5, 19:.;. If ap-
plication is trade oil after Janunry 1,
1967, and before No%unti ,er 5, 1975. it must
he shown that ?he noise levels of the nirplane
are no greater than the ,lagr 2 noise limit,
prrscribetl in a C36.5(a) (2) of Apinvulix C
of this Part.
[(3) .4 p liratioa.s op or aftt r .Varemb, r
r;, 1975. if application i% tnatle oil after
November 5, 197:5, it must be shown that the
noise levels of the aire p innc are no greater,
than the Stage 3 noise limits prescribed in
9 36.5(a) (3) of Appendix C of this I'nrt.
[(c) :l irpla yies with low bypass ratio en-
gines. Fot airplanes that have turbojet en-
gtnes with by1ms ratio.., of less than 2
(inclu(ling, no bypass ratio), the nois.- limit
requirenient% are as follows:
[(1) :I ppl;catiorm before December 1.
l",.. If application is made 1 'efore De-
cemlwr 1, '.969, it trust be shown that the
lowest noise levels, rea>onnhly obtainable
through the use of procedures and inforrtia-
tion developetl for the flight crew Linder
36.1501, are determined;
[(2) :Ipplications on or afeet- December,
1, 1.969, arul before ;Voreiriber 5, 1975. If
application is ntatle oil
	 after December 1.
1 1)f9, nnpl 1 pefon \nwember 5, 1975, it must
be 'ho%%ii that the noi-,e levels of fli p air-
plane tiv na greater than the Stage 2 Boise
limits pivsct-ibed in 4 0G.5(a) (2) of Ap-
pendix C of till, ]'art.
P(3) Applications after .1'orrnlber5, 1975.
If application is inmio on or after Noverulper
5. 19i:p , it must lie Shown that the noise
level of the airplane are no greater than
the :141a"e :3 noise limits limscribetl in -'! C.16..5
(n) (3) of App pendix C of this Part.]
(d) For aircraft to which intragrnph (b)(1)
of this sec tion applip+ and flint do not meet
A , +ppndix C of tills fart, a time 1 •eriod will be
Oared on the tylpe certificate. The tyi pe cer-
tilicate will sliet • ifs. that, ite pon the expiration
of this time i period, the type certificate will be
subject to suspension or modification under
Section fill of the Federal Aviation Act of
IMS (49 U.S.C. 1 .1:11) unless the type design
Of ai1.critft produced under that ti lie certili^ate
on anu after the expiration lisle is modified to
show cot.. t iliance Willi A1lWlIdi% C. With Iv-
sl,ect to 1 possible susixpnsions or modifica-
tions miller this paragraph, the certificate
holder shall have the same notice and nlye:tl
right% its ate contained ill Section 609 of the
Federal Aviation Art of 1958 (49 IT.S.C.
1429).
Ch. 7 uw,tlr. 36-7. 10 10/11770
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	 Appendix C
Noise Levels for Subsonic Transport Category and Turbojet Powered
Airplanes Under Section 36.201
I C36.1 Noise measurement and evaluation.
Compliance with this Appendix must be shown
with noise levels measured and evaluated as
prescribed, respectively. I)v .Appendix A and
Appendix B of this Part or under approved
equivalent proeednres.
I C36.3 Noise measuring points. Compliance
with the noise level sinndards of §C36.5 mint
he shown--
(a) For takeoff, at a point 3.5 nautical
miles from the start of the takeoff roll oil
extended centerline of the runwny;
(b) For approach, at n point 1 nautical
mile firm the threshold oil extended cen-
terline of the runwily. and
[(c) For the sideline, at the point, on a line
parallel to and 0.25 nautical mile. from the
extended centerline of the runwa y , where the
noise level after liftoff is greatest, excrpt that,
for an airpinnr powered by more than three
turho'et engines this distance ►rust Ix- o.35
nautical mi!:s for tL•e purpose of showing
compliance with Stage I or Stn--e 2 noise
limits (as applicable).
[I C36.5 Noise levels.
[(a) Lim;ts. Except as provided in para-
graphs (b) and (e) of this section, it must be
shown by flight test that the noi" ,f
the nirplane, at the nteasuring, points descril ed
in i ('36.3, do ra exceed the following (with
approprinte interpolation between weights)
[(1) Stage 1 noise limits for ncoustical
char-rs for nirp;ants re-ardlrss of the num-
ber of engines are those noise levels lire-
scribed tinder §36.7(c)  of this ;'art.
CA 7 Mmdf. 76-7, W 10/ 1 /771
[(2) .stage 2 noise limits for airplanes
t•r-ardlem, of the nundx-r of engines arc as
fullows:
[(;' For takeoff-108 EP\dII for
alas roam weights of 600,000 pounds or
more, reduced by 5 EI'\dB per halving
of the GCx1,000 pounds maxinntrn weight
down to 93 EP\di; for tnaxiniiiin Freights
Of 75,0101 pounds at1+l less.
[(ii) For sideline and approach-108
FI'\dI; for maxintunl weights of 600.0(1(1
pound-, or more, lrtluml he 2 EPXJB per
Malvin;; of the 6100110 pounds nlaxinntnt
weight down to ll}3 EI'NtIB for maximum
weights of 75000 pounds and less.
[(3) Staye 3 noise limits are as follows:
[(i) For airplanes trith more than 3
engines—
[(A) For takeoff-106 F.P\dB for
ntaxinttnn weights of 850,000 pounds or
more, reduced by •4 1-:17NMI her halving
of the 850010 pounds maxinrtnn weight
down to DO F:P\dli for nlnxinuun
weights of 53,125 pxmnds or less;
[(I1) For xudelin•-103 F:P\dB for
maxims m weights of 850,000 pounis or
itiore. l ydurrd by 2 I:P\dli per halving
of the R:)O,(N)O pxtuuds maximum weight
down to 96 F:P\4111 for maximum
weights of 75,130 pounds and less; anal
[(C) For approach-105 I:P\c1I1 for
maximum weights of 850,000 pounds or
111+1re, reduced by 2 1A N(II; per halving
of the 950,11M brands wright down to
98 El'\1Ilt for nmxinmin weights of
75,110 bounds rind Iess.
31
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[(ii) For airplanes icith .? engine,,—
[(A) For takcotf-104 EM111 for
maximum weights of 850,000 pounds or
snore, reduced by 4 F.P\dB per halving
of the 850,000 Pounds ntaxininin weight
down to 90 EP\dB for maximum
weights of 731,130 pounds anti less;
[(11) For sideline-103 EI'\dli for
maximum weights of 882,000 pounds or
more reduced by 2.56 UNtilli per
halving of the 882,000 /sounds innxitimin
weight down to 96 EP\c{B for ntnxi-
nnum weights of 132,538 pounds anti
less; and
[(C) For approach-105 EVNMI for
maximum weights of 850,000 pounds or
snore, reduced by 2 EP\e113 per halting
of the 850.000 pounds weight down to
98 FP\dB for maxiinwn weighis of
75,130 pounds and less.
[(iii) For airplanes with /ricer than 3
e:.gines-
[(A) For takeoff-101 EP\dB for
maximum weights of 850,000 pounds or
more, reduced by 4 EI'\dB per lialving
of the 850,000 pounds maximum weight
down to 89 EPNdB for ntaxiuunn
weights of 106—)30 pounds and less;
[(B) For sideline--103 EMB for
maximum weights of 882,000 pounds or
more, reduced by 2.56 EP\tlB per halv-
i ng of the 882,000 pounds maxtlltitm
weight clown to 94 EPMB for maxi-
mum weights of 7 70,120 pounds anti le s;
and
[(C) For approach-105 I'Mill for
maximunt weights of 850,000 pounds or
more, reduced by 2 EP\dB per halving
of the 850,000 pounds wed'-ltt down to
98 EPNdB for tnaxinium weights of
75,130 pounds and less.
[(b) Tradeoffs. Except to the extent lim-
ited under §§36.7(c)(1) of this I'art, the
noise level limits prescrilx-d in pnragraph (a)
of this section may lie exceeded at one or two
of the rnettsuring (mints specified in ^ C36.3
of this nplrendix, if—]
(I ) Thu , sum of the exceedanre is not
grunter than 3 EI'\dB'
(2) No exceedance is greater than 2
F M13 . and
(3) The execr-dances are completely offset
by reductions nt other ref uired measuring
points.
(r) Prior applirationx. For applicntions
made before Decentlwr 1, 1969, for airplanes
powered by more than three lurl:ajet engines
with byp;►ss ratios of -two or more, the value
prescribed in paragraph ( b) (1) of this section
may not exceetl 5 PI',Nell; and the value pre-
scribed )it (b) (2) of this section
tnat• not exceed :1 F.P\dll.
4 C36.7 Takeoff test conditions.
[(-) This section nitltlies to all takeoff
noise tests conducted antler this. appendix in
showing compliance with this I'art.]
(b) Takeoff pov. -cr or thrust must be used
from the stnrt of the takeoff to the point at
which all altitude of at least 1,000 feet above
the nintvay is reached, except that, for air-
planes powered by more than three turbojet
engines, this altitude must not be less than
700 feet.
(c) Upon reaching the altitude specified in
paragraph (b) of this section. the plower or
thnist inav not lie reduced below that power
or thrust th,.r will provide level flight with
one engine inoperative, or below that power
or thrust that will maintain it climb gradient
of at least 4 percent, whichever po%^-er or thrust
is greater.
(d) Except its provided in paragraph (f)
of this section, a speed of at least V,+10 knots
must be attained as soon its practicable after
liftoff`, and must be maintained throii hoot
the takeoff noise test.
(e) A constant tnkeoR coil fimi rat ir.n, se-
lected by the applicant, smut be inaintaine,:
throughout the takeoff anise test, except thnt
the landing gear may he retracted.
Ch. 7 IA„m1. 36-7, If 10/1/711
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(f) For applications made after Septem-
ber 17, 1971, the following; apply:
(1) The test dny speeds nn-[ the acoustic
day reference speed must he the minimum
approved Value of V,+10 knots, or the all-
engines-oprrnting speed at 35 feet (for tur-
bine engine fx-nvered airpinnes) or 50 fret
(for reciprocating engine powered air-
planes), whichever speed is greater as deter -
mined under the regulations constituting the
type certification basis of the airplane.
These tests mast be vi,iducted at the test
day speeds :t3 knots, Soise values lrleasurra
at the test da y- speeds must fe corrected to
the acoustic day reference speed
(2) If it negative runway }ry arlient exists
in the direction of takeoff. performance and
acoustic data must be corrected to the zero
Mope condition.
I C36.9 Approach lost conditions.
(a) This section applies to all np;,roaches
conducted in showing compliance with this
Part.
(b) The airplane's configuration must be
that used in sho%%ing compliance wid, the land-
ing requirements in the airworthin^ss regula-
tions constituting the type certification Imsi3
cf the airplane. If more tha , r
 one conligurn-
tion is uscA in showing cotnplirtnce with the
landing requirements in the nincorthineav
ivgululions constituting the type certification
basis of the airplane, the configuration that
is most critical from a r:uise standpoint must
be used.
(c) 'rhe approaches nntst Ile conducted with
a steady glide angle of 3°±0.5 1 and must be
continued to a normal touchdown %with no air-
frnme configuration change.
(d) h.xcept as provided in paragrnph (f)
of this section. a steady upproach speed of not
leas than 1.311 1 - ,- ;:r knots in-w.t br established
ar ►u Ilia lilt ninetl over the 111 ► pronch menst;rin;
point.
(e) All engines must Ile operating at ap-
proximately the same power or thriist.
(f) For• applirt:tions made after Septeur-
ler 17, 1971, the following apply:
(1) A steady nppr ouch speed, thnt is
either 1.30 Vs + 10 Imo's or the speed used
in establishing the approved landing dis-
tance under d airworthiness re,,ulations
coostitniing the type certification basis of
the airplane, whichever spied is greatest,
mint IK . S •.t01 ;1shed and ►nninlained over the
approach measuring point.
(2) A. tolerance of :t k,rots may Ile used
throughout the approach noise testing.
T
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I rtle 14—Afro.11SUMf and Spwce
CHAPTER I--FEDERAL AVIATION AOMIN-
IS'RATiON. DEPARTMENT OF TRANS.
PORTA T ION
IDuctrt Nos 1351112 and 14317 • Amdt 91 1161
PART 91—GENERAL OPERATING AND
FLIGHT RULES
Subpa,t E—Operating Noise Limits [NE%Y1
PICASED COMPLIANCE ", ITir PART 3G NOM
LIMITS B y TUSao.3ET3 WITU H140,1xiUM
WE ICItTS GREATER T1 fAN 75.000 POUNDS
• The purpose of thLs amendment to
Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions 114 CFR Part 911 Is to achieve fur-
ther relief And protection to the Wblle
front aircraft noise by rcgwitnC certain
F . viou%ly excepted airplanes to meet
p► iyent Fe-feral noise standards rat ac-
cordance % 1 0% o Phased time schedule
endinC o::.r.:r.trn.; 1, 1985 This amend-
ment unplentenU a decision. approved by
the President oil 21. 1976. And
nnnourc^d IT. a comprehensive A%lallon
Noise Abatement Policy Statement iss._t:
by :he Sectetary of Trassportatlon ;;nr!
the Fedeial Aviation Admmistr .ator on
Nonembcr 18, 19;6 It extends cuticut
Federal noise standards to dorreslle cv-n-
mercial airplanes in Tic'. more thin eight
years from January 1. 1977. •
This amendment applies to US. re., Is
tered civil sub! a:uc turbojet WTI),anes
with maximum %rcirliL3 greater than
75.000 pounds. It applies to nir,;ianes with
standard airworthlnt~s certificates. If
those nit Aaacs are not ennrcd In for-
e:Cn air commerce. For airplanes op-
erated under Parts 121 and 135 of cite
Federal Aalatior. Pal;ulallons. dates for
progressive R^et comphaltce with Part 36
are also pi cst: ribcd In this amendment, ns
follows:
1. J..nuary 1 1781, for at least onequarter of ti+ c tour•cnCutc airplanes with
low oypaas . atio enclncs.
2. easwary 1. 1981, for at least one
qu,.rter of the four•cncine -pure jets."January 1. 1981• for at Ienst o g le halfOf all other airplane types.
4 January 1. 1983, for at least one half
of the rots -cnClneall planes Alth IoA by-
pass ratio en;ines.
S Januar y 1, 1983, for at least one half
of the four enCue " pure jets.
6 January 1, 1983, for all other air-plane types.
This document also contains a notice
of FAA's decision not to prescribe oper-
ating noise Iunits for Aircraft eugni;ml in
foreign air commerce (Including opera-
tions under Part 129 of the Federal Avia-
tion Regulations'. or for Airplanes welgh-
Ing 75.000 pounds or less, at tills tile.
Tills amendment Is Issued pursuant to1 611 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
therein called "the Act—).
While tills amendment Is expected toproduce significant Improvements Ill 111e
noise envi.onmcnt at major airports•
substantial local act ion will he necessary
to complement the none rcduciron .%C-
tions of the federal Government and air
carriers. The only succtsafinl Attack that
can be launched oil overall proble-n
of alrrnft noise is one that Involaes the
cooperative participauen of all levels of
government a % well as alrpot: oneralors,
Ali ,
 cnnreis. mamifactuiers. and Airport
nemlibors The responsibilities of nil of
these paitirs :uc stated In dctnll In the
"A • InIlon Nat%e Abatement Policy,"
therein cane i • 'tile Policy Slatrmcnt "/
of No%embei 18. 197G That document is
In Inc public rules docket for this ?• mcnd-
ntcnt.
In rcidition to the Policy Statement.
the FAA his L%iced a final em uonnrental
Impact statement 1EISi, dated Novem-
ber 10, 1976. conceining tills nnend-
Inent TIaL% document therein called "the
EIS " I has been place( In the public miles
docket for this amendment IL eonLllns
detailed anal see concerning the recd for
1.1, s amendment and Its estimated costs
and benefit % The EiS contalr• s a dctatied
listing o' the affected civil tuihojet fleet
And fleet fo;ccasts developed by the FAA.
These data Acre used In the environ-
mental and Inflationary tln p .ct Anal , ses
suppoi Ling this regulawry action.
As stated *.g low, compliance wlth this
amenument can be achieved by the
- :a ,stical modification. or ' • retrofit," of
noncomply inq airplanes or through their
teplaccntcnl withcomplying airplanes.
Wulle the cost and benefit tinalyus Ili the
EIS Ind ' ealcs that prolon g ed retention
of certaut aircraft would be unecononucal
due to Increased maintenance and
h i -,her fvrl cost differentials. the replace-
ment p+oihv of Individual of:crators will
depend nn Ihc1r capital 1nVCSl1llent P!ans
and financial capabdity.
It xnopid th"cfo.e be strec%cd. at the
outset, that the purpose of this nm^nd-
ment s not to force the retrofit of older
airplanes. but rather W encoura g e each
opeintor to adopt whatever memo of;
achieving compliance is best suited to
his Inr'i+idual economic situation This
may Imolve acplacemenl of oldc. air-
planes by new teclinclo gy airplanes. the
rctrorituug of his cunrnt fled, a.: 	 ...
Cure of the%c options. however. the FAA
recognizes the advancements In energy
e.71clency. safely. noise reduction, and
engine emissions that Are offered by new
technol ogy nit planes. 'rhLs amendment Is
Intended w encourage Lhe Introduction
of the ueAest reiteration of Airplanes
Into the llcel as soon As pr,,tcticable. To
i naximize the Incentive W 1 ePlace rather
than rcltoLt older airplanes. this nnicud-
ment provides for a carefull y controlled
and lunrted extem%kou of the January 1,
1981, And January 1. 1983, compliance
dates for olieratots who elect to replace
these older atrplanm Ash new nupinnes
that coinlH y w tUa Part 36.
At the duration of the PrMitlent. theSecretary, oil 1, 1976, con-
ducted a public hearing on the need for
slieclal financing measures tc nuure
timely Compliance with tilts amendment,
w1Ui parliculnr cinphaas on the replace-
ment of the older, noWer four -gnomic
airplanes. The Secretary will make a ree-
ommemlitlton to the President by Dc-
ctntber 31. 1976.
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